

# **SCIENTIFIC TEMPER AND ADVAITA VEDĀNTA**

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**SURESHONMESH PRAKASHAN**  
VARANASI

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**Dedicated**  
**to**  
**the sacred and ever inspiring memory**  
**of**  
**Swami Karapatriji Maharaj**  
**and**  
**Professor R. K. Tripathi**

## Foreword

I have read '*Scientific Temper and Advaita Vedānta*' with avid interest. I find the brilliant endeavour of Dr. R. R. Pandey to refute the false notions of unpracticability of Advaita Vedānta in the so called scientific temper-biased modern society. Advaita Vedānta is not for life beyond, its relevance is here and now and the idealistic frame provides an innumerable sets of choices for dealing with human problems as it transcends all dichotomies and gives an incentive for untarnished clean-headed view of things around. Advaita Vedānta takes out 'thingness' from things and charges them with flash of consciousness.

Dr. Pandey has gone deep into the myth of scientific temper. To me scientific temper is not a burden to be carried on one's shoulders, it is an incessant activity of questioning, searching, researching, breaking into finest pieces and reassembling these pieces after having understood properly the relationship which binds these pieces. Advaita Vedānta world view is close to the present day physicists' world view, which goes for wholeness, interrelatedness and complementarity of the physical world. As such Advaita Vedānta is conducive to the development of proper scientific temper. This point has been effectively brought home by Dr. Pandey in this work.



Furthermore, false notions such as Vedānta has brought passiveness in the Indian mind have been forcefully refuted and the active potential of a dispassionate mind has been well underlined.

To conclude I find this book very stimulating. This is a significant positive contribution not only to Indian studies but also to philosophical studies in general.

I congratulate the author for his mature wisdom.

**Vidya Niwas Mishra**

Vice Chancellor

Sampurnanand Sanskrit University

Varanasi

7. 2. 1991

## Preface

The present book is partly atleast the fulfilment of a personal quest which had begun nearly three decades ago when I was initiated into Indian Philosophy as a student at Allahabad University. With the passage of time Vedānta became a passion with me. It was this passion which took me to Germany in 1972 and the two years that I spent at the Universities of Münster and Hamburg in the company of Professors Paul Hacker, Lambert Schmithausen and Albrecht Wezler were extremely fruitful for my intellectual growth. Later, when I joined the Department of Philosophy at the Banaras Hindu University I decided to study Vedānta from some of the most renowned Vedāntins in the holy city of Kashi. Swami Karapatriji Maharaj was then happily in our midst and he graciously agreed to be my guru. It was then that I realized that whatever I knew of Vedānta was hardly more than a few axioms whose full import I was unaware of. I also realized why Swamiji was called Abhinava Śaṅkara of contemporary India and how apposite the honorific was. Swamiji was a realized soul. His mind had been trained in the highest traditions of Indian scholarship and his spirit was in perpetual communion with the Almighty. The mystiques and esotericisms usually associated with Vedānta evaporated when Swamiji gave his discourses. He could relate Vedānta to one's routine behaviour and experiences. He brought metaphysics from its empyrian heights and made it available to his śiṣyas and even laymen. Swamiji is only a memory now and though I do not claim myself to be among his worthy disciples, I humbly offer this book as my homage to his memory. I am conscious of the enormity of my guru-ṛṇa and I am giving what I have received

from him. Between receiving and giving there falls the shadow of my own ignorance. But I feel reassured by the fact that the Guru is great and gracious and is not less pleased by the occasional errors and fumbings of his disciple.

I also studied Vedānta with late Pt. Badari Nath Shukla, a renowned scholar of Navya Nyāya. I had the privilege of discussing philosophy with late Prof. T. R. V. Murti. I express my respectful regards to these two great scholars. Late Prof. R. K. Tripathi converted me into a radical Advaitin. His sacred memory enlightens me even now.

I was lucky to work with Prof. Dr. Lambert Schmithausen of Hamburg University who initiated me into the study of Hermenutics and explained Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī in this light. But for him I would have not learnt philological methodology at all. Prof. Albrecht Wezler of the same University has been equally generous and affectionate to me in discussing Yoga Philosophy. Prof. Paul Hacker was kind enough in discussing some Advaitic and Pauranic text with me. My gratitude to these scholars is more than I can adequately express in words.

My indebtedness to Professor Vidya Niwas Mishra, presently the Kulapati of Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya is too numerous to be satisfactorily acknowledged. He readily agreed to write the foreword. His affection for me has been and shall ever be my strength. Recording my debt to him will be reducing to formality the warmth and goodwill which I get from him as a matter of right.

Professor B. M. Shukla, an eminent scientist and well known educationist is a keen follower of ideas. I am indebted to him for his encouragement in writing this book.

To Prof. ( Mrs. ) L. Saxena, Prof. R. C. Tripathi, Prof. M. Mishra, Dr. D. N. Dwivedi, Dr. S. Mishra, Dr. R. K.

Shukla and Dr. R. L. Singh I owe debts of a more personal nature.

Dr. S. Vijaya Kumar, Reader in Philosophy, B. H. U. read the entire proof of this book. I really value it very much.

My students, Dr. A. D. Sharma, Shri Anand Mishra, Shri Rajaneesh Shukla, Shri Anil Pathak and Shri S. K. Singh, I. A. S. ( Allied ) have helped me in various ways. To them I can only say : Jīvantu śaradah śatam.

I must record my gratitude to the editors of WZKS ( Vienna ), EAST & WEST ( Rome ), Navonmeṣa, Ānvikṣiki, Sandhāna, Journal of Ganganath Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidya-peetha and Research Journal of Faculty of Arts ( B. H. U. 1987 ) for permitting me to reproduce my research articles published by them.

I am grateful to the Chairman and other members of B.H.U. Publications Committee for recommending me Rs. 10,000/ out of the U. G. C. Publication grant for the publication of this monograph.

In the end, however, I alone should be held responsible for the opinions expressed and conclusions drawn in this book. Any errors of judgement and blemishes of style and presentation are entirely mine and I expect that my readers would be generous and forthright in their comments. I assure them that every suggestion will be welcomed and every criticism will be duly considered.

Varanasi  
10. 2. 1991

Rewati Raman Pandey

## Abbreviations

AS	— Āgama Śāstra
AV	— Atharva Veda
BSB	— Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1934
Br. Upa.	— Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad
I. P.	— Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā
I. P. V.	— Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarśinī.
M. K.	— Māṇḍūkyakārikā by Gauḍapāda.
R. V.	— Ṛgveda
P.	— Prakāśānanda
P. H.	— Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam.
P. S.	— Paramārthasāra
SB or SBS	— Śārīrakabhāṣya on Brahmasūtra
SBG	— Śārīrakabhāṣya on the Gītā.
SLS	— Siddhāntaleśasamgraha, Achyutagranthamala, Kashi, Samvat 2011
VSM	— Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī, Culcutta, 1935
TA	— Tantrāloka.

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## Introduction

Since the title of this monograph, 'Scientific Temper and Advaita Vedānta' is striking, it needs at the very outset an explanation. Science, Technology and Scientific Temper are empirical and objective and therefore their scope is limited to the external world but the Advaita Vedānta is transcendental and subjective and, therefore, it is through and through spiritual. The very aim of this monograph is to elucidate that science and technology through their scientific temper can provide *Preyas* (paradise on the earth) to man but they are dumb with regard to *Śreyas* (human emancipation and freedom). That is why, science and technology have converted this earth into heaven, man is in a commanding position, with all facilities and pleasures but he is still restless and frustrated rather miserable. Man cannot hunt peace through *Preyas*-pleasures in the external world. He could realise peace-bliss only through the path of *Śreyas*-spirituality and that is something within and not without. Never before was man in need of spirituality as he is to-day, because he is mad after the miracles of science and technology. When tradition loses its hold, when scepticism prevails, it is philosophy which comes to our aid and gives right direction. It is the *Ātma Vidyā*, *Parā Vidyā*, *Adhyātma Vidyā* which alone can save the human destiny from the twin ghosts of cosmic pollution and nuclear annihilation. There is no other way for salvation ( *nānyaḥ panthā Vidyate ayanāya* ). Therefore, science and technology to-day urgently need the shelter of Advaita Vedānta, and such other spiritual disciplines.

Science and technology are the dominant *zeitgeist* of our age. The whole method and procedure of science is based on



one assumption and that is the orderliness of nature. The two criteria for the scientific truth are logical consistency and agreement with observed data. Thus, science is empirical and objective. The Copernican revolution did not dislodge only the earth from the centre of the universe, as a matter of fact it was man who was dislodged for ever from the centre of the universe. The Galilean-Newtonian revolution completed this task to its logical conclusion and man was thrown out of the universe for ever. In the Newtonian generation the belief in science swiftly became the faith of scientism. The modern scientist did succeed in emancipating man from his belief in the magical powers of supernatural agencies only to get him plunged into equally naive commitment to the magical powers of science. Galileo anticipated this possibility and it was really Descartes, the father of modern Western philosophy who brought it into full and vivid reality. One night Descartes had a vivid dream in which he saw that human mind played no discriminatory part and revealed to the scientist philosopher the foundation of the admirable science. To Descartes from that moment on, space or extension became the fundamental reality, motion the point of all departure and mathematics the language of its revelation. For Descartes nature was 'a machine and nothing but a machine' without any purpose and spiritual significance.

Philosophers and humanists, artists and literateures alike became the students of natural science and frequently its expositors as well. Thus Voltaire took up the interpretation of the master text in his English letters and Elements of the Newtonian philosophy. Rousseau was to have composed a tract on the laws of Chemistry. In the very outset of the century Saint Simon in his first published brochure proclaimed the universal applicability of the law of gravitation to the entire phenomenal world. Thus the cosmic gravitation became

the final explanation of not only physical phenomena but also of human life and activity, of society and politics. It became the tendency of the age to identify one single principle, i. e. the principle of gravitation as underlying the single principle of all reality. It became the science of sciences, physicisism, later physicalism. This religion of science was a faith in the existence of an objective Reason, impersonal and mechanical, harmonious and determinate existing entirely apart from individual man and indifferent to his purposes. If Saint Siman with his fellows in France tried to construct the positive science of society, Jeremy Bentham and his disciples across the channel were engaged in a reconstruction of political and social institutions on the foundations of the Newtonian Universe. The atom and not the human individual was the moving force of the Newtonian Universe.

The convergent influence of Darwin and Newton was so profound that even the top social scientists like Marx and Engels had to preface their volumes on Capital with the words : 'It is the ultimate aim of this work to lay bare-law of modern society'. Engels was equally vocal in his assertion that Marxian dialectics is nothing more than the science of general laws of motion and development of Nature, human society and thought.

It was the profound impact of Newtonian Physics that a galaxy of great psychologists like Watson, Clark L Hall of Yale and B. E. Skinner of Harward did not enrich only behaviourist psychology but they were instrumental for the broader development of behavioural science itself.

The mechanistic Newtonian physics culminated into the emergence of Technological Society in which an autonomous technology is in process of taking over traditional values of every society without exception subverting and suppressing

these values to produce at last a monolithic world culture in which non-technological difference and variety is mere appearance.

Technique or technology is intimately related with concept of machine. Technique certainly began with the machine. Without machine the world of technique could not even be imagined. But technique has now become almost independent of the machine which has lagged far behind its offspring. Our love of machanisation has certainly provided us with unimaginable facilities but this technological civilisation is less than human. This mechanisation has resulted into fast urbanisation in which even small cities are getting every day overpopulated. The concentration of our population in our metropolitan cities is so great that the number of slums is increasing every day with the result that they are badly polluted where even breathing is becoming difficult. Our public transportation is so miserable that man is less important than a parcel; in our hospitals man is only a number. Yet we call this progress.

As machine and technique are intimately related so are science and technique. In our present technical society technique itself has become miraculous, magical and thus, it is occupying the prestigious position of a supernatural agency. Side by side, superstitions and irrational beliefs guide our life. They decide our ceremonies, business dealings, contracts, travels, even daily normal activities. Only one illustration would suffice and it is said that Reagan, the ex-American President used to keep his important meetings, appointments in the light and direction of his personal astrologer, Joan Quigley. Even the C. B. I. had to alert its detectives so that important secret documents of the States are not stolen under the influence of astrologers. Why this obsession with

the supernatural ? Why this submission to the irrational ? Any knowledge which becomes myth, dogma and magic is unscientific whether it is belief in witchcraft or scientism. Cosmologically if geocentric theory was replaced by heliocentric theory, philosophically anthropomorphism of Indo-Greek Philosophy was replaced by mechanomorphism of Newtonian classical physics.

But the physicists have gone far beyond it. The first three decades of the present century changed radically the entire conception of physics. The theory of Relativity and of atomic physics shattered the principal concepts of the classical physics of Newton. The notion of absolute space and time, the elementary solid particles, the causal nature of the universe and the ideal of objectivity of nature : none of these concepts could be applicable to the new physics. The three dimensional space was questioned by the theory of relativity and time was added to it thus replacing it by a four-dimensional continuum, space-time. The unification of space and time and the equivalence of mass and energy have a profound influence on our picture of matter. The energy is associated with activity, and activity is associated with processes and this implies that the nature of subatomic particle is intrinsically dynamic. The relation between the mass and energy is given by the famous equation  $E = mc^2$ ,  $c$  being the speed of light.

The other epoch-making theory of atomic physics is the quantum theory. According to it probability is fundamental feature of the atomic reality which governs all processes and even the existence of matter. At the atomic level the solid material objects of the classical physics dissolve into patterns of the probable. These patterns further do not represent probabilities of the things but rather probabilities of interconnections. Quantum theory thus reveals the basic oneness of universe. This

was the turning point in the contemporary physics. The crucial feature of the quantum theory is that human observer is not only necessary to observe the properties of an atomic phenomenon but is necessary even to bring about its properties. My conscious decision about how to observe, say, an electron will determine the electron's properties to some extent. In other words, the electron does not have properties independent of my mind. In atomic physics the sharp division between the 'I' and the 'world' is no longer valid. We can never speak about nature without at the same time speaking about ourselves. Thus the thing-in-itself or nature or object occupying the central position in the Newtonian Physics has been replaced by the observer, the subject, man himself in the contemporary physics. The contemporary physics compels the physicist to look upon himself, and restore man to his central position. Thus the cycle of the universe which was reversed under the Newtonian physics has once more gone upside down under the contemporary physics, i. e., from anthropomorphism to mechanomorphism and then again from mechanomorphism to anthropomorphism. That's what has been termed as The Turning Point by the author or The Tao of Physics.

Having a lot of science and technology does not mean having a scientific temper. Even the uneducated may have a scientific temper. What is this scientific temper after all ? Normally it is the questioning attitude, inquiring and critical mind. It is fight for reason against unreason, fight for rationality against irrationality, fight against superstitions. It is training in observation, in precision, in objectivity and in a rational habit of mind. Mostly people equate scientific temper with scientific approach and scientific enquiry. It adopts analytical methodology. It has then very little to say about our philosophical and religious truths, our great creations of

human spirits. We cannot peep into the depth of the sublime poetry and dramatic genius of Kālidāsa and Bhavabhūti, Milton and Shakespeare by adopting and following the scientific enquiry. A botanist may dissect a lotus flower into its parts, subparts and into its cells but he cannot appreciate it. Analyse a thing, and life leaves. We murder to dissect. The road to the reality is the vision.

But sometimes, the scientific temper is equated with integral vision, then it transcends the scientific enquiry and scientific methodology. The ultimate aim of man is to realise truth, to appreciate goodness and beauty. The scientific method of objective and analytical enquiry is not applicable to all these and much that is vital to life lies beyond its scope—the sensitiveness to art and poetry, the emotion that beauty produces. For them we need the integral vision.

Now a shift from the world of physics to the world of Metaphysics is to be examined. The history of science is, as a matter of fact, rooted into the history of Western Philosophy. European philosophy is more like a series of revolutions than a smooth progression of ideas. Starting from Thales to Husserl we find these revolutions termed as systems. This series of revolutions or systems is more due to the disagreement in methodology than in substantial doctrine. It was Descartes, the father of modern Western philosophy who proclaimed the criteria of validity as 'clearness' and 'distinctness' but ultimately succumbed to the 'presupposition' of reason as the alpha and omega of knowledge. The Cartesian rationalism was questioned by Locke and other empiricists but they in turn became a victim of another 'presupposition' and declared experience as the alpha and omega of knowledge. It was Kant who declared that rationalism as well as empiricism both are dogmatic philosophy. Kant's critical philosophy did

emancipate Western philosophy from dogmatism but it itself landed into agnosticism. What we have just mentioned as a series of revolutions or systems could be more appropriately termed as a series of 'presuppositions'. It was Husserl, the father of Phenomenology, who following the critical philosophy of Kant declared the ideal of philosophy as 'presuppositionless', dubbed the entire Western philosophy as dogmatic and therefore, naive. The Phenomenology of Husserl culminates in establishing philosophy as a 'Rigorous Science'. He repeatedly attacks psychologism and historicism. His attack on naturalism reveals that all natural sciences accept naturalistic presuppositions, so they are naive. Natural sciences were, as yet, supposed to be the most scientific, rational and objective but Husserl's attack on naturalism resulted in proving them just the opposite, i. e., all natural sciences are most unscientific, irrational and subjective.

The critique of knowledge which Husserl could demonstrate in the twentieth century through his transcendental phenomenology had already been done more lucidly and convincingly in the eighth century by Ācārya Śaṅkara in his celebrated *Adhyāsa Bhāṣya* of *Brahma Sūtras*. The reality of the bewildering mass of phenomenal world is universally accepted as it is given to us in perception. If one questions the reality of this world then by implication perception itself is questioned. Is perception itself false? If so how? This is the challenge before Śaṅkara and he accepts this challenge so boldly that no philosopher in the history of world philosophy could reach to his philosophical genius and his doctrine of *Māyāvāda* is the direct corollary of this challenge. The concept of *Adhyāsa* (doctrine of superimposition) at once explains the phenomenality of the world and nonduality of Brahman. According to Śaṅkara, on the soil of superimposition not only perception but all human knowledge, empirical as well as vedic, stands. Śaṅkara

cannot explain this phenomenal world without the analysis of this natural ignorance. Thus an enquiry about *ajñāna* is phenomenologically an investigation into the naturalistic presuppositions of knowledge or *a priori* conditions of experience. In the following chapters of this little monograph an humble attempt is made to discuss some fundamental issues of Śāṃkara Vedānta as well as post-Śāṃkara Vedānta. This is the first monograph perhaps where to the impact of Ācārya Śāṃkara on Indian Culture and this contemporary relevance of Vedānta have been elucidated. The methodology adopted in most of the chapters is hermeneutical. To-day man is lost in the world. He is not himself. If through this humble attempt he could suspend his natural belief in the external world even for a moment and peep into himself, he would be at peace.





## The Concept of Man, Science-Technology And Scientific Temper

The Chinese have a saying that when elephants fight ( or make love ) it is the grass that suffers. When Reagan and Gorbachov, singly or as a pair, make a move, the earth trembles—Whether it is a competition between the two about the excellence of super missiles or star wars, it is notional in one sense. The super-power that can kill twenty-five times is somehow better than a superpower that can kill only twenty-four times. It is bad enough with the two super-powers. What would happen if there are more ? In time China would be a super-power adding : 'With India scratching at the door'. The world would then be in a state of rigor mortis or at least muscle-bound; for the irony of super-power equation is that the stronger you are the less flexible you become. That is the prospect. Four nations bulging with muscles, unable to move a limb.<sup>1</sup> It is so obvious that the BIG-2 have just met at two-day summit at Geneva without any concrete outcome.

Even without the threat of nuclear catastrophe the global ecosystem and the further evolution of life on the earth are seriously endangered and may well end in a large scale ecological disaster. Our technology does not seem to be of any help. We can control the soft-landings of our space-crafts on distant planets but we are not in a position to control the polluting fumes of our autoes and factories.

Under the circumstances the basic issue is no longer the victory of this or that nation, of this group or that group, this or that religion or ideology. It is survival or suicide of man. It is a time of decision, not despair. The choice is bet-

ween extinction and brotherhood. This leads us to the most crucial point to understand man, to rediscover the power of the spirit in him, and let us make an attempt to redefine him in the light of science and technology.

What is after all the essence of man ? Its essence cannot be denied. There is something by virtue of which man is man. But this is the traditional view of man. This view of man has been questioned by the increasing emphasis given to the historical approaches. If the history of humanity is examined we find it almost impossible to have in common that 'essence' which could be called 'human nature', in every historical epoch. Whether it is cultural anthropology or Darwinian biology or Modern physics all these disciplines agree and have demonstrated that the physical world also evolves and changes. Then the essence of man, the phenomenon of a fixed human nature has been also questioned due to one or more factors. Should we conclude that there is no human nature at all ? If there is no such human nature, no essence, common to all men what is that through which we claim the great ideal of unity of all men ? If so, the very concept of humanity will crumble down. All the sciences dealing with the subject matter of man, like psychology and anthropology will become meaningless. Thus, either we accept the fixed human nature, the essence of man or the relativistic one that leads to the conclusion that man shares with other men only his anatomy and physiology.

The concept of nature or essence of man may be differentiated from certain attributes common to all man yet which in themselves may not constitute full nature or essence of man. The nature or essence of man may comprise all these attributes or even more but these attributes do follow from the nature or essence of man.

Out of these essential attributes the Greek philosophers, rationalists and Kant opted reason and defined man as rational being. They did not deny the irrationality or animality of man rather accepted it to be the basic as abundantly so obvious in Plato, Greek Dramatists, Dante, Shakespeare, Dostoevski and many others but it could be successfully demonstrated by only Freud. Freud declared that man fundamentally is irrational and his rationality is only apparent and superficial.

Another definition of man is that he is a social being zoon politician. While this definition of man as a social being can hardly be questioned, it is rather very general, telling us little about human nature except that he is a herd animal rather than a solitary animal.

Yet another definition of man is that he is homo faber or man is the animal that can produce. Here Marx makes a distinction between the animal faber and the homo faber : the animal produces instinctively; man produces by reason and he evolves a plan in his mind beforehand. There is yet more difference between the two so far as the producing aspect is concerned. Man is a tool-making producer. By the power of his mind he produces tools and thereby he has extended his capacity of body and mind and thus has harnessed energy of various types and has been able to replace human body by robot and human mind by super computers.

Finally, man has been also defined as symbol-making animal. By symbolising man has been able to create words and thereby languages through which he has been able to communicate with others smoothly and efficiently. It is through the singular facility of language that man has been successful to establish his superiority over other creatures and his

super achievements in the fields of religion, philosophy, culture, science and technology are rooted into language.

Thus, the above mentioned attributes of man—reason, the capacity for making social organisation, the capacity for production, and the capacity for symbolising are indeed, essential attributes of man but they are only general human potentialities and may not constitute what could be termed as the 'human-nature'.

Recently, some philosophers have applied historical approach in defining man and thus maintain that man is historic and temporal. In this group of philosophers some may be mentioned by name, Marx, William James, Bergson and Teilhard. If this definition is accepted, we cannot talk of a 'human nature', of an 'essence of man'. Man is no longer rational; he is no longer social; he is no longer religious; instead he *becomes* rational; he *becomes* social; he *becomes* religious.

The existentialists denied the essence of man while defining him. According to them man is existence; existence precedes essence. Every thing else has essence but man has no essence at all. He is existence.

The problem of the definition of human nature may be more conveniently understood by the mathematical idea of 'constants', and 'variables'. By this illustration one may say that in man since he is born, there is something that remains one and the same, and this may be termed as 'human nature', but within man there are number of variables that make him capable of novelty, creativity, productivity and progress. Spinoza was not far from this idea when he said that within our being there is a *connatus* ( force ) that maintains us in our being. Marx also tries to differentiate between the constant and the variable when he talks of 'human nature in

general', and 'human nature as modified in each historical epoch'.<sup>2</sup> Freud also deals with a model of human nature. He also tries to make a distinction between the constant and the variable when he talks of conflict between the ego and the id, the life instinct and the death instinct.<sup>3</sup>

Erich Fromm has beautifully defined the human nature as 'questions', and not the 'answers', as the essence of man.<sup>4</sup> He is a 'freak of nature', being in nature and at the same time transcending it. These contradictions create conflict and fight and thus he finds himself in a dis-equilibrium which he must solve in order to achieve a better equilibrium. The entire history of humanity is a process of search after better equilibrium. The present achievements of man in the fields of philosophy, religion, culture and science including technology is the result of search after a better equilibrium.

By above deliberations we may conclude that though man is not wholly definable but what we have termed his 'essential attributes' can give us an approximate and rather appropriate approach, which could be called the nature of man. The human nature is only a principle but also a capacity. The capacity to become aware, to give account of himself and of his existential situation. This capacity is fundamentally his nature.<sup>5</sup> Further Erich Fromm holds, 'This is what many of the great philosophers, mystics and theologians of the east and the west have believed. For all of them there is within man a spiritual reality that is born, precisely because he can know himself and others, and that is a part of life itself.'<sup>6</sup>

Despite their best intentions Erich Fromm and R. Xirau could only approximately define the essence of man. It is the Vedānta of Śaṅkara which is the culmination of Vedic Philosophy which gives a true picture of human nature. I wonder if there is any other parallel in the history of human thought to

the glorification of the concept of man as it is depicted in the *Puruṣa Sūkta* of the *R̥g Veda*. The *Sūkta* maintains, 'This is all the *Puruṣa*, whatever had been and whatever will be. He lords over immortality. Such is his greatness, and the *Puruṣa* is greater than that; the whole world is one quarter of His and the three quarters of His, the immortal, is in the heaven'.<sup>7</sup> The same idea has been again emphasised in the *Upaniṣads*. The *Kāthopaniṣad* declares, *Puruṣānna param kiñcid sā kāṣṭhā sā parā gatiḥ*'. There is nothing beyond the *Puruṣa*, that is the ultimate limit and that is the ultimate state. This concept of *Puruṣa* ultimately takes the form of the *Brahmavāda* of *Śaṅkara*. What is the nature of this Person ? The same *Upaniṣad* has beautifully defined the nature of *Puruṣa* : '*Tameva bhāntamanubhāti sarvam tasya bhāsā sarvamidam vibhāti*'. It is of the nature of consciousness. The consciousness is the Absolute : *Ekamevādvitīyam*, it is one and non-dual and as such it is the Freedom itself. Because it is Freedom itself it is the summum bonum, *tatra ko śokaḥ kaḥ mohaḥ ekatvamanuṣāyataḥ*, *kṣīyantecāśya karmāṇi tasmin dr̥ṣṭe parāvare*. Kant says that man is an end in himself. For *Śaṅkara* it is not an end rather it is the sovereign end and the only end. This is the *Ātma-lābha*, self-realisation; The *Bhagavadgītā* declares : *Yam labdhvā cāparam lābham manyate nādhikam tataḥ* ( 6.22 ). That is the highest achievement. This is the *Ātma-darśana* in everything. The *Bhagavadgītā* declares : '*Sarvabhūtasthamātmānam sarvabhūtāni cātmani* ( 6.29 ), His own self dwelling within all being, all beings within his own self. This is the state of complete identity. This is the most consistent form of Absolutism. It is the all-embracing Absolute. There remains no difference, '*nāsti bhedaḥ kathañcana*.' It is Me everywhere. The *Gītā* is so consistent on this point : *Yo mām paśyati sarvatra sarvam ca mayi paśyati* ( 6.30 ). It is the I everywhere and everything in me. This is the spiritual

idealism or humanism of the Vedānta of Śaṅkara. Man occupies the central position in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara. He is not an object in the commonwealth of objects. Man is essentially the supreme Reality, Brahman who is identical with his soul. A higher position than this could not be attained by man. The Vedānta of Śaṅkara establishes not only the unity of man with other men and other living beings but also with the supreme reality of the universe or Brahman : The Reality within and without is one and the same. This supreme state of man is not a matter of philosophical speculation or faith only, it is something which can be tested, experienced and lived here and now'.<sup>8</sup> The Absolute, the Tat, the That is Tvam, thou. That thou art. That is parokṣa. I do not know him directly. But I know myself directly. None can deny this fact as it is pratibodhaviditam. It reveals itself in every mode of knowledge. Kant, Feuerbach, Marx and Freud do talk of autonomy and freedom of man but on deeper analysis we find that the freedom of Marx and Freud is superficial, because while Marx is economic determinist Freud is libido-determinist. Sartre does talk of human freedom and human dignity, but the existential freedom of Sartre is only anguished freedom. Is not anguished freedom contradiction in terms ? Who would aspire for such a condemned freedom ?

The Advaitic 'Bhāsā', the Kāśmīra Saivite 'Bhārūpatā', the Śūnyata of Mādhyamika Philosophy and the Bodhi of the Vijñānavādins with their zigzag or direct approaches ultimately lead to the highest state, i. e. the salvation, emancipation or Freedom. None can deny their difference in approaches, i. e. the means of realisation of the Absolute and their different terminologies for the ultimate state. Thus whether it is the Aparokṣānubhūti of the Advaita Vedānta, or the Pratyabhijñā of Kāśmīra Śaivism or the Śūnyatā of the Mādhyamikas or

the Bodhi of the Vijñānavādins the import of all these is one and the same, i. e. the Freedom. The difference of approaches is due to the difference of temperaments of the followers of a particular discipline.

K. C. Bhattacharya has beautifully defined the nature of subject as absolute freedom; 'I am never positively conscious of my present individuality, being conscious of it only as what is or can be outgrown, only as I feel freeing myself from it and am free to the extent implied by such feeling. I do not know myself as free but I conceive that I can free successively as body from the perceived object, as presentation from the body as feeling from presentation and as introspective function from feeling. I am not introspectively aware of my actual introspective individuality but I am aware in my introspection into feeling that the self from which the feeling is distinguished may not actually introspect and may not even possibly introspect, that the individual as it is as introspecting—individual or distinct freedom without being, it may be free even from this distinctness, may be freedom itself that is de-individualised but not therefore indefinite—absolute freedom that is to be evident'.<sup>9</sup>

So far as the problem of human interrelatedness or intersubjectivity is concerned, which has become a very popular theme of the contemporary western philosophy, it is no more a complex problem for the Vedānta of Śaṅkara as it holds within and without only one consciousness, one and nondual, Absolute Brahman. Husserl postulates the existence of the other as an alter ego another 'I' that I can reach and understand through analogy. Max Scheler tried to establish the source of communication in sympathy and love. As Heidegger maintains that man is not only a being-in-the-world, ( *in-der-Welt Sein* ) but he is essentially a being with the others.



( Mitsein ); thus there is distance between man and man. M. Ponty shares the view of Heidegger. Sartre is on the other extreme and holds that communication between man and man is not possible. In this connection Śrī Aurobindo's remarks are quite meaningful : 'A spiritual society would live like its spiritual individuals, not in the ego, but in the spirit, not as the collective ego, but as the collective soul. This freedom from the egoistic standpoint would be its first and most prominent characteristic. But the elimination of egoism would not be brought about, as it is now proposed to bring it about, by persuading or forcing the individual to immolate his personal will and aspirations and his precious and hard-won individuality to the collective will, aims and egoism of the society, driving him like a victim of ancient sacrifice to slay his soul on the altar of that huge and shapeless idol. For that would be only the sacrifice of the smaller to the larger egoism, large enough only in bulk, not necessarily or wider or nobler, since a collective egoism, result of the united egoisms of all is as little a god to be worshipped as flawed and often an uglier and more barbarous fetish than egoism of the individual. What the spiritual man seeks is to find by the loss of the ego the self which is one in all and perfect and complete in each and by living in that to grow into the image of its perfection-individually, be it noted, though with an all-embracing universality of his nature and its conscious circumference. It is said in the old Indian writings that while in the second age, the age of Power, Vishṇu descends in the King, and in the third, the age of balance, as the legislator or codifier, in the age of Truth he descends as Yajña, that is to say, as the Master of works manifest in the hearts of his creatures. It is this kingdom of God within, the result of the finding of God not in a distant heaven but within ourselves, of which the state of society in an age of the Truth, spiritual age, would be the result and the external

figure'.<sup>10</sup> A similar idea we find in the writings of Laski as a contemporary thinker illustrates him so well. 'When nations and communities make spiritual culture, as distinguished from wealth and power, the main object of collective pursuits, then they would not find it difficult to surrender part of their sovereignties to an International Body, which, according to Prof. Laski is a condition indispensable for the establishment of an effective world-order'.<sup>11</sup> Thus a humanist is not the multi-dimensional man as conceived by some scholars.<sup>12</sup> Even animals are not multi-dimensional. Multi-dimensionality of man cannot be denied but it is the spirit, the pure consciousness, the Prajñā which has the capacity to transcend all differences and ultimately establish the ideal of unity. It is the spiritual idealism, or spiritual culture where humanism realises its basic essence. Spiritual idealism is a universal phenomenon but in different cultures it assumes different forms and is given different degrees of importance....The spirit is its own ideal or, in a different terminology, there is no ideal higher than man.<sup>13</sup> Faquir Chand ji Maharaj is a spiritual humanist as he maintains that I am a bubble of supermost consciousness. Due to this egoism we consider ourselves as Americans, or Indians, Sikhs or Hindus, Christian or Jews. This is all egoism. This is called Māyā ( illusion ) in our Indian Philosophy. This egoism has created nations and troubles for the mankind.<sup>14</sup> Again Param Dayal Faquir Chand Ji Maharaj says : 'Everyone is not lucky to attain liberation. First of all—Be-a-Man, follow the path for self-realisation by detaching your self from body, mind and soul. Thereafter you shall qualify to follow the Path of attaining the liberation'.<sup>15</sup> Tagore is of the same view : 'For Reality is the truth of Man, who belongs to all times, and any individualistic madness of men against Man cannot thrive for long'.<sup>16</sup> Thus Mahābhārata declares that there is nothing higher than man on the earth, na mān-

uṣātsreṣṭhātaram hi kiñcit. In this context the remark of Radhakrishnan is beautiful : 'We must have faith in the spirit of man, the spirit capable of suffering and compassion, of endurance and sacrifice, the spirit which has inspired human progress all these centuries.'<sup>17</sup>

One of the most important features of Hinduism is the theory of Karma. This life is due to the karmas of the past life, and the future life will depend on the karmas of this life. Only man and man alone has got the freedom of karma, all other species are only the Bhoga species. Thus man occupies the most dignified position in the entire creation. Unlike the semitic religion he does not depend on the will and grace of God for his salvation.

Indian philosophy as well as the Greek philosophy has been charged that they are anthropomorphic. It's true. They are anthropomorphic. It is complimentary. It is man who occupies the central position. Not only this, the Hindu philosophy holds that each and every particle is presided over by a deity which is following the remark of Capra is pregnant with meaning : 'This abundance of goddesses shows again that in Hinduism the physical and sensuous side of human nature which has always been associated with the female, is a fully integrated part of the Divine. Hindu goddesses are not shown as holy virgins, but in sensual embrace of stunning beauty.....The Western mind is easily confused by the fabulous number of gods and goddesses which populate Hindu mythology in their various appearances and incarnations. To understand how the Hindu can cope with this multitude of divinities, we must be aware of the basic attitude of Hinduism that in substance all these divinities are identical. They are all manifestations of the same divine reality, reflecting different aspects of the infinite omnipresent and ultimately in-comprehensible Brahman'.<sup>18</sup>

So far we examined the nature of man. Now an attempt would be made to examine the status of man in the light of science and technology. Science and technology are the dominant *zutgeist* of our age. The whole method and procedure of science is based on one assumption and that is the orderliness of nature. The two criteria for the scientific truth are logical consistency and agreement with observed data. Thus science is empirical and objective. The Copernican revolution did not dislodge only the earth from the centre of the universe, as a matter of fact it was man who was dislodged for ever from the centre of the universe. The Galilean-Newtonian revolution completed this task to its logical conclusion and man was thrown out of the universe for ever. In the Newtonian generation the belief in science swiftly became the faith of scientism ....the magical concept of science as omniscient and omnipotent. The modern scientist did succeed in emancipating man from his belief in the magical powers of supernatural agencies only to get him plunged into equally naive commitment to the magical powers of science. Galileo anticipated this possibility and it was really Descartes, the father of modern Western philosophy, who had the fateful dream bringing it into full and vivid reality. On a November night in the year 1619 Descartes had a vivid dream in which he saw that human mind played no part and revealed to the scientist philosopher the foundation of the admirable science, ( *mirabilis scientia fundamenta.* ).<sup>19</sup> To Descartes from that moment on, space or extension became the fundamental reality, motion the point of all departure, and mathematics the language of its revelation. Descartes had made of nature as J. H. Randall has put, 'a machine and nothing but a machine': purpose and spiritual significance had alike been banished....Intoxicated by his success, he boasted, 'give me extension and motion and I will construct the universe.'<sup>20</sup>

Philosophers and humanists, artists and litterateurs alike became the students of natural science and frequently its expositors as well. Thus Voltaire took up the interpretation of the master text in his English letters and *Elements of the Newtonian philosophy*. Rousseau was to have composed a tract on the laws of Chemistry. Didvot wrote at length on the elements of Physiology and Montesquie's early work was involved with physical and physiological problems. In the course of the nineteenth century the systematic projection into the human studies of the spirit and method of Newtonian physics was carried to its extreme in nearly every direction. The two fundamental postulates of the scientific mechanist—those of neutral objectivity and analytic reductionism—came to be reflected with toying degree of accuracy in many of the most influential social themes of the period. In the very outset of the century Saint Simon in his first published brochure proclaimed the universal applicability of the law of gravitation to the entire phenomenal world. 'Universal gravity is the sole cause of all physical and moral phenomena'.<sup>21</sup> Thus the cosmic gravitation became the final explanation of not only physical phenomena but also of human life and activity, of society and politics. It became the tendency of the age to identify one single principle, i. e. the principle of gravitation as underlying single principle of all reality. It became the science of sciences, physicism, later physicalism. From it with perfect logic and accuracy all the special sciences including those of man and society could be successively unravelled. This religion of science was a faith in the existence of an objective Reason, impersonal and mechanical, harmonious and determinate existing entirely apart from individual man and indifferent to his purposes. If Saint Simon with his fellows in France tried to construct the positive science of society, Jeremy Bentham and his disciples across the channel were

engaged in a reconstruction of political and social institutions on the foundations of the Newtonian Universe. The atom and not the human individual was the moving force of the Newtonian universe, the instrumental factor, the only significant reality was the evolving mechanism of nature.

The convergent influence of Darwin and Newton was so profound that even the top social scientists like Marx and Engels had to preface their volumes on Capital with the words: "It is the ultimate aim of this work to lay bare—law of motion to modern society. Engels was equally vocal in his assertion that Marxian dialectics is nothing more than the science of general laws of motion and development of Nature, human society and thought.

How the Newtonian mechanistic conception of the universe influenced the entire social studies is obvious by the following remark : The acceptance of living beings as mechanics, the domination of the modern world by technology and the mechanization of mankind are but the extension and practical application of the mechanistic conception of physics.<sup>22</sup>

In the direct line of descent from the doctrine of Watson Clark L. Hall of Yale and B. E. Skinner of Harvard whose contribution not only to behaviourist psychology but to the broader development of behavioural science deserves particular attention.

The mechanistic newtonian physics culminated into the emergence of Technological Society in which an autonomous technology is in process of taking over the traditional values of every society without exception, subverting and suppressing these values to produce at last a monolithic world culture in which all non-technological difference and variety is mere appearance.

Technique or technology forces us to think of machine as both the concepts are intimately related. Technique certainly began with the machine. It is equally true that all the rest developed out of mechanics. It is also true that without machine the world of technique would not exist. But technique has now become almost completely independent of the machine which has lagged far behind its offspring. It is said that the machine has created an inhuman atmosphere. The remark of Jaques Ellul is very pertinent : 'Men now live in conditions that are less than human. Consider the concentration of our great cities, the slums, the lack of space, of air, of time, the gloomy streets and the sallow lights that confuse night and day. Think of our dehumanized factories, our unsatisfied senses, our working women, our estrangement from nature. Life in such an environment has no meaning. Consider our public transportation, in which man is less important than a parcel; our hospitals, in which he is only a number. Yet we call this progress.... And the noise, that monster into us at every hour of the night without respite.'<sup>2 3</sup>

At present technique has penetrated into the very inner self of man and thus it ceases to be external to him. It has absorbed him. In this respect, technique is radically different from the machine. It is in this sense that technique has become autonomous.

As machine and technique are intimately related so are science and technique. As technique has superseded machine so has scientific activity been superseded by technical activity to such a degree that we can no longer conceive science without its technical outcome.

A sketch of the technical society has been drawn in which technique itself has become miraculous, magical and thus is occupying the prestige and position of supernatural agency.

Side by side superstitions and irrational beliefs guide our life. They decide our ceremonies, business dealings, contracts, travels even daily normal activities. Why this obsession with the supernatural? Why this submission to the irrational? 'Practices such as dowry and bride-burning are rampant. So are customs such as child carriage, even though they are illegal. Hardly ever is the culprit punished even when we know who he is—for the culprit usually have access to power. What makes the privileged so arrogant that they may break the law with impunity'.<sup>24</sup> Have not our great men warned us against dogmas, superstitions and irrational beliefs? Any knowledge which becomes myth, dogma and magic is unscientific whether it is belief in witchcraft or scientism.

But the physicists have gone far beyond it. The new conception of the universe that has emerged from modern physics does not mean that Newtonian physics is wrong or that our current theories are right. We have come to realise in modern science that all our theories are approximations to the true nature of things. Each theory is solid for a certain range of phenomena. Beyond this range it no longer gives us satisfactory description of nature and new theories have to be found to replace it or better to extend it improving the approximation.

The first three decades of the present century changed radically the entire conception of physics. The theory of Relativity and of atomic physics shattered the principal concepts of the classical physics of Newton. The notion of absolute space and time, the elementary solid particles, the causal nature of the universe and the ideal of objectivity of nature none of these concepts could be applicable to the new physics.

The theory of relativity questioned the conception of three dimensional space. Time was added into the conception of



three-dimensional space to form a four-dimensional continuum, 'space-time'. In relativity theory we can not talk about space without talking about time and vice versa. According to it the mass is nothing but a form of energy; that even an object at rest has energy stored in its mass. Thus the unification of space and time and the equivalence of mass and energy have a profound influence on our picture of matter. Energy is associated with activity; and activity is associated with processes and this implies that the nature of subatomic particle is intrinsically dynamic. The relation between the mass and energy is given by the famous equation  $E = mc^2$ ,  $c$  being the speed of light.<sup>25</sup>

The other epoch making theory of atomic Physics is the quantum theory. According to it probability is fundamental feature of the atomic reality which governs all processes and even the existence of matter. Subatomic particles do not exist with certainty. At the atomic level the solid material objects of the classical Physics dissolve into patterns of probable. These patterns further do not represent probabilities of things but rather probabilities of interconnections. Quantum theory thus reveals a basic oneness of the universe. It shows that we cannot divide the world into independently existing small units. The crucial feature of the quantum theory is that the human observer is not only necessary to observe the properties of an atomic phenomenon but is necessary even to bring about their properties. My conscious decision about how to observe, say an electron will determine the electron's properties to some extent. In other words, the electron does not have properties independent of my mind. In atomic physics the sharp split between mind and matter, between the I and the world is no longer valid. We can never speak about nature without at the same time speaking

about ourselves. Here again we find a radical shift so far as the focus of scientific explanation is concerned. It is not the thing-in-itself, or nature or object. It is the observer, the subject, man himself : The contemporary physics compels the physicist to look upon himself.<sup>26</sup> The author of the uncertainty principle has lucidly described the new perspective : We can no longer consider in themselves', those buildingstones of matter which we originally held to be the last objective reality. This is so because they defy all forms of objective location in space and time and since basically it is always our knowledge of these particles alone which we can make the object of science....From the very start we are involved in the argument between nature and man in which science plays only a part, so that common division of the world into subject and object, inner world and outer world, is no longer adequate and leads us into difficulties. Thus even in science the object of research is no longer nature itself but man's investigation of nature. Here, again, man confronts himself alone.<sup>27</sup> If we make a general survey of the entire theme we may conclude that it was man who occupied the central position in the Greek philosophy as well as in Indian philosophy but the Newtonian physics threw man out of the universe and he was made a machine. But the contemporary physics has once more restored man to his central position. F. Capra has nicely remarked : 'In modern Physics, the universe is thus experience as a dynamic, inseperable whole which always includes the observer in an essential way.'<sup>28</sup> Thus the cycle of the universe is from anthropomorphism to mechanomorphism and then again, from mechanomorphism to anthropomorphism. The dislodged man is restored to his position by the new Physics. Not only this, the dynamic nature of the object has been established as a scientific fact, that matter has intrinsic property of motion. F. Capra holds that the follow-

ing Upaniṣadic verse is the most appropriate explanation of the dynamism of the universe :

He who, dwelling in all things,  
Yet is other than all things,  
Whom all things do not know,  
Whose body all things are,  
Who controls all things from within—  
He is your soul, the inner Controller,  
The Immortal.<sup>29</sup>

The American physicist is convinced that the above-mentioned Upaniṣadic passage and the like provide a consistent and relevant philosophical background to the theories of contemporary science. Concluding the first part of the preface of *The Tao of Physics*, F. Capra remarks : It is interesting and perhaps not too surprising, that those who are attracted by Eastern mysticism, who consult the I Ching and practice Yoga or other forms of meditation in general have a marked anti-scientific attitude. They tend to see science and physics in particular, as an unimaginative narrowminded discipline, which is responsible for all the evils of modern technology.<sup>30</sup>

Obsessed with the facility of contemporary science and technology man has become, indeed, superman with super human power at his command but at the same time it is the greatest paradox rather the greatest betrayal of the human spirit that the more he is being blessed with super-human powers he is becoming more and more a poor man, thus more and more inhuman, this would lead to the ultimate destruction of humanity. There is no other way for salvation, only the Cosmic Divinity can save humanity from its total annihilation ( *Tamevaviditvātimṛtyumeti nānyaḥ panthā vidyate ayanāya* ).

Having a lot of technology does not mean having a scientific temper. Even the uneducated may have a scientific temper. What is this scientific temper at all ? It is the questioning attitude, inquiring and critical mind. It is elertness and open-mindedness. It is always posing the question *why*. Nothing is taken for granted. Every thing must be well tested. Any problem is well dissected and analysed. It is fight for reason against unreason, fight for rationality against irrationality, fight against superstitions. The scientific temper is the temper of free man. Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru's remark in this connection is very appropriate : 'It is scientific approach, the adventurous and yet critical temper of science, the search for truth and new knowledge, the refusal to accept anything without testing and trial, the capacity to change previous conclusions in the face of new evidence, the reliance on observed fact and not on preconceived theory, the hard discipline of mine—all this is necessary.....The scientific approach and temper are, or should be, a way of life, a process of thinking, a method of acting and associating with our fellowmen'.<sup>31</sup> The scientific temper is to ascertain facts, to grasp them accurately, and to find explanation for them. It is a training in observation, in precision, in objectivity and in a rational habit of mind. Reason is the chief constituent of scientific temper. Sri Aurobindo's remark is very pertinent : 'Reason on the other hand, exists for the sake of knowledge, can prevent itself from being carried away by the action can stand back from it, intelligently study, accept, refuse, modify, alter, improve, combine and recombine the workings and capacities of the forces in operation, can repress here, indulge there, strive towards an intelligent, intelligible, willed and organised perfection. Reason is science, it is conscious art, it is invention. It is the idea and its fulfilment, the ideal and its bringing to fruition. It can look through the immediate appearance and unveil the hidden truths

behind it.....Therefore it is a sovereign power by which man has become possessed of himself, student and master of his own forces.'<sup>32</sup>

The scientific temper consists in rational analysis and logical consistency. Its nature has been beautifully depicted by a Vedāntin : 'Yuktiyuktam vaco grāhyam bālādapi śukādapi, yuktihinam vacastyājyam briddhādapi śukādapi', i. e. if a statement is made even by a child or even by a parrot, if it is logically consistent, it is desirable to accept it. But if it lacks logical consistency it should be rejected even if it is made by a great man or even by Śukadeva himself. Our great poet, Kālidāsa maintains the same scientific spirit when he declares in his famous drama *Mālavikāgnimitram* :

'Purāṇamityeva na sādhu sarvam na cāpi kāvyam navam-ityavadyam.

Santaḥ parikṣanyatarād bhajante mūḍhaḥ para pratyaya-neyabuddhiḥ'.

If there is conflict between mythology and poetry or between tradition and modernity the ultimate criterion is a critical examination.

Gautam the Buddha is equally emphatic on this point :

Believe nothing,  
merely because you have been told of it  
Or because it is traditional  
Or because you yourself have imagined it  
Do not believe what your teacher tells you  
merely out of respect for the teacher  
But whatever after due examination and analysis  
You find to be conducive to the good the benefit,  
the welfare of all beings,  
that doctrine believe and cling to,  
and take it as your guide.

Thus the scientific approach is all right. But it has its own limitations. There are other aspects of human life that are beyond scientific enquiry. The main tool of scientific enquiry is reason. Reason cannot arrive at any final truth because it can neither get to the roots of things nor embrace the totality of their secrets, as it deals only with the finite, the separate, the limited and thus cannot grasp the infinite. It is because of this limitation of reason that Ācārya Śaṅkara supporting śruti dubs reason as unfounded :

‘Yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha’, *Chāndogya Upa.*

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‘Naiṣā tarkeṇa matirāpaneya’, *Kaṭha Upa.* I. 2. 9.

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‘Tarkapratiṣṭhānāt’, Śāriraka Bhāṣya on *Brahmasūtra*, 2.1.11.

The scientific enquiry has very little to say about our philosophical and religious truths, our great creations of human spirit. When we read Kālidāsa, Homer, Milton, Bhavabhūti or Shakespeare, listen classical Indian or Western music or see the immortal sculptures and paintings like Pieta, Mona Lisa, scientific temper fails to throw light on these pieces of art and culture. We find it dumb when it has to estimate our loves and joys, sorrows and sufferings. It cannot appreciate the sublime beauty of Śakuntalā of Kālidāsa nor can it feel the pathos of Rāma of Bhavabhūti.

Another limitation of scientific enquiry is that it is not human. The human world is entirely different from that of material world. Material world is the world of cells, elements and atoms. Through the method of analysis we can analyse even atom into different constituents like electron, proton, neutron etc. but through this analysis we cannot appreciate

the beauty of a lotus flower. A scientist can analyse the sound waves in their subtler constituents but he cannot appreciate a symphony of Beethoven. Analyse a thing, and the life leaves, we murder to dissect. Analysis misses life, reality, imagination and the sense of whole. Road to the reality is the road of vision. The penalty of not using the road is to miss reality. Through analysis we may understand all about the sun, all about the atmosphere and all about the radiation of the earth, still we may miss the radiance of sunrise and the twilight of sunset. Both forms of knowledge are real but the second is more profound, because it belongs to 'the deeper intuitions of the human spirit' as Whitehead calls it. 'R̥sayo tu mantra draṣṭārah,' our R̥sis were visionaries. The *Kaṭhōpaniṣad* very appropriately declares : 'Dṛṣyate tvagryayā buddhyā sūkṣmayā sūkṣmadarsibhiḥ'. I. 3. 12.

The another danger of scientific enquiry is that it destroys our sense of wonder, 'wonder possesses me as I see' is a recurring phrase of Homer. Could it appreciate the ecstasy of a mystic, Kabira ? or devotional love of a Radha or a Mira ? Never !

In so far as the scientific enquiry is a training in observation, in precision, in objectivity and in a rational habit of mind a rationalist is supported by two kinds of faith, the first that his own reason is right and the reason of others who differ from him is wrong and secondly that whatever may be the present deficiencies of the human intellect, the collective human reason will eventually arrive at purity and be able to found human thought and life securely on a clear rational basis entirely satisfying to the intelligence. It is therefore with the temper of science, allied to philosophy, and with reverence for all that lies beyond, that we must face life. Only then we can develop an integral vision of life which embraces in its

wide scope the past and the present, with all their heights and depths, and looks with serenity towards the future.<sup>33</sup> Could a civilization survive without its artists. It is they, the great geniuses of art who make a civilization immortal. Remarks of W. M. Dixon are beautiful : 'The centuries pass, the generations come and go but in each there springs up once more a passion for the past and all its lovely creations. Though we are gone, Persephone will still gather her flowers in sicilian Enna, Faust will brood eternally among his books, Hamlet will never cease to ponder the mysteries on the battlements of Elsinore'.<sup>34</sup>

By scientific temper Pt. Nehru means an integral vision of life : 'Science deals with the domain of positive knowledge but the temper which it should produce goes beyond that domain. The ultimate purpose of man may be said to gain knowledge, to realise truth, to appreciate goodness and beauty. The scientific method of objective enquiry is not applicable to all these and much that is vital in life, seems to lie beyond its scope—the sensitiveness to art and poetry, the emotion that beauty produces, the inner recognition of goodness. The botanist and zoologist may never experience the charm and beauty of nature; the sociologist may be wholly lacking in love for humanity. But even when we go to the regions beyond the reach of the scientific method and visit the mountain tops where philosophy dwells and high emotions fill us or gaze at the immensely beyond, that approach and temper are still necessary.'<sup>35</sup>

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## Adhyāsa : A Priori Condition of Experience

Why does Śaṅkara begin with Adhyāsa without any apology to his *Sārīraka Bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa ? Padmapāda, the Pañcapādikākāra<sup>1</sup> on the *Sārīraka Bhāṣya* does provide an apology why after all Śaṅkara has done so. It is the *Brahma-jñāna* which removes ignorance. It means that there is already Adhyāsa or ignorance. But the reality of this *nāmarūpātmaka-jagat* is universally accepted, as it is *pratyakṣagocara*. If one questions the reality of this world, by implication *pratyakṣa* itself is questioned ? Is *pratyakṣa* itself false ? If so how ?

This is the challenge before Śaṅkara and he accepts this challenge so boldly that no philosopher in the history of world philosophy could reach his philosophical height and his *Māyāvāda* is the direct corollary of this challenge. Śaṅkara does prove the ultimate unreality of this world. This has been done by him in his discussion on the concept of Adhyāsa.

Śaṅkara opens his celebrated commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* with an elaborate discussion of the nature of Adhyāsa. The concept of Adhyāsa at once explains the phenomenality of the world and the nonduality of Brahman. Śaṅkara holds that the *asmad pratyaya* and *yuṣmad pratyaya*, i.e the subject and object are opposed to each other like light and darkness.<sup>2</sup> Adhyāsa is attributing of the subject and its aspects to the object and its aspects and vice versa. It is thus coupling of the real and unreal. Śaṅkara maintains that in spite of this, it is on the part of man a natural procedure ( *naisargikoyam lokavyavahārah* ).<sup>3</sup> Śaṅkara defines Adhyāsa very precisely :

'The apparent presentation in the form of remembrance to consciousness of something previously observed in some other thing.'<sup>4</sup> Śaṅkara examines one by one theories of error, the *khyātivādas* of Indian philosophy and declares that each one of them is either one sided or suffers from some inconsistency. Under *khyātivāda* mostly *akhyāti* ( of Prabhākara ), *viparītakhyāti* ( of Kumārila ), *anyathākhyāti* ( of Nyāya ), *ātmakhyāti* ( of Vijñānavāda ) and *asatkhyāti* ( of Śūnyavāda ) are discussed. There are a few more theories of error, viz. *satkhyāti* ( of Rāmānuja and earlier Sāṅkhya system ), *sadasatkhyāti* ( of later Sāṅkhya and Jainism ) and *apūrṇakhyāti* ( of Kāśmīra Śaivism ). Some of them maintain error as either only omission or as only commission, either as only non-apprehension or as only misapprehension, either as only *āvaraṇa* or as only *vikṣepa*. But according to Śaṅkara himself it is both, omission as well as commission, nonapprehension as well as misapprehension, *āvaraṇa* as well as *vikṣepa*. Śaṅkara defines yet more precisely the concept of *Adhyāsa* : 'Superimposition is the cognition as something of what is not that.'<sup>5</sup> This is *anirvacanīyakhyāti*. As *Adhyāsa* is coupling of real and unreal ( *satyanṛte mithunīkaraṇam* ) the illusory snake in the rope-snake illusion is neither real nor unreal, because in this particular illustration real is the rope on which snake has been superimposed but at the same time it could not be declared as entirely unreal, because it was experienced. Its status remains *anirvacanīya* ( *Śadasadvilakṣaṇa* ). Just contrary to the position of Śaṅkara, Plato maintains that this world is real and unreal both, it is real as it is the copy or shadow of the 'Ideal World.' It is also unreal in so far as it shares with the material world which is though a nonentity or negative reality. Logically Plato commits the fallacy of contradiction but Śaṅkara does not. Sometimes he is charged for not following the law of excluded middle. But this charge on Śaṅkara is false. Beca-

use all these western laws of thought are entirely formal laws. Their operation is mostly limited to speculative philosophy. They cannot be applied to non-speculative philosophy of Śaṅkara. We find illustrations of things, events which cannot be categorised either as real and unreal, never-the-less they are meaningful. A story cannot be categorised as real or unreal, still it is very meaningful. Our Concept of Reality ( *sat* ) is based on our daily experience of *sublation* ( *bādhā* ) of appearance ( *asat* ).

Śaṅkara himself raises a question regarding the possibility of Adhyāsa about the self. All definitions of Adhyāsa agree in so far as they represent superimposition as the apparent presentation of the attributes of one thing in another thing, for example, mother of pearl appears as if silver, the moon, although one only appears as if she were double. But how is it possible in the case of the subject which is just opposite of object ? In superimposition one object is attributed on another which is before us. To this problem three answers have been advanced by Śaṅkara. First, he maintains that the self is non-object in the absolute sense. Secondly, subject or self is well known to exist on account of immediate intuition. Finally he declares : Nor is it an exceptionless rule that objects can be superimposed only on such other objects as are before us, i.e., in contact with our sense organs, for non-discerning men superimpose on the ether which is not the object of sensuous presentation, dark-blue colour.<sup>6</sup>

On the soil of this ignorance stands, according to Śaṅkara, all human knowledge, empirical as well as Vedic. Śaṅkara cannot explain this bewildering mass of phenomenal world without the postulate of this natural ignorance. T. R. V. Murti rightly observes : 'An enquiry about ajñāna is, therefore, an investigation into the *a priori* conditions of experience.'<sup>7</sup>

Śaṅkara points out that there are standard means of valid knowledge, like perception, inference, testimony, etc., which have been accepted by all; and therefore, there must be some ground why all these should be placed under the sphere of natural and universal ignorance—*adhyāsa*. Śaṅkara explains that whether it is perceptual knowledge or it is knowledge which we get from testimony, such knowledge is essentially based on subject object relationship. The 'I' is always associated with the 'not-I' or the body. This is obvious because knowledge or action whether perceptual or belonging to testimony necessarily belongs to a subject. Thus all knowledge with which a man is normally concerned is relational. The subject is always associated with its opposite, the object. Pure subject, therefore, is beyond this relational knowledge. This is what K. C. Bhattacharya has termed as the spiritual subjectivity which is freedom itself. It is rightly observed : 'All types of knowledge (empirical), Śaṅkara points out, are inadequate and are only distinguished from that of animals, only in degree because of man's superior intelligence, but in kind they are similar'.<sup>8</sup>

Actions of animals and men both are guided and controlled by desire to accept or to avoid. Such actions, therefore, are always related to the gain or loss, pleasure or status in life. But it has been advocated in the śruti, Śaṅkara points out, that pure subject or the self has nothing to do with such gain or loss. Self is never interested in all these. So in all cases of empirical knowledge or knowledge from testimony the subject is associated with the object and, therefore pure subject is represented in a relational form which is nothing but its appearance. Thus Śaṅkara observes : 'In this way, there goes on this natural, beginningless and endless superimposition, which appears in the form of wrong conception, and which is

the cause of individual souls appearing as agents and enjoyers and is observed by everyone.<sup>9</sup>

Illusions are normal. If we do not have the experience or illusion we cannot start an enquiry into the real. The dictum, 'jñānānmukṭiḥ' which means release through knowledge is literally true in the case of Advaita Vedānta. Even theistic systems like Viśiṣṭādvaita and Śaiva Siddhānta use this dictum. Rightly it has been declared as improper. Because in these systems the final state is not mokṣa but a kind of exalted state such as *Kailāśa* or *Vaikuṇṭha*. Such a state is not freedom.<sup>10</sup>

The Śāṅkara Vedānta makes an enquiry into the nature of Brahman, Truth. It could be known only through knowledge. Why does Śāṅkara stress so much the concept of jñāna? In cognitive experience reality is revealed as it is, without any modification or distortion. In non-cognitive experiences like willing and feeling reality is not discovered as it is, rather it is modified and sometimes even distorted because of emotional excess of pleasure, pain, anger and lust. "In the Śāṅkara Vedānta truth is neither the coherence of thought nor is it even correspondence. Coherence means consistency. The whole system is linked together but what guarantee is there that the initial judgement is true? An initial lie may be supported by a series of lies. In so far as the correspondence theory is concerned even there is difficulty to ascertain the knowledge and the fact. These theories maintain a gap between knowledge and reality. In the Śāṅkara Vedānta the knowledge and truth must co-incide ( *brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati* ).

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## The Advaitic Theory of Causation

The *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* of Gauḍapāda is supposed to be the first systematic treatise of Advaita Vedānta. The central theme of *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* is *ajativāda*—the theory of non-origination. It has two subdoctrines. First the *ātman* is *aja* 'unborn', which finally leads to creation. Secondly, causation is a myth, which culminates into *māyāvāda*. Here we examine his critique of causation. We would prefer to call it a critique of the concept of Causality.

The main arguments against the concept of causality by Gauḍapāda are the following.

(i) Nothing is born out of itself or out of another or out of both.<sup>1</sup> A jar cannot produce itself, nor can it be produced out of a piece of cloth nor out of both.

(ii) But it may be asked : Is not a pot produced from clay ? Is not a son born to a father ? Gauḍapāda maintains that this is undoubtedly perceived. But he adds that it does not stand to reason. Nothing, in fact, is produced, whether it be existent or non-existent or both.<sup>2</sup> If a thing is existent, it cannot be produced, for it is already there. Nor the second because the non-existent by its very nature cannot be produced. Nor the third, i. e., if it is both, existent as well as non-existent, it involves a contradiction.

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★ The following abbreviations are used :

MK = *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* by Gauḍapāda.

SBh = Śaṅkara's Commentary to the Vedānta-Sūtra.

VSM = *Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī* by Prakāśānanda, Śrī Jivānanda Vidyāsagar ed., Calcutta, 1937.

(iii) Causation is a myth. Why ?

(a) the non-existent cannot have the non-existent for its cause, as the horns of a hare cannot be the cause of a castle in the air;

(b) nor can the existent have the non-existent for its cause, as the horns of a hare cannot be the cause of a jar;

(c) the existent cannot be the effect of the existent, because the existent already exists; if it exists already, it does not need a cause, as a chair cannot be the cause of a jar;

(d) again, the existent cannot be the effect of the non-existent, for that which does not exist cannot produce anything.<sup>3</sup>

With regard to the concept of causality, we find only these four types of relations, none of which is, however, possible. Hence, the very concept of causality is regarded as a pure myth by the enlightened.

Having examined the very concept of causality, Gauḍapāda proceeds to examine the different theories of causation in Indian philosophy. The theories examined by him are the *satkāryavāda* of Sāṃkhya-Yoga, *asatkāryavāda* of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the *pratītyasamutpāda* of Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra schools of Buddhism. We shall, in brief, first examine his criticism of *satkāryavāda* and *asatkāryavāda*.

While *satkāryavāda* maintains the *jāti* 'origination' of a thing, which is already existent in its cause, the *asatkāryavāda*, on the other hand, holds that it belongs to a thing, which is non-existent in its cause.<sup>4</sup> In this way, both maintain contradictory views and their mutual criticisms rather prove *ajātivāda*.<sup>5</sup>

The disputants attribute birth to that which is unborn. But what is unborn must be immortal. To say that unborn is

born is to attribute mortality to it. How is this possible ? The immortal cannot become mortal, nor can the mortal be immortal, for it is impossible for a thing to change its nature.<sup>6</sup>

*Satkāryavāda* maintains the non-difference of cause and effect. It is possible in two ways. Either the cause is identical with the effect or the effect is identical with the cause. If the cause is identical with the effect, then since the effect is born, the cause must be born too.<sup>7</sup> Under such circumstances, the primal cause, *prakṛti* is subjected to birth and then Sāṃkhya cannot maintain it to be *aja* 'unborn' and *nitya* 'eternal'. If the other alternative is adopted, viz., that the effect is identical with the cause, then since the cause is *aja*, the effect must be *aja*. And if it is *aja*, it cannot be produced, and if it cannot be produced, it ceases to be the effect, which is self-contradiction.

And there is no illustration which could prove the premise of *asatkāryavāda*, i. e., that from what is unborn, a thing is produced. Indeed, in the absence of any illustration, no inference can be deduced.<sup>8</sup>

On analysis, we find that while the *satkāryavāda* emphasizes the notion of cause in causation, the *asatkāryavāda*, on the contrary, that of effect. In Kantian terminology, we may say that the *satkāryavāda* tries to maintain the necessary connection between cause and effect without any novelty to the effect and thus retains causation with 'only one term, viz., cause; the *asatkāryavāda*, on the other hand, is keen to maintain the novelty of the effect without any necessary connection between cause and effect and it also maintains causation with only one term, viz., effect. But to maintain causation with only one term is absurd.<sup>9</sup>

The *pratītyasamutpāda* of Buddhists states the combined origination ( *samutpāda* ) of some elements with regard to other elements.<sup>10</sup>

It maintains the relation of simultaneity between cause and effect and traces the series of causes and effects back to the beginning which is beginningless. Gauḍapāda examines it and shows its inconsistencies. First of all, if the effect is the cause of cause and vice versa, how can cause and effect be beginningless?<sup>11</sup> The interdependence of cause and effect and their beginninglessness are contradictory. Secondly, the view that the effect is the cause of the cause and vice versa would assert causation like the birth of the father from the son.<sup>12</sup> There should be definite order between the cause and effect. But the order between the cause and the effect cannot be determined. If it is simultaneity, it is not causation, for it obtains between the two horns of an animal as well.<sup>13</sup> If the effect is prior to the cause, the order of succession is unjustifiably reversed. Finally, if the cause is prior to the effect, it is non-existent. And a non-existent cause like a skyflower cannot produce any effect. Thus the three possible orders of the sequence, i. e., simultaneity of cause and effect, priority of cause over effect, and posteriority of cause over effect, are ruled out. Their absolute ignorance of the order of cause and effect brings into relief the theory of non-origination. Gauḍapāda's criticism as stated above has been considered by the earlier scholars like Stscherbatsky as directed against the *pratītyasamutpāda* doctrine of Sarvāstivāda Buddhism. But a contemporary Indian scholar, Mahadevan, has suggested that Gauḍapāda's criticism is, rather, against the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā doctrine, namely that the cause and effect are reciprocally dependent.<sup>14</sup>

The Buddhist idealists do not find any difference between objects and impressions. In their opinion objects like a jar etc., have themselves no cause and hence they are not the cause of impressions.<sup>15</sup> The idealists, thus, deny the dependent origination on the one hand and of objects and impress-

( "The clouds though numerous have been dispersed somewhere by the wind, as real knowledge disperses the delusive appearances in the Brahman" ).

Ludwig Kretzschmar interpreted Bhavabhūti's concept of *vivarta* as a synonym of *vikāra* of Sāṃkhya-Yoga : "dass *vivarta* bei Bhavabhūti, zweifellos...wirkliche, reale Entfaltungen ....des Brahma bedeute, was sich auch daraus ergebe, dass Bhavabhūti *vivarta* als Synonym von *vikāra* verwende"<sup>26</sup>. On it Hacker comments: "Mir scheint dies Argument nicht zwingend; denn, wie wir gesehen haben, wird im frühen Wortmonismus auch *vikāra* gerade im illusionistischen Sinne gebraucht. Dass die bei Bhavabhūti vorliegende Form des Vedānta das Śabdādvaita Bhartṛharis ist, hat Kretzschmar nicht erkannt"<sup>27</sup>. While Hacker differs from Kretzschmar and interprets *vivarta* rightly as the synonym of illusory appearance, he himself identifies it as a term of the *śabdādvaita* of Bhartṛhari and not of the *ātmādvaita* of Vedānta. I feel that it is more correct to interpret it as a technical term of the form of Advaitism ascribed to Śaṃkara. Because, after the 6th verse of the 6th act, it becomes quite clear that Bhavabhūti uses this term in the very technical sense of Śaṃkara's Advaitism. P. V. Kane, while commenting on the 3/47th verse of the *Uttararāmacarita* observes as follows: "vidyākālpena marutā....pravilayah" ( 6/6 ) lends support to the view that the technical sense<sup>28</sup> of the word was known to the author. It appears to us that even in the present verse the word *vivarta* is used in its technical sense of an illusory appearance. The author means that everywhere the underlying *rasa* is *karuṇā*, but to readers and spectators of average abilities, it appears that in some cases the *rasa* is *śṛṅgāra* or *vīrathat*; this however is a mistake due to the *nimittas* ( the *upādhis* ) in conjunction with which the one *rasa* ( *karuṇā* ) is working. The example is given

only for the purpose of showing the oneness of the underlying entity<sup>29</sup>.

However, Hacker's main contention stands correct that Śaṅkara has avoided the use of the term *vivarta*. Śaṅkara himself has used the term *kāryakāraṇānanyatvavāda*<sup>30</sup> for his theory of causation. He defends throughout one-sided dependence of effect on the cause and not *vice versa*: "ananyatv'pi kāryakāraṇayoh kāryasya kāraṇatvam na tu kāraṇasya kāryātmavam"<sup>31</sup>. In his commentaries he often uses it. His typical illustrations are the illusionist's illusion, dream experience, the rope-snake illusion. On the philological basis Hacker is not prepared to attribute Śaṅkara's theory of causation as *vivartavāda* and he prefers to attribute it as illusory *pariṇāmavāda*: "Śaṅkaras Kosmologie ist eine Art illusionistischer *Pariṇāmavāda*"<sup>32</sup>. To this extent he is right but on the logical basis we do not find any difference between the *vivartavāda* and illusory *pariṇāmavāda*. The *vivartavāda* by its very definition is illusory *pariṇāmavāda*.

Among the direct disciples of Śaṅkara, Sureśvara has at least in his *Naiṣkarmyaśiddhi* and *Sambandhavārtika* not used this term. Padmapāda has, perhaps, used it only once but it appears by his use that he is aware of the technical sense of this term<sup>33</sup>. Mandan Miśra uses *vivarta* and *pariṇāma* as synonyms but in the sense of illusory appearance: "ekatva evāyam draṣṭṛ-drśyabhāvo' vakalpate, drṣtur eva cid-ātmanās tathā tathā vipariṇāmāt vā" ( *Brahmasiddhi*, p. 7, 23 ). The subject itself, which by nature is consciousness, changes or appears in different forms of objects.

Jayanta Bhatta in the *Śabdavivartavādakhaṇḍanam* of his *Nyāyamañjarī* has given the following four possible meanings of the term *vivarta*.

First, *vivarta* may mean *vikāra* or *pariṇama* 'modification'. The illustration given by Jayanta is the changing of milk into curd.

The second meaning assigned to it is creation of something unreal like *Indrajāla*.

The third meaning given by him is the result of a perceptual error, for example mother of pearl appearing as silver.

And the last meaning given by him is the *śabdabrahma* that creates the world and this creation by the Lord is described by the word *vivarta*.

Here it becomes quite clear that by the time of Jayanta (by the end of 9th century A.D. ) the term *vivarta* became very current and it was a well understood term in all its possible meanings. That is why, by the time of the origination of subschools in the Advaita Vedānta this term became very current Vācaspati Miśra, the founder of the Bhāmātī school, and Prakāśātman, the founder of the Vivaraṇa school, have profusely used this term and by this time *vivartavāda* was accepted as the technical name for the Advaitic theory of causation.

For the study of the concept of *vivarta* the little book of Hacker is a masterpiece. Here we propose to examine only one post-Śaṅkara Advaitin, Prakāśānanda ( 16th century A.D. ), the author of *Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, who stands out as unique because of his radical Advaitism, *dr̥ṣṭisr̥ṣṭivāda*.

According to Prakāśānanda *vivarta* has no separate existence apart from its substratum. What is termed as a *vivarta* is nothing but the substratum itself, which through some defect appears in a different form<sup>34</sup>. This different form-*vivarta* is negated by the knowledge of its substratum. But it may lead to the theory of *asatkhyātivāda*. Prakāśānanda does not agree with this, and holds that *khyāti* itself is illusory. The

illusory character of *khyāti* 'perception' consists in the appearance of consciousness as possessing predicate, which is really predicateless. But why is it not perceived as such ? One who knows the self, perceives it as such but who does not perceive it as such is deluded. Because he fancies that his perception of one thing makes known something different, thus in common life he sees a rope but fancies it to be a snake and says—this is a snake. But what is this fancy ? It is a conviction as to the non-existence of a really existing thing. If he really has the perception of the rope, how does that perception present itself to him to be termed as a snake ? That is due to similarity ( between rope and snake ) and due to certain defects. In the above illustration, it is argued that there are two things: the substratum, rope, and its cognition, snake, whereas in the illustrated case, both substratum and its cognition are the self alone, for with regard to the self-luminous self, a second cognition cannot be assumed, And as a *vivarta* distinct from self cannot be shown, the *vivarta* doctrine cannot be held<sup>35</sup>. Prakāśānanda, here, asserts that the *vivarta* doctrine is not the final aim of the *Upaniṣads*, as it serves only to instruct the uninitiated, otherwise from the false perception of duality would follow duality as something real :

Bālān prati vivarto' yam brahmaṇah sakalam jagat  
Avivarttitamānandamāsthītāh kṛtinah sadā<sup>36</sup>.

For the uninitiated it is taught that the whole world is this *vivarta* of Brahman. The wise hold it to be Bliss unmodified.

Starting from Gauḍapāda, the grand teacher of Śaṅkara up to post-Śaṅkara Advaitins, we may, however, categorize philologically the Advaitic theory of causation into *ajātivāda*, *kāryakāraṇānanyatvavāda* and *vivartavāda* but the import of



this theory is only this, that it advocates only one-sided dependence of effect on the cause and not *vice versa*. In other words we may say 'the original is, however, Brahman of which the world may be regarded as a translation at the plane of space-time. As the translation is made for us, the original does not depend for its existence on the translation'.<sup>37</sup>

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## The Status of the Physical World in the Śāṃkara Vedānta

In the Advaita Vedānta of Śāṃkara, the world of sense and intellect is generally dubbed as 'māyā'—'illusion' in the sense of 'imagination' or 'hallucination'. But rarely does 'māyā' mean to Indian philosophers, or even to Śāṃkara, that the world is illusion in the sense that it does not exist. *Māyā* is a philosophical concept employed by Śāṃkara as the basic postulate for the explanation of the physical world. In general, the concept of *māyā* basically means that the physical world is neither real nor unreal, but is indeterminate *Sad-asad Vilakṣaṇa*. The much abused analogy of the rope and the snake is employed by Śāṃkara to illustrate the difficulty of the world problem. Dr. Radhakrishnan very pertinently observes : "The riddle of the rope is the riddle of the universe. Why does rope appear as the snake is a question which school boys raise and philosophers fail to answer."<sup>1</sup>

Here, we critically examine the status of the snake in the rope-snake illusion, in detail.

Illusion as conceived by Śāṃkara, is an identification of the unreal ( *snake* ) with the real ( *rope* ), *Satyāṇṛte mithunīkaranam*. This identification is mutual ( *itaretara* ) i. e. one term cannot be held aloof from the other. The unreal is superimposed on the real. Identification is the only relation that can subsist between the real and the unreal. The unreal appears as if it were real. In the rope-snake illusion, the snake is taken as real, then negated and finally rejected as unreal.<sup>2</sup> To begin with, 'This is a snake', is, for all practical purposes a legitimate presentation. The relation of the 'this'

to the 'snake' is one of complete identification. This state may be called the state of illusion. Here the snake is taken as real. Simultaneous with the first presentation is the second one, 'This is not a real snake'—'This is but a rope'. Here, 'This' serves as a nexus between 'This is a snake' and 'This is but a rope'. Both refer to the same subject. The latter judgment cancels or negates the identity of the 'rope' with the 'snake'. It is not true that the snake was real when it was apprehended and became unreal later when cancelled, "Its unreality is our non-recognition of it notwithstanding its being unqualified by time,"<sup>3</sup> 'This is but a rope'—here the snake is, of course, negated but it is not mere nothing. It has certain 'givenness'. Although the snake is illusory it cannot be said that it is not 'given' at all. And in so far as it has this appearance of 'givenness' it is not altogether non-existent like the purely self-contradictory terms such as 'square circle, or the son of a barren woman.'

Now, we shall examine the category of illusion as analysed by Śaṅkara. It is a new category, the category of the indeterminate. The illusion ( *snake* ) is neither real nor unreal; it is *anirvacanīya*. Why? Nothing can be predicated of the illusory object. Can we say that the snake was of such and such nature? All these characters are now definitely known to have belonged, even then, to the rope. The temporal and spatial positions which the snake occupies actually belong to the rope. Dr. T. R. V. Murti observes: "The reflected image in the mirror has not any size, shape, colour, etc., of its own; for they all belong to the original object or to the mirror ( *Upādhi* ). These characters, the would be predicates do not and cannot get related to the snake or the virtual image for they are not existent subjects."<sup>4</sup>

If the illusory snake cannot be the subject of any proposition, can it be the predicate of any subject? No! its relation-

ship with any existent subject is not possible. The real entity does not accommodate as a matter of fact within its bosom an illusory object. The illusory object, thus, neither characterises anything nor is characterised by anything. All attempts to characterise it in terms of others, to define it, and to explain it causally or by way of identity have proved futile. It is not expressible in terms of others; so it is indeterminate, *anirvacanīya*. It is neither the subject nor the predicate of any proposition. It is utterly unrelated. It is what it is. That it appeared in knowledge is to say nothing intrinsic about it. Its character and existence are entirely exhausted in the appearance ( *Pratibhāsa mātraśarīratvam* ). Dr. Murti well observes : ‘The vedāntic definition of the illusory is but a paraphrase of the reason given for its illusoriness; the world is illusory because it is given, because it is an object ( *dṛśyatvāt, jaḍatvāt* ). This can be expressed as a case of immediate inference—obversion, ‘the given’ is not the non-given; it is different from the ‘not-given’. Of the ‘not-given, we can conceive only two types’ the subject which knows, but is not known and the utterly unreal, e. g., the son of a barren woman. As the indubitable and independent, the subject is real, while the other about which no question of truth or falsity can even be suggested is utterly non-existent.<sup>5</sup> The illusory, the given *snake* is given as an object; it cannot be either real, *sat* or unreal, *asat*. To express it in simple language, the object of illusion ( *snake* ) is not real, for later it is sublated, and the real can never be negated. It is not unreal, for the unreal can never be cognised. Therefore, Śaṅkara concludes that the contents of illusion are indeterminate, *anirvacanīya* inexplicable as either real or unreal. On the other hand, the fact that the real can never be sublated and the unreal can never be cognised, is attested to by normal cognitive experience. It is therefore in the logic of Vedānta,

only the *anirvacanīya* object, that can be a content of perception and an object of negation also. Vedānta does not hold that *sat* or real and *asat* or unreal are contradictory terms, but that they are independent of such mutual exclusion and cannot be defined antagonistically. Thus, no contradiction or violation of the Excluded Middle is to be apprehended for the *Asat* is not conceived as the very negation of *Sat* but as that which does not confront us as real. Had the *Sat* and the *Asat* been conceived as contradictories, e. g., had the *Sat* as the uncontradictable and the *asat* as the contradicted, been contradictories then, acceptance of the one would have *ipso facto* meant the rejection of the other and *vice versa*. *Anirvacanīya*, thus is and can be different from the 'not-given'—from the *Sat* and the *Asat* (*Sad-asadvilakṣaṇa*). The *anirvacanīya* alone is the inexplicable as either real or unreal that can be both revealed and rejected as Dr. R. Reyna observes rightly : "But it is quite possible to say that the phenomenal world is neither real nor unreal, without violating logic; and this is the basic premise from which the arguments in this book have been derived. This is by no means a fundamentally negative outlook, although it is expressed in a negative assertion. We could say of a child that he is neither my mother nor my father but this does not negate the child, and by the negative description. We have said something definite about the object of our perception without causing the object to take upon itself nullity. It is not cancellation or dissolution of the world appearance that is sought but transfiguration through unified experience into a complete knowledge of all that is only a negational explanation can bring about this fuller vision"<sup>6</sup>. A similar observation she had made in her '*The Concept of Māyā*'.<sup>7</sup>

Can any cause for illusion be assigned ? The question is

not whether the illusory appearances, e. g., the snake has any cause, for we have already seen that it is unique and unrelated. If the illusion were uncaused or had any cause other than the ignorance of the real, it would prove to be permanent and in no case cease to exist on our attaining the knowledge of the real.

The contention of Śaṅkara, on this issue, is that in all illusions, the ignorance of the Real ( the *Adhiṣṭhāna*, the locus ) is the only cause of the origin and sustenance of illusion. The snake is seen in the locus, the rope.

By the analysis of the rope-snake illusion, we may trace the following factors involved in it : First, the absence of the correct knowledge of the locus, *adhiṣṭhāna*. Here, in this case, the rope is not known. Technically this is *Āvaraṇa*. There is thus a necessary connection between the illusion and the ignorance. Secondly, to identify the unreal with the real, something must also crop up. The appearance of the snake gives a content, a character to the illusion. This is *vikṛēpa*.

Thirdly, it is the knowledge and non-knowledge of the locus ( rope ) which cancels and allows the illusion ( snake ) respectively.

Fourthly, a consciousness is to be granted which knows both the illusion and its cancellation.

Finally, there are some other factors too. A knowledge of similarity ( *Sādrśya jñāna* ), sense-contact, and some defect either in the sense-organ as jaundice or some environmental defect as darkness, the refractory medium, and distance are also assigned as causes.<sup>8</sup> It is possible to maintain with a show of plausibility that in illusion like the rope-snake, the knowledge of similarity is operative. This, however, is not true of others, e. g., the blueness of the sky.

Contact of senses with a real object is considered necessary in case of perceptual illusion. But this rule is violated in the illusion, the sky is blue.

It is difficult to dispose of the claim that some defect, physical or physiological, is to be found in all cases of illusion. Darkness, for instance, is responsible for the mischief of the snake. But how can I know that the presence of a certain factor, say darkness, engenders illusions or that its removal cancels it or in some way contributes to either? I may know darkness, but darkness as conditioning the illusory presentation of snake I do not know.

Dr. Radhakrishnan rightly observes: "The root of the illusion is logical and psychological and not metaphysical. The pluralistic universe is an error of judgement. Correction of the error means change of opinion. The rope appears as a snake and when the illusion is over, the snake returns to the rope."<sup>9</sup> At one place he observes: "Unreal the world is, illusory it is not."<sup>10</sup> It is not convincing. The world is illusory; it is not unreal, if it is not real. Similarly we agree with Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan when he observes: "Māyā is existent but not real."<sup>11</sup> But he is not consistent when he observes in the same continuation: "Unreal the world is, non-existent it is not." The world is not non-existent. It is correct; but it is also not unreal. It is given, its 'givenness' is not identical with its unreality. Śaṅkara is not so much negating the physical world, as he is re-interpreting it. Śaṅkara does not assert the absolute oneness—identity of Brahman and the physical world. By non-difference *ananyatva*, Śaṅkara does not mean identity but only denies their difference."<sup>12</sup>

Śaṅkara criticises *Śūnya Vāda* on the ground that it negates the physical world without posing another reality. To



negate an error is to accept the truth on which it is based.<sup>13</sup> Here the error is only negated and corrected and is not reduced to a mere 'nothing', because its 'givenness' is a fact. G. R. Malkani is quite pertinent in his observation : "Even though the illusory does not exist, the perception of the illusory does exist. I perceive a rope to be a snake. The snake is non-existent in the rope. It appears therefore that while the illusory does not exist, the perception of the illusory cannot be denied to be a fact of reality."<sup>14</sup>

Śaṅkara employs the simile of the rope-snake and the like to suggest the one-sided dependence of the world on Brahman. In the rope-snake illusion, whereas the appearance of the snake is dependent on the existence of the rope, the existence of the rope does not depend on the appearance of the snake. In the same way, the world is dependent on Brahman in the sense that there will be no world without Brahman. The non-existence of the world does not make any difference to Brahman. Brahman is the archetype of which the world, as it has been said, may be regarded as a copy on spatio-temporal plane and Brahman depends as little for its being on the world as an archetype does on its copy.

Śaṅkara does not allow the application of causation to Brahman. The category of causation applies to the realm of phenomena. The world is the realm of causes and effects and strictly speaking, we cannot say that Brahman is the cause of the world. An essentially non-empirical Being, Brahman is absolutely beyond the purview of an empirical category like causation.

Śaṅkara never denies the existence of the physical world. Dr. S. K. Das observes : "Thus the standing problem of philosophy—the relation of finite to the Infinite—does not arise for Śaṅkara at all. The situation is further reinforced

by a resolute carrying out of the dialectic of causation which unequivocally denies the metaphysical reality and independence of the effect as distinct from the cause. This does not, however, amount to a denial of the empirical reality of the finite world of things as an appearance of reality.<sup>15</sup> Again, he observes : "Well, as Śaṅkara might equally urge in the very words of Dean Inge, "the world of names and forms, this *māyā*, is a solid fact which we have to accept as such and not to account for."<sup>16</sup> To sum up, the doctrine of *Māyā* recognises the reality of the physical world from the relative standpoint. When it declares the physical world to be '*mithyā*' ( unreal ) it is only from the standpoint of cosmic reality. This unreality in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara does not signify a mere construction of fancy ( *alika* ) but is used in the sense or *anirvacanīya* (logically indefinable). Thus we see that Brahman cannot be *anirvacanīya* for, although it is distinct from unreal, it is not distinct from the real, because it is Reality. And by the same logic the unreal ( such as hare's horn ) also cannot be regarded as *anirvacanīya*, for although it is distinct from the real, it is not distinct from the unreal, for it is unreality. The physical world, therefore, is pragmatically and conventionally existent and it is non-existent only from a cosmic point of view. Śaṅkara frankly admits that the existence of the physical world is unquestioned : "For this apparent world, whose existence is guaranteed by all the means of knowledge cannot be denied unless some one should find out some new truth, ( based on which he could impugn its existence ) for a general principle is proved by the absence of contrary instances."<sup>17</sup>

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## The Concept Of Jīvātman, Sākṣin And Brahman

Man's empirical self is called jīvātman. As such he is agent and enjoyer, acquires merit and demerit, experiences pleasure and pain.<sup>1</sup> His power and knowledge are finite.<sup>2</sup> He is subject to attachment and hatred etc.<sup>3</sup> In his essential nature man is the transcendental self ( *Ātman* ) but because of ignorance identifies himself with the body, the sense organs and the internal organ etc. Śaṅkara observes :

"Attributes of the body are, superimposed on the self if a man thinks of himself stout, lean, fair, as standing, walking or jumping. Attributes of the sense organs, if he thinks I am mute or deaf, or one eyed, or blind. Attributes of internal organ when he considers himself subject to desire, intention, doubt, determination and so on."<sup>4</sup>

As man's real self is different from the body, the sense organs, and the internal organ, it is different from his vital air ( *Prāṇa* ) and the mind ( *Manas* ) as well. Śaṅkara tells us, you are neither mind nor vital breath for both of them are unconscious. The distinction of the self from the body forms such expressions as my mind has gone elsewhere.<sup>5</sup> The vital breath is affected by hunger and thirst and you are their witness. Just as the knower of the pot is different from it,

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\* BSB—Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣya, Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1934.

SLS—Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha, Acyutagrāṇthamālā, Kāśī, Samvat 2011.

so you are also different from these states of vital breath, which is experienced as mine.<sup>6</sup>

In the *Ānandamayādhīprakaraṇa* while dealing with the implications of *Brahmapucchaṁ pratiṣṭhā*—Brahman is its tail, its support, Śaṁkara tells us that man's true self is different from all the sheaths of body ( *annamaya* ), vital air ( *prāṇamaya* ), mind ( *manomaya* ), understanding ( *viññānamaya* ) and even with blissful ( *ānandamaya* ). But in his essential nature man is bliss itself; other *kośas* are only appearances.

Śaṁkara recognises the three states of *Jivātman*—the waking, the dreaming, and the sleeping. In the waking state he identifies himself with the gross body and sense organs and is called *viśva*, perhaps because here in this state he is in contact with the external world ( *viśva* ). In the dreaming state, he identifies himself with the subtle body and is called *taijas* (Vital). And in the sleeping state ( *Suṣupti* ) he identifies himself with the *Kāraṇa Śarīra* and is called *prājña*.<sup>7</sup> Underlying all these states there is a permanent witness which is termed by Śaṁkara as *sākṣin* which means a seer, a spectator or a looker on<sup>8</sup> while it witnesses all objects, it itself is witnessed by none. It is rightly observed : While the *jīva* may become the object of self-consciousness on account of the objective element it includes, it is wrong to speak of the *sākṣin* as knowable, for it is the pure element of consciousness in all knowing and to assume that it is knowable would be to imply another knowing element a process which leads to the fallacy of infinite regress. But the *sākṣin* does not therefore remain unrealized for being self-luminous by its very nature it does not require to be made known at all. Its presence is necessarily equivalent to its revelation and it is, therefore, never missed.<sup>9</sup>

Essentially one and the same consciousness underlies the jīvātman and sākṣin both, nevertheless there is subtle difference between the two. Jīva is agent and enjoyer while sākṣin is neither of the two. He is defined as *draṣṭarve sati udāsīnatvam sākṣitvam*. Sākṣin is one who is free from agency etc. and as such a non-involved consciousness. In the following pages an attempt is made to see critically how this concept of sākṣin has assumed different dimensions in the Vedānta literature without losing its essential nature.

The *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* gives a beautiful imagery of differentiation between the jīva and sākṣin in the following lines :—

“Two birds, companions ( who are ) always united, cling to the self-same tree. Of these two, the one eats the sweet fruit and the other looks on without eating.”<sup>10</sup>

In this imagery the jīvātman eats or experiences the pleasant or painful fruits of its past deeds which he had performed out of ignorance; while Īśvara who is by nature eternal, pure, enlightened, freedom itself and omnipresent, does not eat. Īśvara permeates the entire process of the world as its witness and thus inspects the world and the all activities of its creatures. Here God himself has been treated as the witness.

According to the *Kūṭasthadīpa* the kūṭasthacaitanya underlying two types of bodies, thus being the witness of two bodies, i. e., gross body and psychical body is itself sākṣin.<sup>11</sup>

The *Nāṭakadīpa* compares the sākṣin with the lamp of a theatre. As a lamp of a theatre illuminates the lord, the elite and the dancing girl alike; and is self-luminous even in their absence in the same way the sākṣi consciousness illumines ego, intellect, and the objects alike.<sup>12</sup>

By the illustrations from the *Kūṭasthadīpa* and the *Nāṭakadīpa* Vidyāranya tries to explain the nature of sākṣin. According to

ding to the Pañcadaśīkāra the consciousness devoid of the difference of jīva and īśvara is sākṣin. Being an agent jīva cannot be a sākṣin. Īśvara being the creator, preserver and destroyer of the universe also cannot be a sākṣin, because he is not the locus of the bewildering mass of this universe. Thus the locus of the superimposition of the gross and subtle universe alone, i. e., the kūṭasthacaitanya alone could be a sākṣin.

The Tattvapradīpikākāra maintains almost similar view when he holds that the pure Brahman ( neither jīva nor īśvara as they are involved in the universe, can be udāsīna and therefore can be sākṣin ) alone being the locus of all ideas is sākṣin.<sup>13</sup>

The Vedāntakaumudī holds Prājña to be sākṣin; as he is devoid of cause, attributes etc. and has a particular nature of God. He is the motivator of attachment and detachment of human desires but he himself remains non-involved.<sup>14</sup> The Śvetāśvatara gives a beautiful picture of sākṣin :

The one God hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the inner self of all beings, the ordainer of all deeds, dwells in all beings, the witness, the knower, the only one devoid of qualities.

The Suṣuptyutkrānti adhikaraṇa describes God as Prājña, who is different from jīva, as sākṣin.<sup>15</sup>

The Tattvasūddhikāra maintains Brahman itself as sākṣin, though it appears to be belonging to the category of jīva as it is in the following illusion. This is a silver. Here in this illusion, thisness though really is shell, appears as if it were a silver. In the same way the Sākṣin Brahma appears as if it were jīva.<sup>16</sup>

Some maintain the consciousness associated with the adjunct of ignorance as sākṣin. They claim that jīva is really

non-involved and thus is not agent. He becomes agent and enjoyer when he identifies himself with the internal organ. Jīva has, thus two forms, real and unreal. In his real form he is inactive, pure and as such he is sākṣin. But in his unreal form he is conscious of himself and as such he is agent and enjoyer.<sup>17</sup>

The *Sarvavedāntasārasaṁgraha* holds quite a similar view. It holds that ātman is essentially pure and as such he is non-involved, but due to ego sense he takes himself as seer, hearer, agent and enjoyer.<sup>18</sup>

Yet there are some who maintain jīva veiled by internal organ as sākṣin, and jīva qualified by internal organ as knower ( *pramātā* ).<sup>19</sup>

Citsukha differentiates between sākṣin and pramātrin. Jīva veiled by internal organ is sākṣin but when he is qualified by internal organ is pramātā. In the same way Madhusūdana Saraswatī also differentiates between sākṣin and pramātā in the *Siddhāntabindu*. According to him consciousness veiled by internal organ is sākṣin and consciousness qualified by internal organ is pramātā.

In the *Siddhāntaleśasaṁgraha* there is a distinction between the two, sākṣin and jīva, which has been in brief discussed above. We find in this discussion that this term has assumed various dimensions in the Advaitic literature such as kūṭastha-caitanya, Brahman, prājña, avidyopahita caitanya ( consciousness veiled by ignorance ) antahākaraṇopahita caitanya ( consciousness veiled by internal organ ) etc. But there is no opposition in these various theories of sākṣin as each one of them believes that it is non-involved, attributeless, caitanya ( *udāsīna, nirguṇa, caitanya* ).

Kṛṣṇāvaldhāta Paṇḍita in his *Advaitanavanītamatabhedanirūpaṇam* has discussed the post-Appaya Dīkṣita views with



regard to the concept of sākṣin in addition to the views already discussed above.<sup>20</sup>

Dharmarājādhvarīndra has presented two types of polarity with regard to the concept of sākṣin. First he makes a distinction between jīva and jīvasākṣin on the one hand, and then on the other hand he makes again a distinction between Īśvara and Īśvara-sākṣin. According to him the consciousness qualified by internal organ is jīva; and the consciousness veiled by Internal organ is jīva sākṣin. And then the consciousness qualified by Māyā is Īśvara and the consciousness veiled by Māyā is Īśvarasākṣin.

Radhakrishnan makes it more simple when he says that the Absolute consciousness when located in a subject, is called jīvasākṣin; and when it is located in the world itself, it is called Īśvarasākṣin. Here we find that the difference between the two is due to their adjuncts. In the context of jīvasākṣin adjuncts are internal organ and body etc. while in the context of Īśvarasākṣin world itself is the adjunct. God is the soul of the world, while jīva is the soul of man.<sup>21</sup>

The concept of sākṣin is a typical notion of Advaita Vedānta which may be called the principle of objectivity. By the principle of objectivity it is meant that the principle reveals an object or a state as it is, i. e., in non-personal way. In the history of philosophical world there is no parallel notion to this concept of sākṣin. In the West, it was Socrates who for the first time realised the necessity of objectivity of knowledge. He revolted against the Sophist's radical subjectivism which made knowledge impossible. The Sophists had founded knowledge upon perception with the result that all objectivity of truth had been destroyed. It was Socrates who founded knowledge upon reason and thereby restored to truth its objectivity. For Socrates all knowledge is knowledge through

concepts. Then comes Plato who vehemently refuted the Sophist's subjectivism and declared that knowledge is neither perception nor opinion. Otherwise there would be no distinction between truth and falsehood. Plato adopts the Socratic doctrine that all knowledge is knowledge through concepts. But the concept had been for Socrates merely a rule of thought. Plato transformed it into a metaphysical substance. His theory of Ideas is the theory of objectivity of concepts. That the concept is not merely an idea in the mind but something which has a reality of its own outside and independent of the mind—this is the essence of the philosophy of Plato.<sup>22</sup>

Plato's Dialectic is a teleological doctrine which culminates in the Idea of the God. The God is the final explanation of all other Ideas. Husserl's doctrine of Intentionality could be first of all traced in the Dialectic of Plato. But we do not find a principle like the concept of Sākṣin even in the philosophy of Plato.

Descartes, the scientist philosopher to get rid of multitude of prejudices and for the sake of objectivity in knowledge, accepted *clearness* and *distinctness* as criteria of truth and reached the first and most certain of all truth—*cogito ergo sum*. The existence of mind is, therefore, the most certain of all things. Descartes, thus, secured the priority of self-knowledge to outer perception and thereby introduced the subjectivist tendency into the history of modern philosophy.<sup>23</sup>

Locke, the empiricist, disputed the very existence of innate ideas and declared mind as an empty slate and the source and origin of all our ideas lies in experience. According to him the understanding is like a piece of white paper on which perception inscribes its character. External and internal perceptions are the windows through which the light

of ideas penetrates into the dark chamber of the understanding. In the philosophy of Locke the epistemic realism is undoubtedly restored but understanding is declared not only passive but inert also

Kant did make a Copernican revolution in the Western epistemology but his discussion of Transcendental Logic establishes the fact that the world as it appears to us is largely made by us, understanding maketh nature.

Husserl accepts that Descartes' *Meditations* were epoch-making because they went back to the pure ego. The total style of philosophizing is changed; in fact, philosophy takes a radical turn from native objectivism to transcendental subjectivism. But says Husserl, unfortunately Descartes could not free himself from a mass of prejudices; besides, so much of scholasticism lies hidden in his *Meditations*. For instance, he could not get over the prejudice arising from the admiration of mathematical natural science, and as an old heritage, exercising a determining influence on us. And consequently Descartes, standing on the threshold of the greatest of all discoveries could not grasp its proper sense. Descartes' mistake according to Husserl consisted in the fact that he could not fully live up to his own discovery that we should assert nothing we ourselves do not see.<sup>24</sup>

Husserl's goal of a presuppositionless philosophy makes a radical demand to give up all our beliefs and opinions accepted so far.

Husserl maintains that by the operation of phenomenological epoch we bracket the natural world and all the theories connected with it. It is a kind of disconnection, a withdrawal or a detachment from the objective and the natural world. So long as we are immersed in the natural, so long we continue to accept the scientific and philosophical

theories at our disposal from posterity, we are at the naive and the uncritical plane. To be radical and a true beginner we must start afresh. By an act of self-withdrawal we should stand at a distance from the natural world so that the realm of true being, the being of consciousness may appear to us in its pure and transparent character.<sup>25</sup>

But Husserl claims that Intentionality is the fundamental property of consciousness. To be conscious means to be conscious of something. Consciousness as a 'cogito' bears within itself all 'cogitatum'. Our acts of perceiving, believing, seeing and evaluating are always directed towards something. Husserl writes :

"We understand Intentionality the unique peculiarity of experiences 'to be the consciousness of something'. It was in the explicit cogito that we first come across this wonderful property to which all metaphysical enigmas and riddles of the theoretical reason lead us eventually back : perceiving is the perceiving of certain matter; valuation, the valuing of a value; wish, the wish for the content wished, and so on. Acting concerns action, doing concerns deed, loving the beloved, joy the object of joy. In every wakeful cogito a 'glancing' ray from the Ego is directed upon the 'object' of the correlate of consciousness.....<sup>26</sup>

Husserl's principle of Intentionality does establish the idea of objectivity but simultaneously it also destroys the idea of presuppositionless objectivity. Husserl's statement that the consciousness *must* be intentional shows that the two terms, consciousness and its object are relative to each other, hence pure objectivity cannot be there, this is only found in the principle of sākṣin which is independent of all objectivity.

There is nothing like absolute objectivity because the very notion of objectivity is relative one which is based on the notion of subjectivity. "It is the consciousness of truth", as K. C. Bhattacharya holds, "as what is believed in but understood either in the objective or in the subjective attitude, as not literally speakable at all but speakable only in the purely symbolic way, is extra-religious or transcendental consciousness".<sup>27</sup>

## Brahman

There are two definitions of Brahman. They are the *taṭastha* (accidental) and the *Svarūpa* (essential) definitions. Why after all two definitions? Why has Śaṅkara given first the *Taṭastha* definition? It is because when the bewildering mass of phenomenal world is negated, Brahman, the real is discovered. Brahman is not one real and the universe is another beside it. Brahman is the only reality, the locus of the world, it is the appearance, *vivarta* of Brahman. In search of truth the Vedāntic approach is from unreal to the real, from false to the truth.<sup>28</sup> There is no path otherwise, or vice versa, i.e., from real to unreal. That is why Śaṅkara begins his Bhāṣya on the *Brahmasūtra* with the discussion of illusion and ignorance. Brahma-knowledge is an insight, a discovery or recovery and not a new information. In the Advaitic metaphysics one does not become Brahman, one simply realises one's being Brahman. In the Kantian metaphysics human understanding has access only to phenomenon and not to noumenon and as such Kant lands himself into agnosticism. But Śaṅkara is neither sceptic nor agnostic. Śaṅkara leads us from phenomenon to noumenon, from *taṭastha lakṣaṇa* to *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa*. This observation is very pertinent: "The *taṭastha-lakṣaṇa* gives us the that of Brahman and the *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* tells us what it is."<sup>29</sup>

This is the sufficient explanation why does Śaṅkara provide two definitions.

The *taṭastha-lakṣaṇa* simply maintains that the world is the appearance of Brahman. But what appears is false. It is all surface and no depth. The real never appears; it is all depth, substance and no surface.<sup>30</sup> The concept of appearance always implies two aspects of a thing, the essential and the accidental. Again, what appears always appears as another. In the Advaitic logic the appearance is equated with the falsehood ( *dr̥ṣyatvāt mithyā* ). As the appearance is false, it is rejected. Here, appearance also implies evaluation, i. e. the real is preferred to the unreal. The relation between the real and the appearance is not mutual rather is one-sided. The appearance does imply the real but not vice versa. It is the effect which depends on cause but cause never depends on its effect. In other words, we may say : The original is, however, Brahman of which the world may be regarded as a translation at the plane of space-time. As the translation is made for us, the original does not depend for its existence on the translation.<sup>31</sup> The bough of the tree may indicate the location of the moon without belonging to it. The crow perching on house-top does serve as a mark to single out a particular house from among several without forming a permanent fixture therein. Likewise the world may be indicative of Brahman without being constitutive of it.<sup>32</sup>

The *taṭastha-lakṣaṇa* leads us to Brahman, as the unconditioned cause of the world. It does not give us an insight into Brahman, it is the *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* which gives us an insight to penetrate into its deeper nature. For Śaṅkara illusion is a fact. That is why he begins his celebrated bhāṣya on the *Brahmasūtra* with an elaborate discussion and analysis of *adhyāsa*. The rope-snake illusion and the like provide Śaṅka-

ra a pattern through which he interprets the world-illusion. The genius of Śaṅkara adopts this pattern in his Vedānta : ( *idam jagat mithyā, drśyatvāt, śuktirajatvat* ). Though Brahman is the cause of the universe, it is transcendent to it. Therefore, neither is the universe a modification of Brahman nor is it affected by the universe. The universe is appearance ( *vivarta* ) of Brahman, who himself is its very locus ( *adhiṣṭhāna* ). Brahman as substance is a self and only self. Could be self-sufficient and self-evident. It is self-sufficient as it does not owe its existence or nature to other things, rather other things owe their existence or nature to it. It is self-evident as it is known by itself, it is self-luminous ( *svayam-prakāśa* ), while other things are known by it ( *tasya bhāsā sarvam idam vibhāti* ). As it is self evident, it is not unknown thing-in-itself. Not only this, in each mode of knowledge, it reveals itself ( *Pratibodhaviditām* ).

In *Satkāryavāda* of the Śāṅkhya the cause-effect-relationship is one of reciprocal identity. Here the cause itself becomes the effect, i. e., the cause is transformed into the effect, or the effect is the modification of the cause. According to the Mādhyamika system both the terms of cause effect are mutually dependent ( *Pratītyasamutpanna* ) as the cause-effect-relationship is the relativity of things. As both the terms are relative, they are unreal.

Unlike the Mādhyamika the Vedāntin would not reject both terms of the cause-effect-relationship as unreal. He would accept the cause as real and would declare the effect as unreal. He is the *vivartavādin*, according to which the cause-effect-relationship is one-sided dependence, i. e., only the effect depends on the cause and not vice-versa. As the effect is unreal, it is sublated, negated and even rejected.

*Taṭastha-lakṣaṇa* is reaching Brahman from without ( *Svar-*

*ūpāntarābhūtātve sati itaravyāvartakam*). In the *taṭastha* the characteristics of another ( the world ) are conveniently made to indicate Brahman. But *Svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* is reaching Brahman from within (*Svarūpāntarābhūtātve sati anyavyāvartakam*). The three terms of *Svarūpa lakṣaṇa*, *Sat*, *Cit*, *Ānanda* are not synonyms ( *aparyaya* ). They, although, denote one and the same thing but they do not connote one and the same thing. Here the mode of approach is different in each case, *Sat* excludes *asat*; *Cit* excludes *acid*, *Ānanda* excludes *duḥkha*. These terms are not concepts or predicates, i. e., they are not adjectival, they are only substantial, each term is identical with Brahman. The following are the logical implications of the *svārūpalakṣaṇa*.<sup>33</sup>

(i) Here knowledge is discovery, i. e. a direct acquaintance with the thing ( *jñānam tu vastutantram* ).

(ii) Here, subject remains only subject, it is never a predicate. The denotation is the true meaning of a term, the connotation being conceptual is its appearance.

(iii) Existence being substantive could be directly intuited, it is not conceivable. The Vedāntin being a non-speculative is against any ontological derivation of existence from a concept. Whether it is Descartes or Hegel a concept, an idea is more important than existence, as they derive the existence of a thing from its idea or concept. Thus, against the logic of existence of the Vedāntin they believe in a logic of Ideas or concepts.

The *svārūpa-lakṣaṇa* of Brahman, *Sat*, *Cit* and *Ānanda*, defines Brahman as triunal. The question is : Why only three, neither more nor less ? It immediately reminds us the concept of *Prakṛti*, whose nature is *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Like the substantial triunal of Brahman, the Śāṃkhya *Prakṛti* is also triunal. Each of them is *Prakṛti* & the whole of it. T.R.V. Murti



tries to explain the substantive trinity of Brahman, *Sat*, *Cit* and *Ānanda* in the light of three functions of mind, knowing, willing and feeling. *Sattaiva bodhah, bodhaiva sattā* Here existence and knowledge coincide (*Brahmaveda brahmaiva bhavati*). Here one knows Brahman by becoming Brahman. Existence or Substance is self-sufficient and also self-evident, as such it is the Absolute, as the Absolute is infinite and not the finite, it is bliss (*Ānanda*), *Bhūmaiva sukham* ( bliss ), *Satyamjñānāmanantam Brahma*.

The Vedāntic approach towards illusion is cognitive, from the point of view of knowledge. Knowledge depends on the valid means of knowledge, which reveals substance ( Brahman ). As the Brahman is the only reality, it is self-sufficient. It is the only reality, the Absolute. It is also self-evident ( *svayamprakāśa* ).

In an important passage of the *Taittiriya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya* Brahman is defined as *sāmānya*.<sup>34</sup> What is this *sāmānya* ? This is the idea of pure Being ( *sat* ). It is abstracting all specific determinations whatsoever. But Śaṅkara does warn that as it is devoid of all determinations, it should not be taken as pure nothing. The 'being', 'isness' cannot be denied. As it is devoid of all determinations it is not non-existent. Śaṅkara remarks : Brahman free from space, attributes, motion, fruition and difference being in the highest sense and without a second seems to the dull-witted as no more than a non-being.<sup>35</sup> Brahman is held to be the very locus of this universe. The term '*ananta*' has been well explained by Śaṅkara. To be finite means to have a limit. It involves negation. One finite object negates another finite object but could they negate infinite itself. No. ( *Sarve bhedaḥ abhedapūrvakāḥ bhavanti* ).<sup>36</sup>

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# The Concept of Freedom in the Śāṃkara Vedānta

The nondualism of Ācārya Śāṃkara is rooted into some of the Upaniṣadic statements such as : 'Tadekam', 'Ekam Sat', 'Ekamevādvitīyam'. This 'Ekam', 'Advitīyam', i. e. one and nondual Absolute has been termed Brahman and the Upaniṣads define it : 'Satyamjñānāmanantam Brahma'. This Absolute of Vedānta is *Saccidānanda*. It is Reality, Consciousness and Bliss, *Sat*, *Cit* and *Ānanda*. This does not mean plurality of Absolutes, as there is no conceptual distinction; all these denote one entity though in different ways. Brahman is their inexpressible substantial unity. Its realisation is immortality. '*Tatra ko śokaḥ kaḥ mohaḥ ekatvamanupaśyataḥ*'; '*Kṛīyante cāsyā karmāṇi tasmin dṛṣṭeparāvare*'. The realisation of this non-dual Absolute is the highest achievement. This is the summum bonum. This Absolute through its *māyā* agency creates the bewildering mass of phenomenal world—its sun, moon, galaxies of stars, its every minute particle : *Rtasya goṇā*. And this Absolute is also the very inner self of man. The Reality within and without is one and the same.<sup>1</sup> '*Ayam ātmā Brahma*', '*Tattvamasi*'. This is the gist of Advaita of Śāṃkara.

Śrī Bhagavatpāda Śāṃkarācārya was a rare genius who has shaped the unitary character of entire country by religiously integrating it into one sacred land ( *punya bhūmi* ). The entire *Bhārata Bhūmi* is so sacred that even gods aspire to be born here. Because this is the *karma bhūmi* and only from here they can pave the path of liberation : '*Gāyanti devaḥ.... suratvāt*'. In the world-cultural history there is no single intellectual who could mould and reshape the cultural history and

destiny of its so vast people so intensely as is done by Śrī Bhagavatpāda Śaṅkarācārya. This young Advaitin integrated the entire country from Kāshmir to Kanyākumārī and from Dwarika to Puri by establishing four Pīṭhas ( seats ) of Śaṅkarācārya. It is a must for every Hindu to visit these four Pīṭhas of Śaṅkarācārya. Never before was India so integrated religiously into one land as was done by this young genius of India by eliminating all geographical, linguistic and customary distinctions by distributing four places of pilgrimage—Badarikāśrama, Purī, Sringerī and Dwarika Pāṭham all over the country. The remark is so pertinent : There....have been few minds more universal than his.<sup>2</sup> German Philosopher, Schopenhauer was so much impressed by the Upaniṣadic philosophy that he declared : 'In the whole world there is no study so beneficial and so elevating. It has been the solace of my life and it will be the solace of my death. It is literally true even to-day with regard to the Śaṅkara Vedānta....It is the solace of life as well as of death for the common mass of India. When people are restless and helpless, torn by sorrows and sufferings, it is the Śaṅkara Vedānta which provides them peace and thus saves them. That is why it is saving knowledge. Ācārya Śaṅkara in his *Adhyāśabhāṣya* declares that his aim and purpose of writing out *Śārīraka Bhāṣya* is to establish *Ātmadvaitavāda* or *Brahmavāda* so that all sufferings which are rooted into and due to nescience could be eradicated. F. W. Thomas speaks very highly of Śaṅkara Vedānta : 'Thereafter Vedānta was supreme and much adored by all active religions and its idea is implied in all subsequent literature'.<sup>3</sup> His remark is very appropriate, when he says : 'Its doctrine is essentially world idea, not linked to particular people or to any theory of divinely ordered state'.<sup>4</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru asserts : It is this philosophy which represents the dominant philosophic outlook of Hinduism to-day.<sup>5</sup> For

Indira Gandhi, 'Śaṅkarācārya was the greatest historical hero.'<sup>6</sup>

Ācārya Śaṅkara is emphatic on stressing the free nature of man as his very nature, which is the very core of Advaita Vedānta. It is not discovery of Śaṅkara that man's essential nature is freedom itself. It is the very essence of our Vedāntic Philosophy but it was the genius of Śaṅkara which realised the meaning and significance of this concept and awakened our people from their dogmatic slumber of slavery and this is because of this fact that the Śaṅkara Vedānta became the national philosophy of India. After Ācārya Śaṅkara the subsequent Vedāntic tradition was subdivided into two major subschools, either Śaṅkara Vedānta, i. e. the Advaita Vedānta or non-Śaṅkara Vedānta, i. e. the theistic Vedānta. The impact of Śaṅkara Vedānta was so strong that Vedāntins either accepted him and if they did not accept him they suffered very much by the ghost of Śaṅkara Vedānta. Whether Rāmānuja, or Madhva, or Nimbārka or Vallabha or Caitanya, all of them had only one challenge and that is the challenge of Ācārya Śaṅkara. Not only this, theistic literature of the variety and significance of Bhāgavata was interpreted in the light of Śaṅkara Vedānta or in the light of theistic Vedānta. And even here the followers of Śaṅkara Vedānta excelled. The entire Sanskrit world knows the significance of and excellence of Śrīdhari commentary on the *Bhāgavata*. In devotional poetry also the genius of Śaṅkara is unrivalled. True to his philosophy hymns of Ācārya Śaṅkara are not addressed to one single deity or god but to different gods, Viṣṇu, Śiva, Śakti, the Ganges. His devotional songs are so poetic and appealing to heart that they became so popular that they surpassed almost devotional poetry whether addressed to Viṣṇu or Śiva or the Ganges. To illustrate

a few; *Bhaja govindam*, *bhaja govindam*, *Śivoham*, *Śivoham*, *Tataḥ kim*, *tataḥ kim etc.*

It was the impact of Ācārya Śaṁkara that whether it was the Kaśmīra Śaivism or Śaiva Siddhānta their main opposition was with the Śaṁkara Vedānta. Thus Ācārya Śaṁkara was the only challenge not only for the Buddhist, the Jaina, the Cārvāka, the Śāṁkhya-Yoga, the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika and the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā but also for the theistic Vedānta, the Śaivism and Śāktism. So far as the impact of Śaṁkara Vedānta is concerned after its emergence on Indian scene it gradually became formidable. Not only ācāryas of Sanskrit language but even saints of regional language of medieval era like Kabira and Tulasi were much influenced by Śaṁkara Vedānta.

The entire Indian renaissance is rooted into the Śaṁkara Vedānta starting from Ram Mohan Roy through Ram Krishna Paramahansa, Vivekananda, Tagore, Gandhi, K. C. Bhattacharya, Sri Aurobindo to Radhakrishnan. Śaṁkaras conception of self which is freedom itself inspired our great leaders of freedom movement. It was this great concept that Balagangadhar Tilak declared that freedom is our birth right, and this became our single aim and slogan against British rule and India won freedom. This movement was really fought by neo-Vedāntins. Śaṁkara's concept of freedom is not anguished freedom of Sartre, it is rather *saccidānanda*. Freedom is the state of Brahmanhood. This is not an attainment of something new rather it is the realisation of one's own real nature. Śaṁkara does not talk of a heaven which is apart from us but a heaven which is already with us but we have forgotten for the time being. Thus it does not evolve the process of becoming Brahman but it is the realisation of being Brahman.<sup>7</sup> The observation of Deussen is very pertinent : 'Accordingly, in liberation there is no question of becoming something which

does not already exist, but only the attainment of knowledge of what has existed from all eternity.<sup>8</sup> That is why Śaṅkara very lucidly emphasises that freedom is not the fruit of dharma or karma. He Observes : 'But this ( freedom ) is eternal in true sense, eternal without undergoing any change ( *kūṭa-stha nitya* ), omnipresent as ether, free from all modifications, absolutely self-sufficient, not composed of parts, of self luminous nature. That bodiless entity in fact, to which merit and demerit with their consequences and threefold time do not apply, is called release.'<sup>9</sup> Twelves centuries have passed but the impact of Śaṅkara Vedānta is fresh and living on the common mass of our country. It is literally true : 'Śaṅkara's system is unmatched for its metaphysical depth and logical power. Thought follows thought naturally until Advaitism is seen to complete and crown the edifice.'<sup>10</sup>

Śaṅkara Vedānta is *Brahmavāda*. *Māyāvāda* is its logical corollary. Of course, *Māyāvāda* is the doctrine of falsity of bewildering mass of phenomenal world. It means the world is neither real nor unreal. It is just a bundle of contradictions. *Māyāvāda* of Śaṅkara Vedānta has been vehemently criticised by the Vaiṣṇavas, Śaivas and Śāktas alike. Śaṅkara was even declared as *Pracchanna Bauddha* : '*Māyāvādam asat ....Śāstram pracchanna bauddham eva ca*'. But Śaṅkara never maintains that the world is absolutely unreal. He does accept the phenomenality of the world : '*Sarvaprāmāṇasiddho lokavyavahāro*....If we peep into Indian classical literature we find its universal acceptance and application even by those who condemn it. The remark of Ruth Reyna is very pertinent: 'One Can expound māyā with Śaṅkara or against Śaṅkara, but none can expound Māyā without Śaṅkara.....The appeal of Śaṅkara's *Māyāvāda* is so universal and deep rooted into the very hearts of Indian psyche that it could not even be ima-



gined without it. It is so appealing that even illiterate mass, farmers, labourers, Rikshapullers without knowing the alphabets of philosophy know the implications and spirit of *Māyāvāda* and often teach and preach it with full confidence just like a competent authority of this doctrine and not only this, at the moments of utter shock and grief take consolation and inspiration from this doctrine. No philosopher but Śaṅkara and Śaṅkara alone has this charishma and no where else but only in India and India alone it is possible. It is not an exaggeration : His philosophy stands forth complete needing neither a before nor an after'.

Modern Physics has become almost metaphysics. Its leaning is towards Śaṅkara Vedānta. Raja Ramanna writes : The discovery of quantum mechanics and relativity have shaken the very foundations of epistemology. In spite of these violent changes it is only Vedānta which seems to be in a position to absorb the tremendous impact of the new science.<sup>11</sup>

Einstein wondered and expressed his dismay and said that future posterity would hardly believe that a Gandhi in flesh and blood was really born on this earth. It is still more difficult to believe in a dynamic and charismatic personality of Śaṅkara who had command over four vedas at the early age of eight, became master of all Śāstras at twelve and wrote his famous Sārīraka Bhaṣya on *Brahmasūtras* at sixteen, defeated his all rivals throughout the country and vitalised Hinduism with fresh vigour and zeal which was almost rooted out by Buddhism. It was the genius of Śaṅkara which reestablished Hinduism and the present shape of Hinduism is mostly due to Ācārya Śaṅkara.

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## Revelation And Reason and The Advaitic Notion

Professor K. S. Murty sums up the Advaitic conception of four-fold revelation :

(a) There is a partial disclosure of Brahman through the graded forms of existence, from the clod of earth to the gods in heaven ( *Ābrahma stambha paryantam* ).

(b) The veda revealed by God at the beginning of each aeon contains the final truth about Dharma and Brahman. Prof. Murty himself admits in the very beginning of his book 'Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedānta' that this is the main type of revelation accepted by Śaṅkara and accordingly the greater part of his book is concerned with this conception of Vedic revelation.

(c) When people forget the eternal truth in the Veda, then in order to put them back on the right path, and reclaim the Law, God incarnates himself and teaches the quintessence of the Veda.

(d) In the *anubhūti* or integral experience of Brahman, which a knower of Brahman will have, the real nature of Brahman is disclosed.<sup>1</sup>

The Advaita Vedānta holds the 'intrinsic validity-theory, i. e. the theory that all cognition is intrinsically valid and self-luminous. As a matter of fact the Advaita Vedānta has taken over the intrinsic validity of knowledge from the Mīmāṃsā School of Kumārila. 'Sugar is sweet' for instance could be established only by the sense of taste alone and in no way it could be cognised by any other sense at all. So no cognition needs verification. Thus, according to the Advaita Vedānta all

objects are known through cognitions while a cognition is known by itself. Thus all cognition is self-evident. Every cognition is valid in itself unless it is contradicted, e. g. the cognition of rope as a snake. While the truth or validity of cognition is intrinsic and self-luminous, its falsity is due to either misapprehension, doubt or non-apprehension.

The Advaita Vedānta maintains that the capacity of words to signify things is natural and intrinsic. It also upholds the theory of world-cycles. At the beginning of each world-cycle God uses words in the same sense in which they were used in the past-world-cycle. If referents of words differ from aeon to aeon there cannot be any settled order and thus what was called 'good' in the past aeon may be 'bad' in the next aeon. The Advaita Vedānta does not believe in the absolute beginning of the world. God uses words at the beginning of each aeon in the same sense in which they were used in the previous world-cycles ( *Yathāpūrvamakalpayat* ).

The Advaita school follows the doctrine of Upavarṣa, an ancient commentator on the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras*. According to this theory letters are eternal and they are words. 'Ga' is always recognised as 'Ga' because it is eternal. Differences in media and tones cannot change letters. Śaṅkara holds that apparent difference could be explained as due to differences in the audible sounds ( *dhvani* ) made by men at the time of pronunciation.<sup>2</sup> When letters are heard, they leave impressions ( *saṁskāras* ) and when these impressions become combined units, they are called words and these words denote objects. So the Advaita Vedānta holds that since letters are eternal and as words are combined units of letters, therefore, words are also eternal. Like the Mīmāṃsā school the Advaita Vedānta also holds that words signify only universals and through these universals words signify individuals and particulars.

Technical words and proper names are the only exceptions to this but they are not strictly speaking words ( *abhidhāna* ).

The Advaita school holds that the Vedas are *mantra-brāhmaṇātma* ( *mantra-brāhmaṇayoḥ vedanāmadheyam* ). Mantras throw light on the things and deities of rituals. Brāhmaṇas are of three kinds : *vidhis*, *arthavādas* and *Vedānta Vākyas*.

Śaṃkara does maintain the eternity of the Vedas but this eternity is of *pravāharūpa* and not of *kūṭastharūpa*. According to him the Vedas are reliable authority because they teach us about things which are highly useful ( *phalvat* ) and are not known otherwise ( *anadhigata* ) and also they are uncontradicted ( *abādhita* ). Śaṃkara holds that from one world-cycle to the another the stream of Vedic study is kept on unbroken and without beginning. Among post-Śaṃkarites there is controversy on this issue. Vidyāranya maintains that the Vedas are beginningless and are never altered in their form, thus for him the Vedas are not only beginningless but also immutably real. But Prakāśātman and Rāmānanda Saraswatī maintain them as beginningless and endless flow ( *pravāha* ) and they are thus in consonance with Śaṃkara. As usual Vācaspati differs with the Vivaraṇa school on this issue also. According to him the Vedas are in every aeon the same ( *ānupūrvī racanā* ).

Śaṃkara advances following proofs to prove Brahman as the cause of Vedas : (i) These are great books ( *mahat* ) and are mines of all knowledge ( *sarvavijñānākara* ) and are sole sources of our knowledge regarding our *varṇāśramadharmas* and Brahman. They are supplemented by innumerable subsidiary branches of knowledge ( *Vidyāsthāna* ) like the *purāṇas* and *dharmaśāstras*, etc. (iii) Like a lamp, they throw light on all things. (iv) They are like omniscient person, because there is nothing with which they do not deal. Śaṃkara himself holds : The *R̥gveda* is the breath of the great Being.<sup>3</sup>

The Mīmāṃsā School maintains the Veda as impersonal ( *apauruṣeya* ) i. e. it has never an author. The Advaita Vedānta agrees with the Mīmāṃsā conception of *apauruṣeyatva* of Veda and at the same time it also maintains God as the cause of Veda. Thus the Advaita Vedānta makes a reconciliation between the *apauruṣeyatva* of the Veda on the one hand and on the other hand it holds God as the cause of the Veda. Vācaspati maintains God as the cause of Veda but he is not independent. He composes it as it was in the previous aeon. As there is no independent authorship of Veda so it is *apauruṣeya*.

According to the Vivaraṇa School God is not independent even in respect of the order in which Vedic words and sentences are arranged.

According to Śaṅkara God makes the Vedic propositions flash in the minds of the sages in the same linguistic form in which they are now available. That's why even a slight change or mispronunciation of even a single letter will break one's head.<sup>4</sup>

The source of Dharma and Brahman is only Veda. No other composition except the Veda is infallible. Other compositions such as *smṛtis* and *purāṇas* depend on the Veda as inference depends upon perception.<sup>5</sup> Such works are only authoritative only when they are in agreement with the Veda.<sup>6</sup> If they are in conflict with the Veda, they ought to be rejected. Thus according to the Advaita school the Veda is the only true scripture.

Śaṅkara is very clear that as in the case of Dharma, the Veda alone is the source, so is the case with the knowledge of Brahman. 'Śāstrayonitvāt,' *Tasmāt Śāstram pramāṇam*. According to Śaṅkara, *anubhava* means realisation of oneself as Brahman (*brahmātmabhāva*). Śaṅkara holds that *brahmavedabrahmaiva bhavati*, the moment one realises himself as Brahman

he becomes that very moment Brahman. The Vedānta *Vākyas* generate *Brahmasākṣātkāra*. Śaṅkara admits Brahman-intuition, the mental mode of Brahman. If there is mental mode of Brahman how is then nonduality established ? This mental mode of Brahman ( *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti* ) destroys the universe as well as itself. The knowledge derived from *mahāvākyas* is something like the finger which points out an object but it disappears when that object is perceived. When Brahman is revealed all multiplicity disappears, *jñāte dvaitam na vidyate*. According to Śaṅkara *mahāvākyas* directly produce *Brahmajñāna*. Sureśwara, Padmapāda and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī follow Śaṅkara and hold that *mahāvākyas* alone directly lead to *Brahmajñāna*.

Maṇḍana differs from Śaṅkara and maintains *prasaṅkhyāna* as the direct cause of *aparokṣānubhūti*, and he quotes, *tam paśyate niṣkalam dhyāyamānāḥ*.

Vācaspati differs from both these groups. He maintains that neither *mahāvākyās* nor *prasaṅkhyāna* is the principal means of *Brahma-jñāna*. It is *manana* ( contemplation ) of *mahāvākyas* that leads to *aparokṣānubhūti*.

Śaṅkara is very emphatic on the point that in the case of supersensuous things the Veda alone is the source of knowledge.<sup>7</sup> He rejects even Yogic-intuition as *pramāṇa* of Brahman. Both the schools of Advaita Vedānta, Vivaraṇa as well as Bhāmatī follow Śaṅkara and deny the possibility of any supersensuous knowledge through yoga.

Brahman being *nirviśeṣa* cannot be apprehended by any means of knowledge. Neither perception nor inference can apprehend it. As Brahman is free from all attributes and differences it can neither be an object of perception nor inference as it cannot be contacted by any senses nor can have it differentiating mark ( *hetu* ) so that it could even be inferred. So Brahman

could not be established by any empirical means of knowledge. The Advaita Vedānta holds that all proofs advanced by the Nyāya school and the Yoga school to establish the existence of God are not inferences but *yuktis*. An argument which gives a certain knowledge is inference, while an argument which shows only probability is *yukti*. Independent of Veda no inferential knowledge can establish Brahman. According to the Advaita Vedānta theological arguments are no proofs but *yuktis*.<sup>8</sup> Nor does it accept the rational theology. It provides a beautiful critique of a theology based exclusively on reason.<sup>9</sup> It argues that all activity is admitted to be purposive and so must be creation too. What then is the purpose of creation? If it is purposeless, it is like mad man's action. If it is purposeful whose purpose does it serve. God cannot have any end, which he seeks to achieve; nor can he serve the purpose of others. Some schools of thought say God is a person and that a person is one who is indifferent (*udāsīna*). It is incoherent to say that one who is indifferent has created this world.<sup>10</sup> The conclusion arrived at by the Advaita school is that on the analogy of our ordinary experience and by means of inference we can know nothing about God. Since inference can never establish anything that is not in conformity with empirical experience, an omniscient and omnipotent creator of the world can never be inferred.<sup>11</sup> In experience we nowhere meet an omniscient person or one who is able to make something from nothing or from pure matter, or one who is entirely free from desires and passions. So the Advaita school says, on the basis of our experience alone we cannot infer the existence of God. On the other hand the Advaita Vedānta is never guided by the analogy of what is seen but relies solely on the Veda; and that's why it is able to accept Brahman or Pure Consciousness as both the material and the efficient cause of the world, though in experience we nowhere find a conscious



principle to be a material cause or even the same thing being both material and efficient cause.<sup>12</sup>

Prof. Murty is very clear about the scope and applicability of scripture on the one hand and empirical knowledge on the other hand, as propounded in the Advaita Vedānta : According to both Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta there is no conflict between empirical knowledge and *śruti*. The latter is authoritative only in matters supersensual and spiritual. If it contradicts empirical facts it must be understood to be speaking figuratively, allegorically or for the sake of inducing one to follow a particular course of action for one's own good. The great Ācārya has said: A hundred *śruti* texts do not become a *pramāṇa* if they say fire is cold or does not give light for no one can cognise what is opposed to what is seen.<sup>13</sup>

So far we examined an exposition of Advaitic conception of revelation. Now an attempt is made to expound the Advaitic conception of reason and its scope and limit.

### *Three-fold function of Tarka :*

Application of six criteria to ascertain the purport of scriptural passages involves *tarka*, Vācaspati says that discussion of scriptural passages is in fact *tarka*. So according to the Advaita school *tarka* is needed (i) to ascertain the purport of scriptural passages, (ii) to remove doubts (*saṁśaya*) and contrary beliefs ( *viparyāsa* ) and (iii) to convince us of the probability of the existence of what is to be known. i e. Brahman ( *prameya sambhava niścaya* ).<sup>14</sup>

Śaṅkara does not accept pure *tarka* at all. He admits *śrutyānugrahita tarka*. According to Vācaspati *tarka* must fulfil three conditions : (i) It must be dependent on scripture : (ii) It must elucidate the content of scripture, and (iii) it must not be opposed to the scripture.

*Negative Role of Tarka :*

As a true philosopher Śaṅkara does hold that by the mere ascertainment of the meaning of scripture, right vision is not established. There are other schools of philosophy such as Cārvāka, Sāṃkhya and the Yoga etc. which claim to give right knowledge. Some of them are highly respected and supposed to be omniscient, such as Kapila. Some people believe that the Sāṃkhya is on a par with the Advaita Vedānta. But it is not so. To remove this mistake the inconsistency and inner contradictions of such systems must be fully exposed. And this can be done only by independent reasoning without the help of scripture. In this way reasoning would demonstrate the inconsistencies of rival schools of philosophy and at the same time it would also be established that only Vedānta is a true philosophy.

*Tarka* also removes another danger. The other rival systems of philosophy quote Vedic sentences and utilise them to establish their own positions. Śaṅkara holds that such interpretations of scriptural passages are not real interpretations rather they are distortions. These distortions could be demonstrated only by independent reasoning.

In the *Upaniṣads* we often find passage, *Ātmā va' re śrotavyaḥ, mantavyaḥ, nididhyāsitaḥ*. Śaṅkara explains that *śravaṇa* ( hearing ) is receiving instructions from one's teacher and from scriptures; meditation ( *manana* ) is discussion through reasoning ( *tarka* ); and contemplation ( *nididhyāsana* ) is steadfast knowing of it. According to Śaṅkara scriptural testimony and argument together demonstrate it. In the Advaita school *vicāra* ( *tarka* ) has a significant role. Sureśvara and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī hold that hearing ( *śravaṇa* ) of *mahāvākyas* is the principal means of Brahma-realisation but it must be aided by *manana* and *nididhyāsana*.

*Anvaya-Vyatireka Tarka :*

Śaṅkara does claim that Brahman could be known through the method of *Anvaya-Vyatireka Tarka*, i. e. reasoning based on the presence and absence of connection. *Anvaya-vyatirekābhyām niṣprapañcam prapañcayet*. In the *Upaniṣads* he has demonstrated this methodology.

(i) Whatever is an object of cognition, cannot be Ātman. The body, senses, mind, reason, and even ego-sense are objects of cognition. So they cannot be Ātman.

(ii) Whatever is material ( *jaḍa* ) cannot be Ātman. Body, senses and manas etc. are material, they cannot be Ātman.

(iii) Whatever is mutable ( *parivartya* ) cannot be Ātman. The body, senses and manas etc. are mutable i. e. they grow, decay and come to an end, so they cannot be Ātman.

(iv) In the waking and dream states whatever is present is found absent in sleeping state, therefore whatever is absent ( *vyatirikta* ) in the sleeping state, i.e. body, senses and manas etc. are absent in the sleeping state, they cannot be Ātman. But the *Turiya*, i. e. Ātman is present in all the states as underlying and unifying principle, so it is the only reality.

Śaṅkara examines even Arthāpatti ( postulation ) : *Pīno' yam devadatto divā na bhunkte, bhojanam vinā pīnatvaṁ katham ? Devdattaḥ ratrau bhunkte*. When we see that Devadatta is fat but he does not eat in day time, here we find a conflict between the fatness of Devadatta and his not-eating in the day-time, this conflict is removed when we postulate that he eats at night. Seeing the relative nature of world, we may postulate the Absolute, but through this postulation the nature of Absolute cannot be known. The Absolute could be known only through the scripture.

Prof. Murty examines the nature of revelation in other Hindu schools also and concludes that the Vedic authority is accepted by all. Even the Nyāya system which is the ardent advocate of supremacy of reasoning ultimately surrenders to the scriptures with regard to *Dharma*. In the realm of dharma, the Nyāya holds, reason is useful only in protecting the truth revealed by scripture from heresies and has no positive role.<sup>15</sup>

Prof. Murty himself claims in the very preface of his book : In general, my views on revelation in this book are in agreement with those of the Nyāya writer Jayanta, while my conception of God differs very little from that of Rāmānuja.<sup>16</sup>

It is true that Jayanta is very catholic towards religious beliefs and practices. He accepts that scriptures of other faiths are as authoritative as is our Veda. He also claims that religious practices do differ, but what does it matter whether one is a Hindu saṁnyāsī or a Jaina ascetic ? The Veda itself mentions several alternate ways of reaching heaven. Buddhism and Jainism may be additional alternate ways.

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## Impact of Śrī Bhagavatpāda Śamkarācārya on Indian Culture

The relics of ancient cultures like Māyā, Anteka and Ajateka etc. have been traced from the deep depths of oceans, caves of mountains and dense forests of the world. Once Australia, Africa, South America and Indian subcontinent were joined. We know a little only of a few ancient cultures that too either through their archaeological remains or through the scattered pages of history. But Indian culture or Vedic culture which is also termed as Hindu culture is still vibrating and pulsating with meanings. What is the sustaining force of its perpetual vibration and pulsation? What is the secret of its perennial character? How could it embrace, mingle and comingle whosoever came to it? How could Indian culture build up its mighty stream by embracing the currents and cross-currents of the Indus Valley, the Aryan, the Dravidian, the Austric, the Scythian, the Greek, the Hūnas, the Iranian, the Mangolian even the semitic (Islamic and Christian) races? Nowhere else in the world is this sublime generosity of embracing so many races and cultures seen in the course of time as in India. The Parsis, the followers of Zoroaster have settled down in the western part of this country for over ten centuries. In Cochin, there is an ancient colony of Jews. It is said that it was St. Thomas, one of the twelve Apostles of Christ who came to India and planted the seed of Christianity just after the passing away of Christ. Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism came out of Hinduism. India is, no doubt, a geographical entity but still more an

integral rather perfect vision of life ! What is the secret of its perfection ?

The sustaining and vitalising force of Indian Culture is rooted in its Advaitic philosophy of Vedānta. The Upaniṣads declare : '*Tadekaṁ*', '*Ekam Sat*', '*Ekamevādvitīyam*'. This '*Ekam*', '*Advitīyam*', i. e. one and nondual Absolute has been termed Brahman and the Upaniṣads define it : '*Satyamjñāna-manantam Brahma*'. This Absolute of Vedānta is *Saccidānanda*. It is Reality, Consciousness and Bliss; *Sat*, *Cit* and *ānanda*. This does not mean a plurality of Absolutes, as there is no conceptual distinction; all these denote one entity though in different ways. Brahman is their inexpressible substantial unity. Its realisation is immortality : '*Tatra ko śokaḥ kaḥ mohaḥ ekatvamanupaśyataḥ*'; '*Kṣīyantecāśya karmāṇi tasmindrṣṭe parāvare*'. The realisation of this non-dual Absolute is the highest achievement. This is the summum bonum. This Absolute through its *Māyā* agency creates the bewildering mass of phenomenal world—its sun, moon, galaxies of stars, its every minute particle: '*Rtasya gopā*'. And this Absolute is also the very inner self of man. The Reality within and without is one and the same.<sup>1</sup> '*Ayam ātmā Brahma*', '*Tattvamasi*'. This is the gist of Advaita Vedānta.

Śrī Bhagavatpāda Śaṅkarācārya was a rare genius who has shaped the unitary character of entire country by religiously integrating it into one scared land ( *punya bhūmi* ). The entire *Bhārata Bhūmi* is so sacred that even gods aspire to be born. Because this is the *Karma Bhūmi* and only from here they can pave their path of liberation : *Gāyanti devāḥ.... suratvāt*. In the world cultural history there is no single intellectual who could mould and reshape the cultural history and destiny of its so vast people so intensely as is done by Śrī Bhagavatpāda Śaṅkarācārya. This young Advaitin inte-

grated the entire country from Kashmir to Kanyakumari and from Dwarika to Puri by establishing four seats ( Pīṭhas ) of Śaṃkarācārya. It is a must for every Hindu to visit these four Pīṭhas of Śaṃkarācārya. Never before was India so integrated religiously into one land as was done by this young philosopher. Thus religious unity of India was established for ever by this young genius of India by eliminating all geographical, linguistic and customary distinctions by distributing four places of pilgrimage—Badarikāśrama, Puri, Śringerī and Dwārika all over the country. The remark is so pertinent : 'There have been few minds more universal than his.'<sup>2</sup>

German philosopher, Schopenhauer was so much impressed by the Upaniṣadic philosophy that he declared : 'In whole world there is no study so beneficial and so elevating. It has been the solace of my life and it will be the solace of my death'. It is literally true even to-day with regard to the Śaṃkara Vedānta. It is the solace of life as well as of death for the common masses of India even to-day. When people are restless and helpless, torn by sorrows and sufferings, it is the Śaṃkara Vedānta which provides them peace and thus saves them. That's why it is saving knowledge. Ācārya Śaṃkara in his Adhyāsabhāṣya declares his aim and purpose of writing out *Śārīraka Bhāṣya* is to establish the *Ātmādvaitavāda* or *Brahmavāda* so that all sufferings which are rooted into and due to nescience could be eradicated. F. W. Thomas speaks very highly of Śaṃkara Vedānta : 'Thereafter Vedānta was supreme and 'much adored by all active religions', and its idea is implied in all subsequent literature.'<sup>3</sup> His remark is very appropriate, when he says : 'Its doctrine is essentially world idea, not linked to a particular people or to any theory of divinely ordered state.'<sup>4</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru asserts : 'It is this philosophy which represents the dominant philosophic



outlook of Hinduism to-day'.<sup>5</sup> For Indira Gandhi, Śaṅkarācārya was the greatest historical hero.<sup>6</sup> Ācārya Śaṅkara was so emphatic on stressing the free nature of man as his very nature, which is the very core of Advaita Vedānta. It was not a discovery of Śaṅkara that man's essential nature is freedom itself. It is the very essence of our Vedāntic philosophy but it was the genius of Śaṅkara which realised the meaning and significance of this concept and awakened our people from their dogmatic slumber of slavery and this is because of this fact that Śaṅkara Vedānta became the national philosophy of India. After Ācārya Śaṅkara the subsequent Vedāntic tradition was divided into two major subschools, either Śaṅkara Vedānta, i. e. the Advaita Vedānta or non-Śaṅkara Vedānta, i. e. the theistic Vedānta. The impact of Śaṅkara Vedānta was so strong that Vedāntins either accepted him and if they did not accept him they suffered very much by the ghost of Śaṅkara Vedānta. Whether Rāmānuja, or Madhva, or Nimbārka or Vallabha or Caitanya, all of them had only one challenge and that was the challenge of Ācārya Śaṅkara. Not only this, theistic literature of the variety and significance of *Bhāgavata* were interpreted either in the light of Śaṅkara Vedānta or in the light of theistic Vedānta. And even here the followers of Śaṅkara Vedānta excelled. The entire Sanskrit world knows the significance and excellence of Śrīdhara commentary on the *Bhāgavata*. In devotional poetry also the genius of Śaṅkara is unrivalled. True to his philosophy hymns of Ācārya Śaṅkara are not addressed to one single god but to the different gods, Viṣṇu, Śiva, Śakti, the Ganges. His devotional songs are so poetic and appealing to heart that they became so popular that they surpassed almost devotional poetry whether addressed to Viṣṇu or Śiva or Śakti or the Ganges. To illustrate a few; '*Bhāgavindam*, '*bhaja govindam*', '*Śivoham*', '*Tataḥ kim*', etc.

It was the impact of Ācārya Śaṅkara that whether it was the Kāśmīra Śaivism or the Śaiva Siddhānta their main opposition was with the Śaṅkara Vedānta. Thus Ācārya Śaṅkara was the only challenge not only for the Buddhist, the Jaina, the Cārvāka, the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Pūrva Mīmāṃsa but also for theistic Vedānta, the Śaivism and Śāktism.

Ācārya Śaṅkara's impact either positive or negative was not only on philosophical systems of India rather it was so universal that no cultural discipline remained uninfluenced with the Śaṅkara Vedānta. In the following pages an humble attempt is made to examine the impact of Śaṅkara Vedānta on the perennial character of Indian culture :

Brahman=*Rasa* ( *Raso vai saḥ* )=Ānanda=Ātman, i. e. when the heart of human soul is surcharged with the sentimentality, currents and cross-currents of noble sentiments burst forth out of it, the totality of these currents and cross-currents ( of noble sentiments ) is called culture. Culture consists in the realisation of man's own divine nature. It is the process of perfection as it is the perfect which is really beautiful. Beauty is the balance. It is in this balance, there is rhythm, emotional resonance or musical echo. Our Ṛṣis realised the ultimate Truth when they were well established in *Ṛtaṁbharā Prajñā*. They found in it the rhythm of the Real, that is why it is so sweet and beautiful. The entire world is illumined and radiant with the light and Radiation of the Real : *Tasya bhāsā*. This world is due to the dance of Lord Śiva, the Naṭarāja, i. e. this world is due to *Ṛtam=Nartanam=Rhythm* of the Real= Lord Śiva : *Sā sphurattā mahāsattā', Māyām tu prakṛtim vidyāt māyinam tu maheśvaraḥ'*. This world is *Kṛti*=creation of Māyī Maheśvara. Indian concepts about *Kṛti*, *Prakṛti* and *Samskṛti* are quite clear. We discussed the concepts of *Kṛti*.

Let us examine the concept of *Prakṛti*. This phenomenon of sense and intellect which is in space and time and which is under the operation of causation has been termed as *Prakṛti*.<sup>7</sup> This *Prakṛti* or physical world is well established by perception. This world of insentient things is under the regulation of invariable law of causation.<sup>8</sup> Culture has been defined as the realisation of human values. It is a big dictionary of human excellence.<sup>9</sup> Thus it is the realisation of man's divine nature : 'Īśvaraḥ sarvabhūtānāṃ hṛddeṣe arjuna tiṣṭhati.' O Arjuna, God Himself sits at the very heart of every thing. Through his divine nature man becomes universal from particular, perfect from imperfect and macrocosm from microcosm. The cultural world is the world of symbolic expressions of investigations of perennial history of meaning and noble nature of man.<sup>10</sup> Again it has been well observed by the same scholar : 'In so far, however, as the study of culture is the study of symbols and meanings, ideas and experiences, values and creativity, it tends to acquire the nature of a hermeneutic and a spiritual phenomenology, as ideal dialectic and critique of values.'<sup>11</sup>

The Western philosophy particularly the semitic religion treats *Prakṛti*, the physical world simply as a means. It is the right of man to harness and control the natural resources of the world. It is due to this attitude towards nature that they excelled in science and technology. Their attitude towards nature is of pragmatic utility. Nature and its resources which once used to be blessings for us have been so much harnessed and exploited that they have become almost hell. The entire ecological disbalance is due to this Western attitude towards nature. Water, air and the entire environment is badly polluted. It is almost difficult to breathe in the cosmopolitan cities of Europe and American subcontinent. The

world witnessed the recent explosion of the Russian atomic reactor and aftereffects of its radiation. Science and technology, no doubt, appear to us as boons and blessings as they have converted this earth into heaven so for comfort and facilities are concerned but they have stolen our peace and happiness.

Just on the contrary, Indian attitude towards nature is entirely different. Nature, i. e. the physical world is as important as the human world. It has got equal status. Not only this, according to the Śaṅkara Vedānta, the Reality within and without is one and the same. Indian philosophy and culture flourished in the very lap of nature. The Indian sages lived and underwent penance in the surroundings of nature. The forests and mountain caves were their abodes. Our entire cultural heritage, whether it is literature or drama-turgy, sculpture or poetics sing the glory of nature. *Rāmāyana*, *Mahābhārata*, *Śākuntalam*, *Uttararāmācaritam* and *Meghadūtam* abound with picturesque depiction of nature and beautiful scenes. Nature, therefore, is never treated as an inert phenomenon. It is not only living rather it is divine and therefore so lively and beautiful. Indian literature is full of beautiful and attractive episodes of forest life and peaceful hermitage. Though we are gone, the love-utterance of the emperor, Duṣyanta who is charmed and mad after the divine beauty of Śākuntalā the forest-girl of Kālidāsa is immortal. *Maduramāsām darśanam, hate 'smi'*, it is so beautiful to see at her, I am really dead. Though centuries have passed, the entire surroundings of forest is still surcharged with the pathos of Sītā. The most dominant Indian attitude towards nature is Advaitic, it is vision of *Īśāvāsyamidam sarvam*, it is all divine, therefore, the entire nature is radiant with divine light, *tasya bhāsā*. In our tradition, it

is because of this attitude that utmost importance is given to the recitation of *Swastyayana*, i. e. *Śāntipāṭha* : *Dyauḥ śāntiḥ antarikṣa- śāntirevaśāntiḥ*. The Vedic *Ṛṣi* wishes peace to every thing—the heaven, the sky, the earth, water, herbs, vegetables, *Viśvedeva*, *Brahman*. Peace and peace alone.

We discussed the concept of *Ṛtam* which is the regulative force of nature, the external world. The same force regulates our desires, will and thought too. Thus there is a beautiful identity between the external world as well as the internal world. This is the secret of *Gāyatrī* also. The sun which vitalises and illumines the entire external world the same sun should vitalise and illumine to my intellect, the internal organ also. *Ācārya Śaṅkara* was the first strong genius to realise the significance of the advaitic tendency of our ancient *Vedāntic* heritage and it is he who advocated and established it into such a logically coherent system of philosophy that it became almost the synonym for sometimes of the entire Indian Philosophy. I do not say that *Ācārya Śaṅkara* is the propounder of this system. But he is the best advocate of this system. He discovered it from different religious institutions and rituals and from other cultural sources. The institution of sacrifice ( *Yajña* ) conveys the same secret. It is well illustrated in the *Bhagavadgītā* :

*Brahmārpaṇam brahmahavirbrahmāgnau brahmaṇā hutam, Brahmaiva tena gantavyam brahmakarmasamādhinā. 2. 24.*

Thus sacrifice is just an offering for becoming *Brahman*, the Perfect. But this perfection is realised after many steps. Daily sacrifice is obligatory for each and every Hindu householder. The five daily sacrifices are : *Brahma Yajña*, *Pitr Yajña*, *Deva Yajña*, *Bhūta Yajña* and *Mānuṣya Yajña*, *yajñe sarvaṇ pratiṣṭhitam. Tasmāt yajñaṇ paramāṇ vadanti*. It is

these sacrifices that provide Hinduism the highest pedestal and make it most generous and universal. This is the secret that no semitic religion can stand with Hinduism. All the Hindu religious rituals, sacrifices, offerings, prayers and Yoga etc. are means of self-realisation :

*Tametamātmānam brāhmaṇāḥ yajñena dānena,  
Tapasā nāśakena vividiṣanti.*

By surrendering one's ego one becomes macrocosm from microcosm, and the Lord Himself who is macrocosm becomes microcosm. The Lord Kṛṣṇa is bought by Mīrā. Cowherd-girls of Vrindābana compelled Lord Kṛṣṇa to dance by offering a little amount of sour milk to him. Its so beautiful :

*Aho citramahocitram vande tatpremabandhanam,  
Yadbaddham muktidam muktam brahma*

*krīḍāmr̥gikṛtam*

Hinduism is *Śāstra*-oriented. Is it *Pothī*-dharma ? No. Ācārya Śaṅkara condemns even Śrutis and maintain that even if thousands of śrutis declare that fire is cold, we are not to believe in these Śrutis. If *Śāstra* does not take into account the common man and worldly life, it is meaningless. The sky is our father and the earth is our mother. Synthesis between *Śāstra* and *Loka* is a must.<sup>1 2</sup>

The *Karma* theory of Hinduism is also rooted into the concept of *Rta*. At the level of space and time, this concept of *Rta*, operates as the principle of causality and at the level of human conduct it operates as the doctrine of *Karma*. Thus the concepts of causality and morality are rooted in the concept of *Rta*. The theory of *Karma* is not fatalism rather it is the principle of freedom. In the Hinduism man is not condemned to be free rather it is his very nature which is *Saccidānanda*. The two corollaries of *Karma* doctrine are the concepts of rebirth and immortality of human souls.

The *Puruṣārthacatuṣṭaya*, *Dharma*, *Artha*, *Kāma* and *Mokṣa* are four human values of life but among these four human values, *Mokṣa* is the summum bonum. *Dharma* plays the central role : *Dharmādarthaśca kāmāśca*. The worldly prosperity and sex-pleasure are values but they must be regulated by morals : *trivargam sevet*. The *Kāmasūtra* was conceived only in India. Thus Indian culture synthesises worldly prosperity with the concept of liberation, worldly pleasures with spirituality.

If culture is the realisation of noble human values and spirituality, civilization is the aquisition of worldly prosperity and comforts. It is obvious that in a civilised society a great mass of barbarism may exist,<sup>13</sup> but a cultured society is through and through noble. Culture is not any good or bad human conduct. It is rather the realisation of well established noble conducts and values. It is the realisation of man's own divinity and spirituality.<sup>14</sup> Indian culture is rooted into the higher wisdom of Vedānta. When in due course of time it is polluted, God Himself incarnates and rectifies it : '*Sambhāvāmi yuge yuge*'.

Brahman = *Pranava* = *Parā Vāc* = *Citi* = *Rasa* = *Ānanda*. The one nondual Absolute through its *Māyā* agency assumes different forms depending on the sentiments of its devotees : '*Ekam sat viprāḥ bahudhā vadanti*'. Different constituents of Indian culture, its poetics, dramaturgy, literature, sculpture, painting, music, dance and other fine arts are rooted into the concept of '*raso vai saḥ*'. Bharata the propounder of *Nāṭyaśāstram* represents more the spirit of composite culture of India than any one else. As in his drama on its dais there is a synthetic unity of different constituents of culture, music, dance, poetry, sculpture etc., so is the case with our Indian culture in which currents and cross-currents of so many sub-cultures have mingled and comingled.

Indian Aesthetics is the just synonym of Indian life. The Upaniṣads declare that self is the dearest principle; *Ātmanastu kāmāya sarvam khalu priyam bhavati*. All human creation is rooted into the depiction of beautiful. Any creation of beauty is the creation of art. Any human creation is beautiful as it reflects the very self of its creator. The essence of any piece of creation lies in its admiration. An artist creates out of inert and gross substance something but it appears vibrating and pulsating with life and meaning. It becomes an object of admiration. Thus in the realisation of beautiful, there is the realisation of self : Self = Bliss = Beautiful. If a piece of creation is surcharged with the poetic meaning, there is emergence of beautiful. There is nothing in our Indian Aesthetics which is evil or ugly. Even so called lower emotions, fear, anger, sorrow etc. are converted into noble emotions through the chemicals of noble sentiments. For example anger is converted into vitality, sorrow into pathos. Is it less admirable that the ugly is converted into beautiful ? But it is possible only when the very inner heart is touched. The spontaneous poetry came out of pathos when Vālmiki, the first poet of India felt shocked when one of the Krauncha pairs was killed at the moment of their sex-game. The western tragedies believe in the principle of catharsis which is based on the principle of power ( *Śakti* ), but according to Indian Aesthetics when we become introvert, look into our selves, we feel peace because we get a glimpse of our own self.

Just above an humble attempt is made over the nature and scope of culture and in this light a brief survey of Indian culture with its different constituents is made. We find in our ancient cultural legacy the dominance of Advaitic notion and credit goes to Ācārya Śaṅkara who established it into a major philosophical system of the world. It is already observed that



in our tradition we have *Līlā puruṣa* and not historical person (*Itihāsa puruṣa*). But it is true that after his emergence on Indian scene Ācārya Śaṃkara could not be ignored. We discussed the legacy of Ācārya Śaṃkara over the different constituents of Indian culture. The entire Indian renaissance is rooted into the Śaṃkara Vedānta, starting from Ram Mohan Roy through Ram Krishna Paramahansa, Vivekananda, Tagore, Gandhi, K. C. Bhattacharya, Sri Aurobindo and Radhakrishnan. Śaṃkara's conception of self which is freedom itself inspired our great leaders of freedom movement. It was this great concept that Balgangadhar Tilak declared that freedom is our birth right and which became our single aim and slogan against British rule and India won freedom. This movement was really fought by neo-Vedāntins. Twelve centuries have passed but the impact of Śaṃkara Vedānta is still fresh and living on the mass of our country. It is literally true : 'Śaṃkara's system is unmatched for its metaphysical depth and logical power. Thought follows thought naturally until Advaitism is seen to complete and crown the edifice.'<sup>15</sup>

Śaṃkara Vedānta is *Brahmavāda*. *Māyāvāda* is its direct corollary. Of course, *Māyāvāda* is the doctrine of falsity of bewildering mass of phenomenal world. It means that the world is neither real nor unreal. It cannot be categorised or described either as real or unreal. It is just a bundle of contradictions. Yes, it is. *Māyāvāda* of Śaṃkara Vedānta has been vehemently criticised by the Vaiṣṇavas, Śaivas and Śaktas. Śaṃkara was declared even as *Pracchanna Bauddha* : *Māyāvādam asāt śāstram pracchannam bauddha eva ca, 'Māyāvādam avaidikām'*. But Śaṃkara never maintains that the world is absolutely unreal. He does accept the phenomenality of the world : *Sarvaprāmāṇyasiddhe lokavyavahāre*. If we peep into Indian classical literature we find its universal acceptance and application even by those who condemn it.

The remark of Ruth Reyna is very pertinent : 'One can expound Māyā with Śaṅkara or against Śaṅkara, but none can expound Māyā without Śaṅkara.' The appeal of Śaṅkara's *Māyāvāda* is so universal and deep rooted into the very hearts of Indian masses that Indian cultural heritage could not be imagined without the doctrine of *Māyāvāda*. It is so appealing that even the illiterate mass, farmers, labourers, Riksha-pullers without knowing the alphabets of philosophy know the implication and spirit of *Māyāvāda* and often preach it with full confidence just like a competent authority of this doctrine and not only this, at the moments of utter shock and grief take consolation and inspiration. No philosopher but Śaṅkara and Śaṅkara alone has this charisma and no where else but only in India and India alone it is possible. It is not an exaggeration : 'His philosophy stands forth complete needing neither a before nor an after.'

Modern Physics has become almost metaphysics. Its leaning is towards Śaṅkara Vedānta. Raja Ramanna writes : 'The discovery of quantum mechanics and relativity have shaken the very foundations of epistemology. In spite of these violent changes it is only Vedānta which seems to be in a position to absorb the tremendous impact of the new science.'<sup>16</sup> T. R. V. Murti's remark is equally accurate : 'A vicious materialistic philosophy produces unrest, strife and bitterness among men, as it is based on egoistic premises—appropriation and domination. Only a spiritual philosophy can serve as the basis of a world-culture. The essence of this consists in the utter negation of all egoity and the realisation of unity of all beings. It is only Absolutism of Spirit that can make for the fundamental unity of existence and at the same time allow for differences that are exhibited in the great cultural groups of the world. The transcendence of Spirit means its freedom.

from empirical standpoint, and universality. Different ways of realising the Spirit are quite compatible with its universality.<sup>17</sup> Einstein wondered and expressed his dismay and said that future posterity would hardly believe that a Gandhi in flesh and blood was really born on this earth. It is still more difficult to believe in a dynamic and charismatic personality of Śaṃkara who had command over four Vedas at the early age of eight, became master of all Śāstras at twelve and wrote his famous *Śārīraka Bhāṣya* over *Brahmasūtras* at sixteen, defeated his all rivals throughout the country and vitalised Hinduism with fresh vigour and zeal which was almost eradicated and rooted out by Buddhism. It was the genius of Śaṃkara which reestablished Hinduism and, Buddhism was rooted out from India for more than one thousand years. Present shape of Hinduism is mostly due to Ācārya Śaṃkara.

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## Some Fundamental Issues of Post-Sāṃkara Vedānta in the Light of the Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī

Prakāśānanda, the author of the *Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, proceeds with the advaitic basic doctrine that the ( *ātman* ) is the only reality, which is one without a second,<sup>1</sup> and which is by nature Being, Consciousness and Bliss ( *sac-cid-ānanda* ).<sup>2</sup> The most remarkable thing in the VSM is the constant emphasis on the bliss ( *ānanda* ) aspect of the Self<sup>3</sup> by its author (which is just opposed to that of Śāṃkara, who avoids this aspect of the Self as far as possible ).<sup>4</sup> The verses from 54 to 65 ( from page 244 to 247 ) of VSM leave an impact on its reader as if its author is speaking from a mystic plane and has realised the ecstasy of bliss. Under such mystical ecstasies P. has become much more radical in denouncing the unreality of the manifold world than other Advaitins and one is reminded of the radical Advaitavāda of Gauḍapāda, who was under a great influence of Mahāyāna Buddhism. In his philosophical analysis, P. does not stick to a certain philosophical dogma; rather he transcends step by step all philosophical levels only to reach the ultimate Truth.

Illusionistic reconstruction of *jīva* and the world :

The advaitic position that the Self is the only reality imp-

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Abbreviations used :

SLS Siddhāntaleśasamgraha, Acyutagranthamālī, Kāśī, Samvat 2011.

VSM Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī, Calcutta, 1935.

lies that all manifold is under the sphere of unreal, i. e. appearance, whose principle is Nescience ( *avidyā* ) or Deceit ( *māyā* ).<sup>5</sup> It is through this principle of illusion, i. e., *māyā* or *avidyā* that the Advaitins reestablish the world of manifold things ( *prapañca* ) and the existence of finite subjects ( *jīvas* ) bound in this world. As a solution to the above task, there have been many approaches. The most important alternatives open to the advaitic thinkers can be deduced from a sketch given by Prakāśātman in the 7 th Varṇaka of his Vivaraṇa. From this exposition of the Vivaraṇa we may abstract 4 main models through which the Advaitins could and did reestablish the manifold world ( *prapañca* ) and the existence of bound subjects ( *jīvas* ). They may be arranged in the following order :

1. The principle of illusion causes an ( illusory ) trichotomy of Consciousness into pure *brahman*, creator ( *īśvara* ) and *jīva*.
2. The principle of illusion causes a dichotomy of Consciousness into *brahman* = *īśvara* on the one hand, *jīva* on the other.
3. The principle of illusion causes a dichotomy of Consciousness into pure *brahman* on the one hand, *jīva* = creator on the other.
4. The principle of illusion turns *brahman* itself immediately into *jīva* and in this sense *brahman* is also creator of the world.

These different advaitic models have been well differentiated as one may see in the SLS ( pp. 81 to 120 ). The Vivaraṇa school favours *pratibimbavāda* which holds the *jīva* to be a reflection of *brahman*, which as the prototype ( *bimba* ) is *īśvara*.<sup>6</sup> And then again, this *pratibimbavāda* has another

variety i. e., *ābhāsavāda*, according to which the reflection (*pratibimba*) is unreal (*ābhāsa*).<sup>7</sup> The Bhāmatī school maintains *avaccheda-vāda*, which regards the consciousness to be limited by Nescience.<sup>8</sup> In the last case, there are many *jīvas* (*nānājīva-vāda*), while in the first case, if there is considered to be only one reflection in Nescience, there may be only one *jīva*, as is the case with 4th model, according to which as there is only one *jīva*, other *jīvas* are simply imagined ones (*jīvābhāsa*).

The theory of *jīva* in the VSM :

The VSM follows the 4th model given by Prakāśātman. according to which *brahman* itself through its own *avidyā* becomes the *jīva*. In the VSM we find a long Pūrvapakṣa ( VSM 15—91 ) in which the opponent refuting the followers of Maṇḍana ( 3rd model of Prakāśātman ) holds that the Self (*ātman*) which is *brahman*, is the substratum as well as object of Nescience ( cf. 91, 1 ). As Prakāśānanda on these issues does not refute the opponent, rather makes the result of the opponent's argumentation the basis of his own exposition ( cf. com. on VSM, p. 15 : *siddhāntimatam avalambya ekadeśino matam pūrvapakṣi prācaṣṭe* ), and in other passages he himself, too, occasionally expresses ideas which are in harmony with the ideas of this opponent, we make then use of the statements of this opponent also ( except his false conclusions on p. 91, 3—6 ) while describing the system of P. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that many important ideas are completely relegated to the Pūrvapakṣa and by this P., perhaps, wants to show that he is not much interested in the advaitic issues of *jīva* and the world, rather with the help of different steps, he wants to reach the ultimate nature of the Self which is release.

Thus, for P. the highest Self, i. e., the *brahman* itself through its own *avidyā* becomes the *jīva*<sup>9</sup>. It does not seem that P. considers this relationship of the Self with Nescience to be a reflection ( *pratibimba* ) though his attitude towards the *pratibimba-vāda* ( 1st model of Prakāśātman ) is not very much clear from the text : On p. 171, p. lets the opponent, who is obviously here speaking on behalf of P. ( cf. the resumption on p. 173, 3—6 and p. 243, 5—8), refute the theory (advocated by Vidyāranya) that the *jīva* is an appearance ( *ābhāsa* ), i. e., an unreal ( *asatya* ) reflection of consciousness of *ātman* ( VSM 172, 10 ), and also lets him offer, as the secondary alternative ( VSM 172, 10 ), the theory that the *jīva* is, indeed, a reflection of *brahman*, but still real ( *satya* ). Here again is clear the disinterest of P. against the speculative reconstruction of world and the *jīvas* in it. Nevertheless, it is evident that P. is inclined towards the 4th model, according to which the Self itself is the substratum as well as the object of Nescience and is itself directly the *jīva* also ( cf. 172, 8 — 0 ). Accordingly, P. lets the *pratibimbādvāda* be refuted by an opponent without defending it in the Uttarapakṣa. We, thus, can in the VSM largely proceed with the theory that the highest Self or *brahman* through its Nescience is directly the *jīva*, and is being veiled by its own Nescience ( *ā-vṛ* )<sup>10</sup>, and experiencing instead of its real nature, the manifold world<sup>11</sup>, whose creator as a *jīva* it itself is<sup>12</sup>.

The problem of the veilmant of the self-luminous Self :

The assumption of a veilmant of self-luminous Self is, however, problematic. If the Self is self-luminous, i.e., due to its own conscious nature, then the idea that it is object of Nescience and as such veiled by it, is as implausible as the idea of obscuration of the light of the self-luminous sun on a



clear mid-day sky ( VSM 8, 5—7; 106, 1 ). Against this P. remarks : “And yet just as blear eyed owls fancy that the self-luminous sun at noon is enveloped in darkness, so the grossly ignorant imagine that the Self is concealed by Nescience”<sup>23</sup>. The association of the *jīva*, which is identical with the self-luminous Brahman, with Nescience, is consequently not a reality, rather it exists only in the imagination of this *jīva*<sup>14</sup>. According to another passage ( which is put into the mouth of the above-mentioned opponent and seems to reflect older attempts ) the self-luminosity of the Self may still be saved by the assumption that Nescience veils only the bliss- ( *ānanda* ) aspect of the Self and not the intelligence aspect, which is not object of Nescience ( VSM 16, 2; cf. SLS 20<sup>2</sup>, 10 )<sup>15</sup>. But the bliss aspect of the Self is not different from its intelligence aspect, so the veilmant of bliss aspect without the veilmant of intelligence aspect appears to be impossible ( VSM 17, 1—3 cf. SLS 194, 14; also VSM 247, 7 ). In reality, the Self must be manifest also in its non-dual bliss aspect, which is selfluminous too ( VSM 17, 4 ), and that this really is the case, is confirmed by the fact that the Self is manifest to everybody as the object of highest love ( *paramapremāspada* )<sup>16</sup>. That the manifestation of the bliss aspect ( in this world ) is not experienced in the same way as it is in the state of release, depends on the association of the Self with Nescience ( 17, 3 ) more exactly on the fact that one wrongly imagines ( *pari-kṛp* ) that the bliss aspect and the intelligence aspect of the Self are different and that only the last one is manifest<sup>17</sup>. The cause of this imagination ( *parikalpanā* ) consists in the fact that in the state of *saṃsāra*, there is a hindrance ( *pratibandha* ) through which one does not realise one's full bliss nature, though it is manifest<sup>18</sup>. This hindrance, of course, is not a real one, which really may prevent the manifestation of the bliss nature of the Self in the

state of *saṃsāra* : P.'s view is expressed by an opponent like this : "Even during transmigration unobstructed bliss ( *apratibandha eva ānandaḥ* ) exists; the hindrance or obstruction is not real but consists entirely in inattention ( *anavadhāna* ) to the Self, just as inattention makes one lose sight of the jewel round one's neck, this inattention pertains to him who is overcome by the poison of sensuous objects etc., sounds and the rest, which fall within the manifold wrought by Nescience, and whose mind eagerly desires the sight of objects, and whose heart is drawn away, even while he holds the Self, by the bait of sensuous objects awakened by the firm impressions, and who thus finds no time to recognise that Self the most dear, the Lord of the universe, who as the web entering all things is very near to him"<sup>19</sup>. It is, thus, the illusory perception of the manifold world ( as something second besides the Self ) which causes inattention ( *anavadhāna* ) towards the ( fully manifested ) bliss of the Self, and in this way the bliss of the Self is everpowered and the clear awareness of the bliss nature of the Self which constitutes release is hindered<sup>20</sup>.

The fact that in the *saṃsāra* the self-luminous Self and especially its bliss nature is experienced not in its entirety but rather in a limited way, is for P. the result of an imagined ( *parikalpita* ), i. e., subjective veilmant through Nescience, which is understood in an actualistic sense as inattention ( *anavadhāna* ) to bliss, on account of the fact that its clear awareness is hindered by the perception of the manifold world ( *dvaitadarśana* ).

P.'s explanation is, thus, clearly distinguished from two theories mentioned by the SLS on this issue. One of these two theories ( SLS 202, 10-205, 5 ) like the VSM evidently starts from the 4th model of Prakāśātman, which maintains

that *brahman* itself through its own Nescience becomes the *jīva* and thus has to accept the veilmment of the Self. This veilmment, however, does not affect the intelligence aspect of the Witness ( *sākṣī* ) which in this case probably means consciousness illusorily limited by the Internal Organ ( *antaḥkaraṇopahitaṇ caitanyam*, SLS 190 ). On the contrary, the bliss aspect is fully veiled. But this veilmment is not weakened by a subjectivistic and actualistic interpretation (as in P.) but is real in so far as it is an objective obscuration produced by Nescience, which can be overcome ( *āvaraṇābhibhava* ) only by a transformation of the Internal Organ in the form of bliss ( *sukharūpa*, SLS 205, 2 ). For P. such an assumption is not at all necessary, because a transitory suspension or diminution of the actual perception of the manifold world which impedes the realisation of the bliss nature of the Self would be altogether sufficient<sup>21</sup>.

The second theory, which SLS cites with regard to our problem ( SLS 200, 7—203, 3 )<sup>22</sup> conceives the *jīva* as a reflected image of *brahman* consciousness and explains the diminution of bliss experience of the *jīva* by the assumption that due to the imperfection of the reflecting substance ( here obviously the Internal Organ ) the bliss nature of *brahman* is transferred to the reflected image only partly. Thus the assumption that the bliss nature of the *jīva* or 'Witness' is veiled by Nescience is not necessary to this theory, and a direct participation in the bliss of *brahman* is excluded by the difference between original and reflected image. Only by certain processes of cognition ( *vṛtti* ) which are influenced by good *karman*, it may be brought about that together with the object cognised also the bliss aspect of *brahman* ( upon which the object is superimposed ) is reflected in the foremost part of the corresponding transformation of the Internal Organ ( *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti* ).

*Ekajīvavāda* :

According to the view of the opponent, whom P. has authorised to work out an illusionistic theory of *jīva* and the world, there is only one *jīva*, because the limiting adjunct ( *upādhi* ) of the *jīva*, i. e., Nescience too is likewise only one<sup>23</sup>. This view appears to be inevitable if one follows the above-mentioned 4th model of Prakāśātman. This so-called *ekajīvavāda* is, of course, faced with an additional difficulty by the fact that there is experience of many similar *jīvas*, and *ekajīvavāda*, somehow, must explain this experience. The SLS mentions the following three different theories as a solution to the above problem :

A section of *ekajīvavādins* maintains that there is only one single *jīva* animating only one body ( *eka-śarīraikā-jīvavādā*, SLS 122, 4 ). The other bodies are non-animated like the ones seen in dream. The entire universe is imagined ( *kalpita* ) by Nescience ( *ajñāna* ) which belong to that *jīva*. All empirical usage is imagined like dream cognition. As there is only one *jīva*, there is not even the distinction of bound and released. The release of Śuka etc, is imaginary like the release of persons seen in dream<sup>24</sup>.

Another section of the *eka-jīva-vādins* argues that Hiraṇyagarbha, who is a reflection of *brahman*, is the one principal *jīva*. The other *jīvas* are secondary reflections of this principal *jīva*, and are similar to the apparent clothings put on the bodies of human beings sketched on an artistically worked cloth. This section of Advaitins, thus adopts the view of a single *jīva* animating many bodies conveying distinction ( *saviśeṣānekaśarīrajīvavādā* )<sup>25</sup>.

A third group of *eka-jīva-vādins* maintains that since Hiraṇyagarbhas vary from aeon to aeon, it is not possible to dete-

mine which Hiranyagarbha is the principal *jīva*. It prefers, therefore, the view of a single *jīva* animating many bodies indistinctly ( *aviśeṣāneka-jīva-vāda* ). The non-recollection of one's happiness, etc., by another is explained as due to the difference of bodies. The illustration of a *yogī* participating the feelings of different bodies cannot be quoted according to this theory as a counter-argument, since that is an exceptional case, due to the supernatural powers of the *yogī*<sup>26</sup>.

Among these three varieties of *eka-jīva-vāda*, the metaphysical assumption of the second one is that *jīva* is a reflection ( *pratibimba* ) of *brahman* Consciousness. The VSM, somehow, does not follow this metaphysical assumption, rather it assumes that *brahman* itself through its own *avidyā* becomes (directly) *jīva*; thus, this second type of *eka-jīva-vāda* will not be met within the VSM. The question remains whether P. or the opponent who on these issues mostly works out the view of P. can be fixed to one of the remaining two models of *eka-jīva-vāda*. The fact that P. explains the experience of plurality of individual subjects by referring to the illustration of dream-illusion<sup>27</sup> seems to speak in favour of the first model ( *eka-śarīraika-jīva-vāda* ) of SLS. The same holds true also for the following statements which P. puts into the mouth of the opponent :

"There is really but one Self in its own nature eternal, pure, awakened and free, cognizable through the Upaniṣads only. This Self through its Nescience becomes *jīva*, falsely imagines bodies of gods, men etc., creates the 14 worlds and although ( thus itself ) being the Creator ( *īśvara* ) is deluded [ by thinking ] : Of these bodies, one is a god, another is a man, another is Hiranyagarbha, the creator of all things, another is Viṣṇu, the preserver, still another is Rudra, who destroys the world at *pralaya* or final resolution. These three have *rajas*,

*sattva* and *tamas* respectively as their limiting conditions ( *upādhayaḥ* ), to which all their powers are due. Then again, I myself, on the contrary, am a son of a brahmin, having served the gods by *pūjā*, etc., and acquired 'hearing' and other prescribed means, I shall gain emancipation". ( VSM 42, 3--43, 10 ).

From this passage one gets the impression that the *brahman*, which through its Nescience has become the *jīva*, identifies itself only with one of these bodies, whose existence it conceives and that the animation of the other conceived bodies, especially of the heavenly bodies is simply imagined. This obviously corresponds to the first model, i. e. *ekaśarīraika-jīva-vāda*.

Of course, in the case of this theory the question arises : Among the many similar individual subjects ( *jīvas* ), which one is like the dreaming person, real *jīva*, ( while ) the remaining *jīvas* exist only in its imagination<sup>28</sup> i. e., among the many human bodies, which is the one with which the *jīva* identifies himself ? In the context of discussion of this problem the opponent of P. variates himself in a passage<sup>29</sup> to the 3rd model of SLS ( *aviśeṣānekaśarīraika-jīva-vāda* ) : The *jīva*, which is limited only by Nescience ( *avidyopahita* ) permeates all the bodies<sup>30</sup> and causes their movements and gestures in the same way as a *yogī*, according to the Naiyāyikas, is able to move several bodies at the same time. Moreover, this one *jīva* limited only through Nescience, participates in the feelings of various bodies like the above mentioned *yogī*, but the portions of this *jīva* which are limited by the different bodies cannot participate in the feelings of other portions, just as in one and the same body the portion of the soul located in the foot cannot participate in the feeling of some other portion.

It is clear that in both illustrated models of *eka-jīva-vāda*, there is no order of bondage and release as there are no different points of time for release of the different *jīvas*<sup>31</sup>, that therefore, by the release of one *jīva* all the remaining *jīvas* would be released<sup>32</sup>, although P. puts into the mouth of his opponent the remark that in his system there is no place for 'all'<sup>33</sup> at all. Yet there remains the fact that for the *eka-jīva-vāda* release is an event happening but once :

“Since this is the case, the Self which is one only, perfect, having self-luminous bliss as its only nature, is through the influence of its Nescience, termed *jīva*, the transmigrating individual. No other transmigrating individual than this Self can be conceived of. When this same Self ( termed *jīva* ) has destroyed its sin by the store of merit acquired during a beginningless round of transmigrations, has become possessed of freedom from passion through the grace of *śāstras* and teacher and has become proficient in ‘hearing’ etc. which it has practised faithfully and continuously for a long time, when [ after that the *jīva* ] gains intuition [ of its true nature ] through sentences like ‘that thou art’, then it puts an end to Nescience and all its products and, self-contained in that bliss which is its real nature, it returns to that greatness which is its real nature and now receives the designation of ‘emancipated’. In that state of emancipation ( when knowledge of Brahman has been gained ) there is left no *jīva* other than that one; nor does any manifold really exist, because it is no longer experienced by it” ( 44, 6—45, 2 ).

It is clear that for this theory the assumption of a *jīvan-mukta*, i. e., the conception that the released after the spiritual event of release still continues to exist as a *jīva* for some time so that as a teacher he may bring about knowledge to the unreleased, becomes superfluous.<sup>34</sup> The releasing know-

ledge of the *jīva*, accordingly, does not come by the help of a real teacher, who is unthinkable in *eka-jīva-vāda*, rather only by an imaginary teacher<sup>35</sup>.

The fact that *samsāra* still continues, moreover, would compel the *eka-jīva-vādin* to the concession that the unique event of release has not yet taken place.<sup>36</sup> In the VSM this consequence is not explicitly drawn and would even be contradicted by the fact that P. in the verses on p. 244 speaks like one who is already released.

### Illusory Character of The World :

The principle of illusion ( *māyā* or *avidyā* ) does not constitute only the *jīva*, i. e., it is not responsible only for the fact that there is spirit which does not know its blissful nature though it is identical with *brahman*; rather it is also responsible for making the *jīva* experience that he is entangled in a manifold world; and this manifold world, too, originates from *māyā* or *avidyā*.

Consequently, for all Advaitins, the world, like its constituting principle, is illusory, i. e., ontologically false ( *mithyā* ) or indescribable ( *anirvacanīya* ) which according to the view of most Advaitins means that it is neither being ( *sat* ) [ as the only true reality is *ātman* ] nor non-being ( *asat* ) [ like a hare's horn which in opposition to the world cannot be experienced at all ]. Thus, the world has an intermediary status between being and non-being. P. too, incidentally, characterises the world exactly like Nescience ( *avidyā* ) as indescribable ( *anirvacanīya* )<sup>37</sup> and false ( *mithyā* ).<sup>38</sup> But so far the definition of this concept is concerned, P. mostly follows a more negative formulation, perhaps coined by Prakāśātman,<sup>39</sup> according to which 'falsity' or 'indescribability' of a cognised object consists in its being the counter-entity to a



negation stating that it did not exist at any time in the substratum, where it had been cognised.<sup>40</sup>

Objectivity and subjectivity of the world :

Thus the illusory character of the world is indisputable among all Kevalādvaitins; as we shall see, it merely has been explicated with varying degree of radicality. On the other side, there were serious disagreements regarding the relationship between the *jīva* ( or *jīvas* ) and the world. The vital point, again, can be drawn from the 4th model sketched by Prakāś-ātman : The consciousness which under the influence of *māyā* or *avidyā* associated with it makes the illusory world appear, can be either something ( illusorily ) different from and opposite to the *jīva*, or it may be conceived to be the *jīva* itself.

In the first case ( model 1 and 2 ) the world is a creation of God ( *īśvara* ) and in spite of its illusory character it is given ( as something already existent ) to the *jīva* ( or *jīvas* ) and it is, thus, objective and inter-subjective ( common to all ). In the other case, on the contrary ( model 3 and 4 ), the world is a creation of the *jīva* ( or *jīvas* ) and to that extent ( provided that the theory that the world is created collectively by all *jīvas*<sup>41</sup> is excluded ) it is subjective.<sup>42</sup> This holds true especially for the representative of the 4th model, according to which *brahman* itself through its own Nescience directly becomes the one and single *jīva* and as such at the same time apparently transforms itself into the world and to that extent is itself creator of the world. It applies, consequently, also to the VSM which, above all, proceeds on this model. Accordingly it is said : "There is really but one Self, in its own nature eternal, pure and awakened and free, cognisable through the Upaniṣads only. This Self through its Nescience becomes *jīva*, falsely imagines

bodies of gods, men etc., creates the 14 worlds and although ( thus itself ) being the creator ( *īśvara* ) is deluded ( by thinking ) : Of these bodies, one is a god, another is a man, another is Viṣṇu, the preserver; still another is Rudra, who destroys the universe at *pralaya* or final resolution. These three have *rajas*, *sattva* and *tamas* respectively as their limiting conditions ( *upādhayaḥ* ), to which all their powers are due. Then again [ there is the individual man, who thinks within himself ] : I myself, on the contrary, am a son of a brahmin; having served the gods by *pūjā*, etc., and acquired 'hearing' and other prescribed means, I shall gain emancipation'' ( VSM 42, 3—43, 10 ). Thus, it is the *ātman* itself, which, through its own Nescience having become *jīva*, itself creates the world and simply imagines the existence of a world-creator different from itself.<sup>43</sup> In this sense it is that the occasional description of *ātman* as *īśvara*<sup>44</sup> or *deva*<sup>45</sup> in the VSM should be taken.

*Brahman* and *avidyā* as the world-cause :

The doctrine that world on the one side, i. e., so far as it is illusory and insentient ( *jaḍa* ), is a product of Nescience, but on the other side, i. e., so far as it is manifest as existent, is an apparent transformation ( *vivarta* ) of *ātman* or *brahman*, compels the Advaitins for a clarification : In which sense is on one side *māyā* or *avidyā*, on the other side *brahman*; the world-cause ? The different views in this respect are shown by the SLS : Some Advaitins maintain that both are the material cause ( *upādānakāraṇa* ) of the world; Nescience is the material cause of the world by transforming itself really into the world ( *pariṇāma* ), *brahman*, on the other hand, by the way of an apparent transformation ( *vivarta* ).<sup>46</sup> According to Sarvajñātman, on the contrary, only *brahman* is the material cause, but needs Nescience

( *ajñāna* : Saṁkṣepaś. I, 322; *māyā* : SLS 77, 6 ) as a mediating factor ( *dvāra* [ *kāraṇa* ] ).<sup>47</sup> For Maṇḍana and Vācaspati, who follow the third model of Prakāśātman, only *brahman* is the material cause, and Nescience ( *avidyā* ) which subsists in the *jīvas* is a helping force ( *sahakārin* )<sup>48</sup>. P. in opposition to these, observes that the principle of cause and effect is fundamentally inadmissible with regard to *brahman* : only Nescience, eternal and indescribable, is the cause of the world. *Brahman* is not the cause, for the unchanging one ( *kūṭastha* ) is neither cause nor effect.<sup>49</sup> According to P. *brahman* can be called the cause of the world only in a metaphorical sense, viz. because it is the basis or substratum ( *adhiṣṭhāna* ) of the cause of the world, i. e. of Nescience.<sup>50</sup> When upaniṣadic passages<sup>51</sup> describe *brahman* as the cause of the world, they do not mean it literally, rather they emphasise the fact that *brahman* is one without a second, and for this purpose they introduce it as the cause of the world, presuming the view that the effect is not different from its cause.<sup>52</sup>

We thus find a tendency in P. which is, perhaps, the result of his deep acosmic mystical experience, to disengage *brahman-ātman* from its cosmological function : it is not cause of the world, rather it is the substrate of the world-cause, and thereby of the world also.<sup>53</sup> *Brahman* not being the cause of the world, the world will not participate in its nature, not even illusorily. Thus, the world loses any kind of being, even any kind of limited or illusory being, because this being could be derived only from *brahman* as the cause of the world. The being which is erroneously ascribed to the world, is rather directly the being which is the essence of its substrate i. e., of *brahman* itself.<sup>54</sup>

Srṣṭi-drṣṭi-vāda and drṣṭi-srṣṭi-vāda :

If the world is a subjective creation of the one *jīva*

( which *brahman* has become through Nescience ) or more exactly a product of that Nescience, then the question arises, whether this world as a whole preexists to the single cognitions of that *jīva* or not; in other words, is the creation of the world a cosmological event by which the whole world is constituted for a world-period ( *kalpa* ) and is already existent before the *jīva's* cognitions of it ( *sr̥ṣṭi-dr̥ṣṭi-vāda* ), or is it created at the very moment and to the exact extent it is perceived or cognised ( *dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭi-vāda* ) ?

The first alternative, i. e., *sr̥ṣṭi-dr̥ṣṭi-vāda* is in no way excluded by the assumption of *eka-jīva-vāda*, according to the 4th model of Prakāśātman. One could assume that Nescience, which has made *brahman* appear as a *jīva*, brings forth the world in a cosmological evolutionary process, but the *jīva* by whose Nescience the world is made, does not know it, because his consciousness is veiled by Nescience, and because this veilmant ( *āvaraṇa* ) can be over-powered ( *abhibhava* ) only by a specific transformation of the Internal Organ.<sup>55</sup> According to this theory, consequently, the world would be conceded to exist ( illusorily of course ) even when it is not perceived or cognised ( *ajñātasattā* ). This position is occasionally found in P., e. g., when he observes : A means of knowledge ( *pramāṇa* ) makes an object known ( *prameya* ) which, even before the exercise of the means of knowledge,<sup>56</sup> had been witnessed by the Witness ( *sākṣi* ), yet of course, not as something known but rather as something unknown.<sup>57</sup>

Yet it is not this conception that is typical for the VSM but the opposite conception, viz. the idea of *dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭi-vāda* : the doctrine that the world does not exist when it is not perceived;<sup>58</sup> i. e., that its existence is only so long as it is cognised ( *pratīṣamakālīnam eva sattvam*,<sup>59</sup> *prātītikam sattvam*<sup>60</sup> ), that after a short duration it always disappears.<sup>61</sup>

When the world exists only so long as it is perceived by a *jīva*, this does not only imply that with the release of this *jīva* the world ceases to exist once and for all<sup>62</sup>, but also that during sleep its existence is interrupted ( a conclusion which moreover is valid only in the context of *ekaśarīraika jīva-vāda* ). “In dreaming sleep the *jīva* dissolves the world of waking state and, aided by the defects of sleep, imagines ( *parīkalpya* ) a world precisely similar to that of waking, and experiences through the sense organs of the respective actual ( imagined ) body....Finally he puts an end to this state of dream and either returns to the waking state or enters into that of dreamless sleep in which there is an end to all such false imagining”.<sup>63</sup> Thus, in dreaming the world of the waking state is replaced by another similar one, in deep sleep, on the contrary, it reaches disappearance without any substitute; in deep sleep every type of manifold world ( *prapañca* ) is inexistent.<sup>64</sup> When a man passes from waking consciousness into the state of dreamless sleep from which he again awakens, his present consciousness relates to a different series of objects; his ‘recognition’, i. e. his idea of the identity of the present and the former series, is simply due to the fact that because of the similarity he overlooks the difference between the two;<sup>65</sup> just as when ten persons in twilight mistake a rope for a snake and speak ‘one and the same snake we all saw’, although every one of them has seen his own personal erroneously constituted object.<sup>66</sup>

One further consequence of this doctrine is that the function of the sense faculty and its contact with the object cannot be maintained as the cause of perception of the object,<sup>67</sup> for if sensuous perception of an object were to result from a previous contact of sense organs with this object, the result must have already existed before the perception of which it is

object.<sup>68a</sup> The conception that the senses are the cause of the perception of exterior objects, depends on the idea that the perception of objects only takes place when senses are active, otherwise not; but this idea depends on an error ( *bhrama* ), as in a dream, where the dreamer has the same idea although the senses are, admittedly, inactive.<sup>68b</sup>

Thus, like dream-perception the sensuous perception of the waking state is simply an error, whose only cause is Nescience.<sup>69</sup> The same applies to all other effects, also to the objects themselves, i. e., Nescience is the only cause of things. That people when aspiring for definite effects, regularly take definite causes—this can again be explained by the illustration of dream.<sup>70</sup> It results, therefore, that all the effects ( not only knowledge, but also its objects ) are made of nothing but mere Nescience ( *āvidyaka, māyika* ),<sup>71</sup> and are existing only so long as they are cognised. There is, therefore, no difference between ordinary objects and the contents of illusion or dream.<sup>72</sup> There is only real Being ( *pāramārthika-sattva* ) of *brahman*, and apparent being ( *prāṭitika-sattva*, i. e., existence only for the time of being cognised ) of all the manifold.<sup>73</sup> The differentiation of three grades of beings—absolute Being of *brahman*, being from the standpoint of daily practice ( *vyāvahārika-sattva* ) and the illusory being of illusion and dream—as Prakāśātman had undertaken,<sup>74</sup> is according to P. not based on any real fact. Yet there is no contradiction between the view of a two-fold being and the older view of a three-fold being for the ( ancient teachers ) did not abandon the position that the existence of all the manifold is dependent on the perception of it, when they taught a third kind of being ( *vyāvahārika-sattā* ); they merely did so in order to satisfy the deluded persons, the *vyāvahārika-sattva* being based on an internal difference [ within the *prāṭi-*

*tika-sattva* ] constituted merely by the minds of ignorant people.<sup>75</sup> In reality, however, there is no material difference between the waking state and dreaming state. Even the fact that in practical life people presuppose a continuous existence of objects ( they do not complain of the non-existence of a son etc. when he has left the house, because they do not realise his non-existence resulting from non-perception ) is not peculiar to the waking state but holds true in dream, too.<sup>76</sup> The upaniṣadic passages also which speak of a creation of the world by *ātman* or *brahman*, do not reveal a cosmological truth, but in the context of the method of superimposition and negation ( *adhyāropāpavāda* ) simply prepare the way to the knowledge of *brahman* free from all manifold.<sup>76</sup>

Non-existence of the world outside knowledge :

If the world or the objects exist only so long as they are perceived, the question arises, whether thereby an existence outside knowledge is meant, or whether its existence is not different from its being cognised or perceived, i. e., the world exists only as a content of cognition. In this sense, the SLS also differentiates between the two types of *dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭi-vāda* : One theory according to which the creation of the world [ implies illusory existence outside perception but that ] is confined to the time of its being perceived ( *dr̥ṣṭisamaya eva prapañca-sr̥ṣṭiḥ* ).<sup>78</sup> And another theory, according to which the creation of the world is nothing else but its being perceived, as there is no proof of a difference between the object of perception and perception itself.<sup>79</sup> The last doctrine has been explicitly ascribed to the 'author of [ Vedānta ] Siddhāntamuktāvalī and others',<sup>80</sup> and this is correct. P. makes the opponent whom he has authorised to work out an advaitic theory of *jīva* and the world, declare : "If existence as

long as being cognised means that the existence ( of the world ) is nothing else but its being cognised, then I accept.....<sup>81</sup> "That there is no proof of difference between the object of cognition and its cognition,<sup>82</sup> P. makes his opponent demonstrate elaborately.<sup>83</sup> Hence, it follows that this universe animate and inanimate, which appears, is nothing but cognition ( *pratitimātram eva* ). As the world of dreams, which is really nothing but cognition ( *viññānamātram eva* ),<sup>84</sup> appears ( in consciousness ) under diverse forms of cognitions and cognised objects, so too the world of waking consciousness, of things animate and inanimate. One cannot but feel oneself reminded by these formulations of the idealism of the Buddhist school of Yogācāra, whose typical technical terms are *cittamātra* and *viññaptimātra*. The connecting link may have been the Yogavāsiṣṭha quoted frequently in the VSM. Also in passages where P. himself is speaking, we find statements, which fit in the context of this subjectivistic-actualistic theory that the world is nothing but cognition. Thus, in one passage, for example, P. says that this entire world consists of nothing but erroneous ideas ( *jagad idam akhilam bhrāntimātraikadeham* 92, 5 ).<sup>85</sup> In another passage it is shown that the world is different from the non-being only by its being perceived and from this the conclusion is drawn that one is accordingly concerned only with perception, as an object outside cognition does not exist<sup>86</sup>. The world as such, as outside cognition, is accordingly an absolute non-entity ( *tuccha, atyantāsat* ),<sup>87</sup> something indescribable as being and non-being ( *anirvacanīya* ).<sup>88</sup> The above-mentioned ( p. 116 ) emphasized negative formulation of 'indescribability' ( *anirvacanīyatva* ) and 'ontological falsity' ( *mithyātva* ) gains a new meaning. If these concepts should not be simply dropped, but should be used in the sense of P's own theory, then they could mean nothing else but [complete]



non-being in all the three times.<sup>89</sup> Also P's definition of 'sublation' ( *bādhā*, i. e., the negation of erroneous content caused by right knowledge ) as the 'confirmation that [ the erroneous content ] is non-existent on the substratum in all the three times'<sup>90</sup> fits in this context.

Of course, after this reduction of the world into cognition and the total disownment of its existence outside cognition, also the above-mentioned theory ( p. 118 ), that Nescience is the cause of the world ( thereby one, above all, thinks material cause ) needs rectification. "In reality" says P. "Śruti does not even imply that Nescience is the cause of the world, for it [ Nescience ] has been taught as the [ efficient ] cause of error ( i. e., of the erroneous perception of the manifold world ). For a theory of [ true ] causality is alien to the Upaniṣads, because these confine their teaching to that of illusory manifestation ( *vivarta* )".<sup>91</sup> As the context shows, this concept of illusory manifestation ( *vivarta* ) which in other Advaitins denotes the illusory display of *brahman* into the indescribable but objective world, has received a new meaning in P., i. e., has been reinterpreted in a subjectivistic-actualistic sense.<sup>92</sup> As we read in another passage, "what is called illusory manifestation ( *vivarta* ) is nothing but the substratum itself, which through some defect appears under a different form".<sup>93</sup>

It is clear that in view of this negation of the world outside cognition and its reduction ( for the moment ) into corresponding cognition of the one *jīva*, the epistemological problem how to explain the fact that the *jīva*, is able to cognise if not the whole, yet a part of the world, conceived as a preexisting whole, does not occur in P's system. The representatives of *śrṣṭi-drṣṭi-vāda*, which, on the contrary, had to tackle this epistemological problem, had developed three

different theories, according to the different models of illusionistic reestablishment of *jīva* and world advocated by them. All of these three theories are found already in Prakāśātman.<sup>94</sup>

According to the first theory, *jīva* is omnipresent and unveiled by Nescience but is not creator of the world—being differentiated from the creator probably by being a reflection ( *pratibimba* ) in Nescience—and is, therefore, by nature without any contact ( *asaṅga* ) with the objects, except that in the Internal Organ ( *antaḥkaraṇa* ) the consciousness of the *jīva* gets involved, so to speak, and that by means of the transformations of the Internal Organ it may get tinged ( *uparāga* ) even by the objects, i. e., come into contact with them and cognise them.

According to the second theory, *jīva* is limited by the Internal Organ ( *antaḥkaraṇa* ) or an image reflected in the Internal Organ ( *antaḥkaraṇa* ) and as such it is by nature separated from objects and cannot manifest them. But when psychoses ( *vṛtti* ) arise it may expand its reach and identify itself with *brahman* consciousness which as the material cause of objects reveals them.

According to the third theory which obviously proceeds from the model that *brahman* itself through its Nescience directly becomes the *jīva* who is omnipresent but is veiled by Nescience, only in the Internal Organ ( *antaḥkaraṇa* ) this veilment ( or obscuration ) is overpowered ( *abhibhaya* ) and through appropriate transformations of the Internal Organ ( *antaḥkaraṇa* ) even objects ( more precisely the consciousness underlying them ) can be freed from veilment and thus be cognised.

For Prakāśānanda there is no such problem as already mentioned. What one could at most expect from him is a

more detailed analysis of cognition itself ( as, e. g., was carried out by idealistic Buddhism). But such an analysis does not lie in the interest of P. as also the reduction of the world into cognition is for him only a preliminary step, which is yet to be surmounted.

Non-existence of perception of manifold world :

The highest and ultimate step of his analysis of the world is disclosed by P towards the end of VSM where even the theory that the manifold world is a mere idea, is transcended. Even perception of the manifold world, its manifestation in the subjective imagination is superimposed,<sup>95</sup> viz.: perception ( *dr̥ṣṭi* ) or manifestness ( *khyāti* ) which in reality is formless ( *ni prakārikā* ) and identical with the subsisting consciousness, that is, the essence of the *ātman*, yet appears as if it had ( manifold ) forms ( *saparakārikatvena bhānam* ).<sup>96a</sup> This form in which it appears does not own, in reality, any existence beyond the subsisting manifestness ( consciousness ) of the Self, which is free from all reflective ( or imaginative ) activity.<sup>96b</sup> Thus, in reality, except the self-luminous Self nothing else is cognised.<sup>97</sup> But, although accordingly, that which is really existent is actually manifest yet one is erroneously convinced that it is non-existent ( *asattvaniścaya* )<sup>98</sup> and one fancies ( *abhimāna* ) that cognition which, in reality, is nothing but the self-luminous consciousness of the Self had something else as its contents,<sup>99</sup> as in common life one sees a rope but fancies it to be a snake.<sup>100</sup> But in this case, one did not see the snake at all,<sup>101</sup> there was only the perception of a rope.<sup>102</sup> The fact that this perceptor presents itself as if it were reproducing a snake,<sup>103</sup> is merely due to similarity ( between rope and snake ) and to certain defects ( of eyesight etc., which may stand generically for Nescience ).<sup>104</sup> A person who is free from error knows that there are two

things only, viz., the substrate ( i. e., rope ), and its cognition and that there does not exist any other cognised object ( i. e., snake ) or cognition of such an object.<sup>105</sup> Analogously, in the metaphysical case too there is only the substrate ( *brahman* or Self ) and its cognition—both being identical in this case, as a cognition different from the Self cannot be assumed.<sup>106</sup> The vision of the manifold world, however, is as non-existent as the manifold world itself.<sup>107</sup> For otherwise, i. e., though not the world itself yet its perception or imagination were existent, it would turn out to be something second, besides the Self,<sup>108</sup> and thereby the monistic doctrine of non-duality will be crippled. This holds equally good according to P. even if one considers this perception to be ontologically 'false' ( *mithyā* ) or 'indescribable' ( *anirvacanya* ), so long as one intends to maintain any difference between falsity, i. e., indescribability and complete non-existence at all the three times.<sup>109</sup> Thus also the perception or cognition of the manifold world ( *dvaitadarśana* ) is as absolutely unreal ( *atyantāsat* ) or non-existent ( *tuccha* ) or void ( *śūnya* ) as the manifold world itself.<sup>110</sup> It is obvious that at this level of absolute non-existence of any kind of illusion, the concept of illusory manifestation ( *vivarta* ) which for the time being had been retained, although interpreted in a subjectivistic actualistic sense, has lost every function ( has become devoid of any use ) and is consequently given up completely : "The *vivarta* doctrine is not final aim of the Upaniṣads, in that it serves only to instruct the uninitiated", and then again, "For the uninitiated it is taught that the whole world is this *vivarta* of Brahman, the wise hold it to be bliss unmodified".<sup>111</sup>

The last consequence of this absolute non-existence of even illusory expansion of the *ātman* into the manifold world

or even into the perception or cognition of such a world is that even the cause of this illusory expansion, Nescience ( *avidyā* ), forfeits its existence. Thus even Nescience is non-existent ( *avidyamāna* ) and void ( *tuccha* ).<sup>112</sup>

Thus, the entire manifold world including its perception or cognition and Nescience as its cause proves in final analysis to be absolutely non-existent; it results that ever since there is only *brahman*, without a second.<sup>113</sup>

Thus, this analysis of the world results in an ontological anticipation of the state of release, and this anticipation, in opposition to most of Advaitins, is total as even an illusory existence ( objective or subjective ) of the world and of bondage is emphatically negated.

Release as a spiritual event, therefore, should be understood as the termination of one's ever since absolutely non-existent *saṃsāra*,<sup>114</sup> as the elimination of one's merely imagined, absolutely non-existent Nescience, which in reality by the power of *ātman* is ever since eliminated.<sup>115</sup> Release is, in reality, an eternal state which accordingly is ever given.<sup>116</sup> One is released, although one was already released,<sup>117</sup> one had, we should say, only imagined to be in bondage.<sup>118</sup>

### References

1. *ekam evādvitīyam* : VSM 204, 6 ( ChU VI, 2, 1 ); cf. 42, 3; 205, 1; 165, 5; 198, 6 ( *advaita-tattva* ).
2. VSM 27, 7; 105, 3; 155, 2; 261, 6; cf. 244, 8.
3. E. g. VSM, 54 :  
*ānandarūpam ātmānam sac-cid-advayatattvakam,*  
*apūrvādipramāṇoktam prāpyāham tad vapuṣṭhitam.*
4. P. Hacker, *Śaṃkara der Yogin und Śaṃkara der Advaitin*, WZKS XII-XIII/1968, p. 131.

5. Śaṅkara uses *māyā* and *avidyā* indiscriminately and the discrimination between the two is of much later origin in the history of the advaitic literature and does not find a place among Śaṅkara's immediate disciples—Sureśvara and Padmapāda. Following Padmapāda even Vivaraṇa-kāra does not differentiate the two. But later Advaitins draw a distinction between the two. According to the *Prakaṭārthavivarāṇa* the consciousness reflected in *māyā* is *īśvara* and the consciousness reflected in *avidyā* is *jīva* ( SLS 1, 28 ). *Pañcadaśī* distinguishes *avidyā*, the *rajas-tamas*-predominant, from *māyā*, the pure *sattva*-predominant ( SLS 1, 30 ).
6. SLS 1, 40.
7. SLS 1, 33–34.
8. SLS 1, 41.
9. VSM 42, 6; 44, 6—8; 172, 3—5.
10. VSM 32, 10—13; 117, 2; 143, 5.
11. VSM 32, 14; 268, 1 and 3.
12. VSM 43, 1—2 and 10.
13. VSM 106, 2—107, 1.
14. Cf. VSM 176, 2—4.
15. Cf. SLS 193.
16. VSM 18, 5; 248, 1—3, cf. 149, 5, also SLS 194, 15; and Viv. 262, 2.
17. VSM 17, 4—18, 4.
18. VSM 248, 9.
19. VSM 249, 13—250, 6.
20. VSM 201, 5–7.
21. Cf. L. Schmithausen, *Zur advaitischen Theorie der Objekterkenntnis* WZKS XII-XIII ( 1968 ), p 338; and also cf. VSM 149, 9–150, 2.

22. Cf. L. Schmithausen, *op. cit.*, p. 353.
23. VSM 30, 1—3 cf. 32, 5; 37, 5.
24. SLS p. 121.
25. SLS 1, 44a, pp. 122—123.
26. SLS 1. 44b, pp. 123—124.
27. VSM 34, 2; 38, 2.
28. VSM 38, 3—8.
29. VSM 40, 4—41, 8.
30. VSM 172, 8—10.
31. VSM 34, 1n 3.
32. VSM 37, 5.
33. VSM 36, 6.
34. VSM 235, 3.
35. VSM 235, 1 and 235, 4.
36. SLS 121, 4; cf. Nyāyamakaranda, 331, 12—332, 3.
37. VSM 203, 7; *siddhānirvacaniya( tva )sya jagataḥ*; 222, 5—7.
38. VSM 36, 4—6.
39. Viv. 174, 11; cf. also Viv. 164, 2 and Citsukha's comm. on *sarvatra pratipannopādhanu : yatrādhiṣṭhāne pratipannaṃ tatra tatra sarvatra*. Cf. further K. CAMMAN, *Das System des Advaita nach der Lehre Prakāśātman's*, Wiesbaden 1965, p. 18.
40. VSM 14, 2f; 220, 12f and 220, 10 ( *tatra kālatraye' pi nāsti* ); 221, 4.
41. SLS 130, 11—131, 2.
42. So SLS 131, 8—10 ( 3rd model ).
43. VSM 42, 6—43, 10 ( p. 10 also ).
44. Cf. also 196, 3—6.
45. 250, 2; *paramapriyatamaṃ jagadīśvaram.....ātmanam*; 143, 1, 143, 4.
46. SLS 74, 7.

47. SLS 77, 5; cf, Saṃkṣepaś. I, 323; T. Vetter, Sarvajñātman's Saṃkṣepaśārīrakam ( 1. Kapitel ), Wien 1972, p. 106.
48. SLS 79, 1—3.
49. VSM 203, 7; cf. 203, 5; further SLS 80, 5.
50. VSM 204, 3—5; 203, 6; SLS 80, 7.
51. cf. VSM 191, 4—194, 2,
52. VSM 204, 5—205, 5.
53. VSM 153, 3 sarvajagad-adhiṣṭhāna-bhūtam ātmānam; cf. 126, 2f. : vyāpakatvam = sarvasambaddhatvam = ananugātānām adhiṣṭhānatvam, and 130, 5f. : sarvātmakatva = sarvādhiṣṭhānatva.
54. VSM 142, 4 ( ya ātmā.... ) sattā sarvapadārthānām....; 265, 4 ātmasattātīrīktāyā dvaitasattāyā abhāvāt.
55. Cf. L. Schmithausen, Zur advait. Theorie der Objekterkenntnis, pp. 338 and 355ff.; and SLS 205, 1; ajñānam ca....sākṣyaṃśam vihāya caitanyam āvṛṇoti.—The description of sṛṣṭi-drṣṭi-vāda in SLS 362, 3 ff. presupposes that the creator of the world is different from the jīva.
56. VSM 180, 6ff.
57. VSM cf. 214, 5.
58. VSM 45, 2 : ananubhūyamānam dvaitam....na kiṃcid asti; 45, 4; ajñātasattvam neṣṭam.
59. VSM 72, 3.
60. VSM 63, 2; 51, 2.
61. VSM 89, 5f....jagat sarvam....udbhūya sthitim āsthāya vinaśyati muhur muhuḥ; cf. also the Yogavāsiṣṭha-quotation 63, 4....bhāvāḥ sarve'mī budbudā iva kṣaṇam udbhūya gacchanti....layam. The passage VSM 4, 4 drṣṭasya kṣaṇavināśītvāt must refer especially to the ( moral or ritual )



actions as is confirmed by the commentary which adds to *dr̥ṣṭasya* the gloss *kriyārūpasya*.

62. VSM 45, 1—2.
63. VSM 43, 10—44, 5.
64. VSM 53, 8—54, 5.
65. VSM 53, 5—8.
66. VSM 51, 7; 52, 3—53, 5; this comparison is of course in the sense of the standpoint of the partner of discussion, and not in the sense of *ekajīvavāda*.
67. VSM 57, 3; cf. SLS 356, 4.
- 68a. VSM 55, 8—56, 2.
- 68b. VSM 57, 2; 60, 6; 61, 5.
69. Cf. VSM 61, 4 : *bhramajñānasya avidyāmātrayonitvam*.
70. VSM 61, 6—62, 3.
71. VSM 63, 1 : *brahmātiriktaṃ kṛtsnaṃ kāryajātaṃ jñāna-jñeyarūpaṃ sarvaṃ āvidyakam eva*, cf. 67, 2.
72. VSM 46, 4—6 and also 48, 1.
73. VSM 51, 1—5.
74. Viv. 165, 1.
75. VSM 51, 1—5 : *bhrāntabuddhisiddhāvāntaravaiṣamyam āśritya*.
76. VSM 50, 4—7.
77. VSM 196, 6—8; cf. SLS 359, 1.
- 78-79. SLS 361, 2—4; 336, 1.
80. SLS 362, 1.
81. SLS 362, 4.
82. VSM 73, 1.
83. Cf. VSM 88, 6.
84. VSM 88, 7—9; cf. further 89, 2 : *idaṃ bhānamātraṃ carācaram*; 89, 5 : *jagat sarvamdṛṣṭimātraṃ*, 90, 2, *dṛṣṭimātraṃ jagattrayam*; 91, 1 : *dṛṣṭimātrātmakam jagat*

Moreover the quotation—though theistic of Yogavāsiṣṭha. on p. 90, 7 of VSM.

85. Cf. also VSM 277, 1 : jagadātmakasya vibhramasya.
86. VSM 269, 2ff.
87. VSM 282, 2 : jagattucchatvam; 278, 5 f. dvaitajātasya sarvasya tucchatvāt; cf. 276, 9 atyantāsatsamsāra; 268, 5—269, 2.
88. VSM cf. 276, 4ff. where a controversy over the concept of indescribability is presented.
89. Cf. VSM 273, 8ff. kim idam mithyātvam ? traikālikāsattvam, asattvāviśeṣe'pi kadācit pratiyamānatvam vā ? nādyah iṣṭāpatteḥ.
90. VSM 224, 3f. 219, 6; 220, 1—5.
91. VSM 205, 5—8 cf. P. Hacker, *Vivarta*, Wiesbaden 1953, p. 234.
92. Cf. Hacker, loc. cit.
93. VSM 270, 5—7; cf. also 89, 3f. and 50, 1f; here, however, the term vivarta, being unfit for P's system, has been avoided.
94. Viv. 308, 317, 2; cf. L. Schmithausen, *Zur advaitischen Theorie der Objekterkenntnis*.
95. VSM 270, 10f. khyāter api adhyastatvāt.
- 96a. VSM 271, 1f.
- 96b. VSM 271, 3f.
97. VSM 271, 7f.
98. VSM 272, 1f.
99. 271, 8f.; cf. 245, 1 sadvāye dṛḍhaniścayaḥ.
100. VSM 271, 9.
101. VSM 272, 7f.
102. VSM 272, 3f. vastuto rajjupratyaya eva, cf. 272, 6.
103. cf. 272. 3f. sarpollekhitayā sa pratyayaḥ parisphurati.

104. VSM 272, 5ff.
105. VSM 272, 13--15.
106. VSM 272, 15--273, 2.
107. VSM 272, 1 ātmano dvaitadr̥ṣṭiḥ kadācid api nāstyeva  
275, 7 ātmano dvaitadarśanābhāvam anumanyate; cf.  
275, 9.
108. VSM 273, 6f. anyathāviparītadr̥ṣṭyaiva dvaitāpatteḥ.
109. VSM 273, 7--274, 2 and 275, 9-276, 10.
110. VSM 283; 7 : dvaita-taddarśanayoḥ tucchatvāt....ātmanah  
adr̥ṣṭadvayatvam ( cf. 1, 2 : adr̥ṣṭadvayam ...ātmanam ),  
284, 3: ātmano dvaitadarśanaśūnyatvam, 281, 10: ātmā-  
tiriktasya sarvasya tucchatvam; 275, 12 : atyantāsatsam-  
sāra ( takes up dvaita-darśanābhāve in l. 9 ).
111. VSM 273, 5f. cf Hacker, Vivarta, p. 50; cf. also the  
quotation on p. 275, 5f.
112. VSM 283, 5 avidyamānā yā avidyā ( quotation from the  
Yogavāsiṣṭha p. 282, 5ff. ) : tucchā....māyā ( quotation  
from Pañcadaśī VI, 130 ); cf. 259, 7f : adhiṣṭhānabhe-  
dena adhyastasya ( sc. ajñānasya, cf. 1. 6 ) pṛthakasva-  
rūpābhāvāt, further 218, 10 ( cf. note 110 ).
113. VSM 277, 6; sadā advaitam evāsti; cf. 112, 4f.....  
( here even the concept of Advaita is also given up,  
perhaps because, as a negation of dvaita, by the total  
non-existence of the latter it itself falls down ).
114. VSM 275, 11 + 276, 1; 276, 8 and 9f.
115. VSM 107, 1--4.
116. VSM 260, 4ff.; 275, 9 and 11 nityamuktasya.
117. VSM 260, 5 and 276, 8 ( KaUp V, 1 ).
118. cf. VSM 154, 1f.

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# Contemporary Relevance of Vedānta

## Swami Vivekananda's Mission of Vedānta

Among the thinkers who have moulded the Indian mind during the last century and a half the place of Swami Vivekananda is the most prominent. Vivekananda saw India's grinding poverty, her social backwardness, the mental inertia into which she had fallen; but he also saw her cultural wealth, the deep-rooted traditional strength, her assimilative powers and above all her super spirituality. He awakened India from her dogmas, superstitions and blind faiths in which she had been slumbering for centuries.

Vivekananda's style reflects many-sided sensitiveness. But the subject nearest to his heart was philosophy. His entire philosophic endeavour was directed towards presenting the Advaita Vedānta in an intelligible concrete, scientific, practical and inspiring form. He was convinced that it was the practical Vedānta which could restore India to its past glory in the world of thought. But this was not his sole object. He was a great visionary. He attempted to fashion on the basis of the Vedānta a philosophy that would resolve all conflicts of humanity and raise it to the ideal unity.

Vivekananda was impatient with the entire tradition of regarding Vedānta as a set of highly complex and difficult metaphysical principles which only a few could understand and that too had been hidden too long in caves and forests. He felt that the first requirement was to liberate the elevating ideas of the Vedānta from the shell of academism into which they had been imprisoned for centuries. His aim was to make it popular....The drum of the Advaita shall be sounded at all

places—in the bazars, from the hill-tops and in the plains.<sup>1</sup> He was convinced that practical Vedānta alone could liberate the Indian masses, nay, the entire humanity from its bondage and inertia. It is the Advaitic spiritual humanism which is popularly known as the Sanātana Dharma that made India Immortal. While nations after nations have come upon the world-stage and played their roles for some time and disappeared from the scene without leaving a ripple on the ocean of time. Where are the Greeks, one time the monarch of half of the world? Where are the Romans who terrorised once the entire world? Where are the Arabs who in fifty years had carried their banners from the Atlantic to the Pacific? Where are the Spainiards, the cruel murderers of millions of men? Civilizations of Egypt, Babylon and China are to be found only in the books of history alone. The world invaded India for the last thousand of years, reduced it to poverty and slavery but it did not beg for mercy at the hands of any nation. Despite its poverty and slavery, it has been living, as it were, an eternal life of super spirituality. Because it is convinced that the force of spirit alone prevails upon the brute force.

Three religions stand in the world which have come down to us from times prehistoric—Hinduism, Zoroastrianism and Judaism. These three have faced shocks after shocks but could survive by their internal strength. But while Judaism failed to absorb Christianity and was thrown out of its place of birth by its all-conquering daughter almost the same fate Zoroastrianism had to face as it too was driven out of its place of birth, and it too could get shelter like so many other religions only in India. But the history of Hinduism is altogether different. Sects after sects came out of Hinduism and sometimes seemed to shake the Vedic religion to its very foundation but

like the waters of the seashores in tremendous earthquake it receded only for a while only to return in all-absorbing flood, a thousand times more vigorous and when the tumult and storm of the rush was over these sects were absorbed and then assimilated into the eternal religion of the Vedas. After all what is the secret of the eternity of the Vedic religion? In the following pages an humble attempt is made to unravel this secret in the light of Swami Vivekananda's mission of the Vedānta.

By Hindu religion Vivekananda means Vedic religion which is rooted into the Vedas. The Vedas are the revealed truths by the Vedic seers ( *Rṣayo tu mantra draṣṭāraḥ* ). These seers are a historical figures. Except Hinduism all the great religions are connected with the history of their founders. All their religious and ethical teachings and doctrines are built round the life of a personal founder from whom they get the sanction and authority of their respective religions. If the historicity of these personal founders is questioned, as has been the case in modern times with the lives of almost all so called founders of faiths, they are shaken and shattered. Thus while all the great religions of the world centre round their respective personal founder of the religion, it is the Vedic religion alone which does not centre round a person. It does centre round the *principles* and not the *persons*.

Again, the great religions of the world believe in the personal God. Among these religions there are at least two, which did denounce the very existence of God but the founders themselves were raised to the status of personal God. But the case of Hinduism is, in this respect also just different. It is impersonalistic and thus Absolutistic. As it is impersonalistic and Absolutistic it could absorb all personal Gods of these religions. It is the universal religion. It is open to

all. Vivekananda quotes here *Bhagavadgītā*, 'whosoever comes to Me, through whatsoever form, I reach him; all men are struggling through paths which in the end lead to me' ( 4. 11 ).<sup>2</sup> In this respect Vivekananda quotes a very famous verse of the *Śivamahimnastotra* : 'As the different streams having their sources in different places all mingle their water in the sea, so, O Lord, the different paths which men take through different tendencies, various though they appear, crooked or straight, all lead to thee'.<sup>3</sup> The *Upaniṣads* are full of such spiritualistic verses. These are the ideals of universal religion. This is the secret of Hinduism. As a matter of fact the author feels that this statement is equally applicable to the brilliant success of Swami Vivekananda at the Parliament of Religions. On 11th Sept. 1893 Swamiji quoted only these two verses, of course in the reverse order and he charmed the entire audience. Then onward he was referred as 'cyclonic monk from India.' That is why, the variety and richness of incarnations one finds in the Hinduism, it is almost impossible to find anywhere else in the other religions of the world.

According to Vivekananda, '*Ekam sad viprāḥ bahudhā vadanti*' provides the central philosophy of Vedic Religion. This is one of the grandest truths that was ever discovered.<sup>4</sup> The Absolutism of the Vedānta philosophy is rooted in the above-mentioned dictum of the *Upaniṣad*. In the Absolutism of the Vedānta the Ātman, the substratum of subjectivity and the Brahman, the substratum of objectivity are fused into one, *Tattvamasi*, That thou art. This is the essence of the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara. The fusion between the internal world and the external world has far reaching implications. In the philosophy of Vedānta science and religion are fused together. The results of the contemporary physics are nearest to the



Vedānta. According to the Quantum physics the observer disturbs the very structure of electrons. On 19th Sept. 1893 at the World Parliament of Religions, at Chicago Vivekananda delivered a prophetic statement : 'From the high spiritual flights of the Vedānta philosophy, of which the latest discoveries of science seem like echoes.....'<sup>5</sup> Vivekananda's above mentioned statement is prophetic in the sense that the two pillars of contemporary physics, Einsteins theory of relativity and Heisenburg's quantum physics were yet to be discovered. The remark of American physicist is very pertinent, 'It is interesting, and perhaps not too surprising, that those who are attracted by Eastern mysticism, who consult the Iching and practice yoga or other form of meditation, in general have a marked anti-scientific attitude. They tend to see, science in general and physics in particular, as an unimaginative, narrow-minded discipline which is responsible for all the evils of modern technology'.<sup>6</sup> The entire holistic movement is deadly against scientific and technological civilization which has polluted our first necessities, water, air and space and has converted man into robot. None questions their positive side but the results of negative side are disastrous. A good number of top scientists are convinced that the contemporary physics has reached at a point where it is becoming metaphysics.

In the Absolutism of the Vedānta philosophy the idea of the universality of all religions and the idea of oneness of things are rooted together. This dictum is responsible for our generosity and tolerance towards the other religions of the world. We accommodated, adjusted other faiths with all openness and most of them were even assimilated with our faith because we were highly rooted into the spiritual humanism of the Vedānta philosophy. It was this spirit that only Hindus

built churches and mosques for the followers of these faiths. No civilization can claim to be eternal unless it is rooted so strongly in such a lofty spiritualistic humanism. No civilization can grow unless fanaticism, fundamentalism and brutality stop. In this respect Vivekananda made a beautiful remark : 'Inspite of their hatred, inspite of their brutality, inspite of their cruelty inspite of their tyranny and inspite of the vile language they are given to uttering, we will and must go on building churches for the christians and mosques for the Mohammedans until we conquer them through love.'<sup>7</sup>

As mentioned above the excellence of the Vedānta of Śaṅkara lies in the fact that the Brahman, the Absolute is identical with the very soul of man, thereby the concept of man occupies the supreme position in the Advaitic metaphysics. It establishes not only the unity of man with other men, and with other living beings but also with the supreme reality of the universe or Brahman. The Reality within and without is the same.<sup>8</sup> Thus, the sun, the moon, stars, fire, air and every particle of the cosmos is surcharged with the same radiance of the supreme Reality ( *Tasya bhāsā sarvamidam vibhāti* ). This Reality reveals itself in each and every mode of knowledge ( *Pratibodha viditam* ). Thus Vivekananda is very much emphatic on the point of oneness and nonduality ( *Ekamevādvitīyam* ) of the supreme Reality. He does admit the grandeur and ecstasy of dualistic love and worship of religious philosophies of the Hindus but he maintains that we have enough of these. But at present the nation urgently needs 'muscles of iron and nerves of steel, gigantic wills which nothing can resist, which can penetrate into the mysteries and the secrets of the universe, and will accomplish their purpose in any fashion even if it meant going down to the bottom of the ocean and meeting death face to face'.<sup>9</sup>

The degradation and misery of the Hindu race made Vivekananda restless and impatient. He could not tolerate its age-long slumber caused due to inertia and weakness. He awakened and reminded it again and again about its past glory and cultural wealth. Vivekananda was very much fond of the following two verses of the *Bhagavadgīta*. He maintains that this is the very essence of the *Gītā*<sup>10</sup> : 'He who sees the Supreme Lord dwelling alike in all things, the Imperishable in things that perish, he sees indeed. For seeing the Lord as the same, everywhere present, he does not destroy the Self by the Self, and thus he goes to the highest goal.'

The spiritual unity of the Vedānta was essential for the elevation of the entire humanity. All the evils of human race are due to ignorance and it is the Advaita Vedānta which could root out the evils of ignorance. He preached love and love alone and based his teachings on the great Vedāntic truth of the sameness and omnipresence of the Soul of the universe.

Vivekananda disliked the idea of denunciation and condemnation of even evils of our society because it would not solve our problems. His ideal was rather growth, expansion and development on national lines. He was very much proud of his country. He was equally proud of her brilliant cultural wealth. He had only one mission to go forward since for him going back was national decay and death.

Vivekananda was proud of his noble heredity. He was convinced that he was descendant of the Brahmin of spiritual culture and renunciation. For him an ideal Brahmin is one in whom worldliness is altogether absent and true wisdom is abundantly present. That is the ideal of Hindu race. A Brahmin is he who has killed all selfishness and who lives and works to acquire and propagate wisdom and the power of love.<sup>11</sup> Thus by the ideal of Brahminhood Vivekananda really

meant the essential divinity of human race as he holds : 'This Vedāntic idea is applicable not only here but over the whole world. Such is our ideal of caste as meant for raising all humanity strongly and gently towards the realisation of as great ideal of the spiritual man who is non-resisting, calm, steady, worshipful, pure and meditative. In that ideal then there is God.'<sup>12</sup>

How is this hidden divinity of humanity to be realised ? According to Vivekananda, it is possible by awakening and reminding people about their real nature. He believes in the ideal of doing one's duty and thus carrying the light and life of the Vedānta to every door and rousing up the divinity that is hidden within every soul. This is the mission of the Vedānta and in it lies the salvation of humanity. Romain Rolland is very much accurate in his estimate of Vivekananda : 'Men like Vivekananda are not made to whisper. They can only proclaim. The sun cannot moderate its own rays'.<sup>13</sup>

### **An Aurobindite Approach Towards Social Change**

Philosophy has been playing a major role in all dynamic periods of civilisations. When tradition loses its hold, when scepticism prevails, it is philosophy which comes to our aid and it gives a right direction. All thought is a dialogue with circumstance. It is never absolute and final. Intellect does not work in vacuum and abstraction. It is the best human aid which he employs for the betterment of his entire race.

Philosophy changes with the changes of historical perspective. Today, we must integrate new discoveries with our philosophical conceptions. Humanity is passing through a period of dangerous crisis. The devaluation of values has become a normal affair. It is groping in the darkness. It is not getting its right direction. Not only this, it is almost

dazed and non-plussed by the scientific and technological advancements. Only philosophy can save it. It has to come to its aid. It must declare, “*Uttiṣṭhata jāgrata...*” ( Arise, awake.... ).

Robert A. Nisbet in his book, *Social Change and History*, while examining the two concepts, especially the concept of Social Change throughout the whole range of Western thought from ancient times to the present, holds that the idea of social development emerged in the 19th century as a by-product of the theory of biological evolution. He argues, “All that we see are the mingled facts of persistence and change. We see migrations and wars, dynasties toppled, governments overthrown, economic systems made affluent or poor, revolutions in power, privilege and wealth....., but we do not see ‘death’, ‘decadence’, ‘degeneration’, or ‘sickness’. We do not see ‘genesis’, ‘growth’, ‘unfolding’, or ‘development’; not in cultures and societies. All of these words have immediate and unchangeable relevance to the organic world, to the life cycle of plants and organism. There they are literal and empirical in meaning. But applied to social and cultural phenomena, these words are not literal. They are metaphorical.”<sup>14</sup> My own comment is that it is true to a large extent. But we do see the ‘growth’ or ‘development’, ‘decadence’ or ‘degeneration’, even ‘death’ of certain cultures and societies. Let us examine the case of Germany and Japan after the 2nd World-War. I feel, all these concepts can appropriately be applied to them one by one. Don’t we see the ‘growth’ and ‘development’ of super powers, U. S. A. and U. S. S. R. ? Don’t we see the ‘decadence’ and ‘degeneration’ of British empire ? Are not many countries with a long cultural tradition now in the state of sickness ?

The distinction made by Nisbet between history and deve-

lopment is nice. "The emphasis in the historiographic perspective is upon exactness of time and place and relationship. In the nineteenth century, Leopold von Ranke gave memorable definition to this type of pursuit of the past when he said—'the task of the historian is to tell it "*wie es eigentlich gewesen ist*" : how it actually has happened'.<sup>15</sup> In the second great perspective, the developmental or evolutionary, the emphasis is not upon the past conceived as a genealogy of happenings and persons, but upon more or less timeless sequences of emergent changes. If event is the key to the historiographic perspective, change is the key concept in the developmental perspective".<sup>16</sup>

Nisbet in this book shows that the metaphor of organic growth and the analogy of the life-cycle are embedded in the pronouncements of sages, historians and social scientists, from Heracleitus and Aristotle to Marx, Spengler, Toynbee, Berdyaev and Sorokin. He demonstrates the historical relation of the classical Greek ideas of growth, the Christian epic, with the fusion of Hebrew and Greek ideas and the modern ideas of progress, development and sociological functionalism and finally demonstrates that the metaphor remains closely involved in contemporary social theory.

Sri Aurobindo's '*Human Cycle*' gives a graphic picture of social evolution. He bases his elucidation on Lamprecht who himself has based on European or particularly German History. He maintains that human societies progress through certain distinct psychological stages which he terms respectively *symbolic, typical, conventional, individualistic* and *subjective*.

Sri Aurobindo feels that these concepts are quite suggestive and if examined, they may throw some light on the secret of our historic evolution and this is the line on which his investigation is based.

Sri Aurobindo maintains that any human society whether it is comparatively cultured or savage, economically advanced or backward at its early stages, we do find strongly symbolic mentality. This social stage is always religious, actively imaginative in its feelings. Through symbols it seeks to express its different modes of life. Symbolism occupies the key-place in the early stages of social evolution. Man feels its presence behind every phenomenon. All the moments and phases of his life are full of this symbolism.

At the beginning of Indian society, the far off Vedic age we find every thing symbolic. The ritual of sacrifice in its every detail is mystically symbolic. Not only the actual religious worship is symbolic, but also the social institutions of the time were penetrated through and through with the symbolic spirit. The "Marriage hymn" ( X. 85 ) of the *Rgveda* illustrates this symbolism.

The Indian ideal of relation between man and woman has always been governed by the symbolism of relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. Aurobindo accepts that the Vedāntic subjugation of female by male through its symbolism was so predominant that Śākta symbolism though just opposite of the Vedānta could not restore and elevate the female principle.

Then the symbolism of *caturvarṇa* is very significant, as this institution of the orders of society was the result to an economic evolution. This symbol appears in the "Puruṣa-Sūkta" of the *Rgveda* where the four orders are described as having sprung from the body of creative Deity, from his head, arms, thighs and feet. To us this is merely poetical image and its sense is that *Brahmins* were the men of knowledge, the *Kṣatriyas* the men of power, the *Vaiśyas* the producers and support of society, the *Śūdras* its servants. As if

that were all, as if the men of those days would have so profound a reverence for mere poetical figures.....We read always our own mentality into that of those ancient forefathers and it is, therefore, that we can find in them nothing but imaginative barbarians. To us poetry is a revel of intellect and fancy, imagination a playing and caterer for our amusement, our entertainer, the nautch-girl of the mind. But to the men of old the poet was a seer, a revealer of hidden truths, imagination no dancing courtesan but a priestess in God's house commissioned not to spin fictions but to image difficult and hidden truths.<sup>17</sup>

The second stage, the *typal*, is predominantly psychological and ethical; all else even the spiritual and religious is subordinate to the psychological idea and to the ethical ideal which expresses it. Religion and Dharma occupy the central position at this stage.

This stage creates certain social values which remain in operation even when this stage is passed. The chief contribution it leaves behind, it leaves even when this stage is over, is the idea of social honour and prestige of the Brahmin which resides in purity, in piety, disinterested and exclusive pursuit of learning and knowledge; the prestige of Kṣatriya lies in courage, chivalry, strength and nobility of character; the honour of the Vaiśya lies in sound production, order, liberality and philanthropy, the honour of the Śūdra resides in obedience, subordination, faithful service, a disinterested attachment. They become a convention, though the most noble of conventions. In the end, they remain more as a tradition in the thought and on the lips than a reality of the life.

This stage, the *typal* passes into the conventional stage. This stage is born when the outer becomes more important



than the inner, the body or clothes become more important than the person himself. Thus in the evolution of *Varṇa-vyavasthā*, birth, economic function, religious ritual and sacrament, family custom—each began to exaggerate enormously its proportions and importance in the scheme. At first, birth did not enjoy first place in the social order, but when the type fixed itself, its maintenance by education and tradition became necessary and education and tradition fixed themselves in a hereditary groove. Under this scheme, the son of a Brahmin was always to be looked upon conventionally as a Brahmin; birth and profession were together the double bond of the hereditary convention. When once it was established, the maintenance of the ethical type receded to the secondary or tertiary importance. Aurobindo remarks, 'the tendency of the conventional age of society is to fix, to arrange, firmly, to formalise, to erect a system of rigid grades and hierarchies, to stereotype religion, to bind education and training to a traditional and unchangeable form, to subject thought to infallible authorities, to cast a stamp of finality on what seems to it the finished life of man'.<sup>18</sup>

The conventional of society has its golden period when the spirit and thought that inspired its forms, are confined but yet living, not yet altogether dead. The golden age, naturally appears very beautiful and attractive from a distance to the posterity, by its precise order, symmetry, fine social architecture, the admirable subordination of its parts to a general and noble plan. Thus the orthodox idealist looks back to a perfectly regulated society devoutly obedient to the wise yoke of the *Śāstra*, and this is his golden age. Then a moment comes when the gulf between the convention and the truth becomes intolerable and the men of intellect arise, the great 'swallowers' of formulas, who robustly reject the type and

convention by the aid of their shrewed and sharp reasoning. It is then that the individualistic age, the age of Protestantism has begun. It is the Age of Reason, the Age of Revolt, Progress, Freedom. Aurobindo remarks, 'A partial and external freedom, still betrayed by the conventional age that preceded it into the idea that the Truth can be determined by machinery, but still a necessary passage to the subjective period of humanity through which man has to circle backward the recovery of his deeper self and a new upward line or a new revolving cycle of civilisation'.<sup>19</sup>

When conventions and traditions become corrupt, as a revolt against these conventions and traditions an individualistic age is born. When the old general standards and values become corrupt and bankrupt, and can no longer provide any inner help; it is, the individual, who has to become a discoverer, a pioneer, and to search out by his individual reason, institution, idealism, desire, claim upon life or whatever other light he finds in himself, the true law of the world and of his own being.

The individualistic age has taken birth in Europe and has exercised its full sway. The East has entered into the age of individualism, not out of its original impulse but only by contact and influence. Aurobindo remarks, 'If its rationalistic civilisation has swept so triumphantly over the world, it is because it found no deeper and more powerful truth to confront it; for all the rest of mankind was still in the inactivity of the last dark hours of the conventional age'.<sup>20</sup>

The dawn of individualism is always a denial, a questioning. In religion, in politics, in social order the individual finds an equally stereotyped reign of convention, fixed disabilities, fixed privileges, the self-regarding arrogance of the high, the blind prostration of the low. He has to rise in revolt on every

claim of the authority. He questions and challenges every authority. The individualism in the West was rooted in its *Renascence*. The *Renascence* gave back to Europe on one hand the free curiosity of the Greek mind, its eager search for first principles and rational laws, on the other the Roman's large practicality and his sense for the ordering of life in harmony with a robust utility and the just principles of things. But both these tendencies were pursued with a passion, a commitment and determination. But without certain standards and guiding principles the champion of individualism may go astray. It is imperative for him, according to Aurobindo, the search for two supreme desiderata. He holds, 'It must find a general standard of Truth to which the individual judgment of all will be inwardly compelled to subscribe without physical constraint or imposition of irrational authority. And it must reach to some principle of social order which shall be equally founded on a universally recognisable truth of things; an order is needed that will put a rein on desire and interest by providing atleast some intellectual and moral test which these two powerful and dangerous forces must satisfy before they can feel justified in asserting their claims on life'.<sup>21</sup> The discoveries of Physical sciences provided them. Here were the laws, principles which could be verified and which satisfied and guided the free individual judgment. Here in these was the fulfilment of individualistic age of human society.

But the knowledge of the physical world is not the whole of knowledge. Man is not only a physical and vital being but it is much more mental being. Here Aurobindo again remarks, 'Therefore, to find the truth of things and the laws of his being in relation to that truth, he must go deeper and fathom the subjective secret of himself and things as well as their objective forms and surroundings.'<sup>22</sup>

When man realises that intellectual reason betrays itself as an insufficient light and a fumbling seeker, he realises the need of a deeper knowledge which could provide him new powers and means to rediscover his authentic self. At this stage he becomes self-conscious. In this process the rationalistic ideal begins to subject itself to the ideal of intuitional knowledge and a deeper self-awareness. Sri Aurobindo remarks, 'All these tendencies, though in a crude, initial and ill-developed form, are manifest now in the world and growing from day to day with a significant rapidity'.<sup>23</sup>

The great objective art and literature of the past does not command the mind of new age. An ever-deepening subjectivism is becoming predominant in music, art and literature. Sri Aurobindo remarks, 'If the subjective age of humanity is to produce its best fruits that the nations should become conscious not only of their own but each other's souls and learn to respect to help and to profit, not only economically and intellectually but subjectively and spiritually by each other'.<sup>24</sup> The first teaching of true subjectivism is that we are a higher self, than our ego or our members; secondly, that we are in our life and being not only ourselves but all others.

Symbols, types, conventions and ideas are not sufficient. 'A spiritual symbol is only a meaningless ticket, unless the thing symbolised is realised in spirit... A spiritual idea is a power, but only when it is both inwardly and outwardly creative.'<sup>25</sup>

Then again, Sri Aurobindo remarks, 'These three things are in fact the nature of the soul; for freedom, quality, unity are the eternal attributes of the Spirit. It is the practical recognition of this truth, it is awakening of the soul in man the attempt to get him to live from his soul and not from his ego which is the inner meaning of religion, and it is that to which

the religion of humanity also must arrive before it can fulfil itself in the life of race.'<sup>26</sup>

Prof. Maitra remarks, 'No development of our being is possible without an awakening of our inner being. The movement of evolution, therefore, is threefold—one upwards, an ascent, one downwards, an integration, and one inwards, towards the soul.'<sup>27</sup>

After supramental transformation, each and every particle of the universe is radiant with the light of the Supreme, '*tasya bhāsā sarvamidam vibhāti*' ....In this context Prof. Misra's remark is quite pertinent, 'Now nature or becoming will no more appear as something undivine and will no more suffer from darkness, ignorance and inconscience. On the other hand it will shine with the light and consciousness of the Divine and will permanently enjoy in its movement and further evolution in knowledge, the powers and bliss of *saccidānanda*.'<sup>28</sup>

Even Laski is to a great extent in agreement with Sri Aurobindo. Prof. Devaraja remarks, 'When nations and communities make spiritual culture, as distinguished from wealth and power, the main object of their collective pursuits, then they would not find it difficult to surrender part of their sovereignties to an International Body, which according to Prof. Laski, is a condition indispensable for the establishment of an effective world-order.'<sup>29</sup>

Thus the Human Cycle is really complete when the realisation of identity between '*Tat*' and '*Tvam*' is realised—'*Tat-tvamasi*.'

### Integral Humanism of Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru

Indian freedom movement is basically rooted into the Hindu Renaissance. Starting from Ram Mohan Roy through Ram Krishna Paramahansa, Vivekānanda, Tagore, Gandhi to Shri Aurobindo, the whole galaxy has been termed as the

Neo-Vedāntins. They are through and through theistic. Of course, most of them are humanists as they do believe in human glory and dignity. In this galaxy of the great wise men of Hindu Renaissance who moulded and directed Indian mind during the last century and half the place of Swāmī Vivekānanda is the most prominent. Vivekānanda saw India's grinding poverty, her social backwardness, the mental inertia into which she had fallen but he also saw her cultural wealth, the deep-rooted traditional strength, her assimilative powers and above all her super spirituality. He awakened India from her dogmas, superstitions and blind faiths in which she has been slumbering for centuries. It is Swāmī Vivekānanda who rescued the knowledge of Vedānta which was hidden in caves and forests and sounded the drum of Advaita at all places—in the bazaars, from the hill-tops and in the plains.

If Swāmī Vivekānanda awakened India from its dogmatic slumber of centuries it was Mahatma Gandhi who experimented morals in politics and won freedom for India through Truth and Non-violence and guided the destiny of Afro-Asians by liberating them from centuries of slavery. Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru was charmed with the pervasive influence of Gandhiji and he writes : 'He seems to be the vehicle and embodiment of some great force of which even he is perhaps only dimly conscious. Is that the spirit of India, the accumulated spirit of the millennia that lie behind our race, the memory of thousand tortured lives'.<sup>30</sup> And again : 'Has he drunk somewhere from the sacred spring of life that has given strength to India through the ages'.<sup>31</sup>

When we read through the pages of *The Discovery of India* we also discover the personality of its author, Pt. Nehru. Pt. Nehru, the First Prime Minister of India is not only statesman, rather he is a visionary, a scientist and a philosopher. We find

him lost in the high visions of Bhārat Mātā while discovering India. The poet in Pt. Nehru becomes prominent when his attention is attracted towards India : 'The mountains and the rivers of India, and the forests and the broad fields, which gave us food, were all dear to us, but what counted ultimately were the people of India, people like them and me, who were spread out all over this vast land. Bhārat Mātā, Mother India, was essentially these millions of people, and victory to her meant victory to these people.'<sup>32</sup> Then again he writes : 'India is a geographical and economic entity, a cultural unity amidst diversity, a bundle of contradictions held together by strong but invisible threads. Overwhelmed again and again, her spirit was never conquered and to-day when she appears to be the play thing of a proud conquerer, she remains unsubdued and unconquered. About her there is the illusive quality of a legend of long ago; some enchantment seems to have held her mind. She is a myth and an idea, a dream and a vision, and yet very real and present and pervasive'.<sup>33</sup>

Pt. Nehru has been declared by a contemporary thinker as an atheist,<sup>34</sup> but I feel, he is apparently an agnostic : 'Truth as ultimate reality, if such there is, must be eternal, imperishable, unchanging. But that infinite, eternal and unchanging truth cannot be apprehended in its fullness by the finite mind of man which can only grasp, at most some small aspect of it limited by time and space, and by the state of development of that mind and the prevailing ideology of the period. As the mind develops and enlarges its scope, as ideologies change and new symbols are used to express that truth new aspects of it come to light, though the core of it may yet be the same. And so truth has ever to be sought and renewed, reshaped and developed, so that, as understood by man, it might keep in line with the growth of his thought and the development

of human life. Only then does it become a living truth for humanity, supplying the essential need for which it craves, and offering guidance in the present and for the future'.<sup>35</sup> Pt. Nehru quoting Voltaire, 'Even if God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent Him', maintains : 'Perhaps that is true and indeed the mind of man has always been trying to fashion some such mental image or conception which grew with the mind's growth.....Whether we believe in God or not, it is impossible not to believe in something, whether we call it a creative life-giving force or vital energy inherent in matter which gives it its capacity for self-movement and change and growth or by some other name, something that is as real, though elusive, as life is real, when contrasted with death.'<sup>36</sup>

Pt. Nehru is an ardent advocate of scientific temper : 'It is the scientific approach, the adventurous and yet critical temper of science, the search for truth and new knowledge, the refusal to accept anything without testing and trial, the capacity to change previous conclusions in the face of new evidence, the reliance on observed fact and not on preconceived theory, the hard discipline of the mind—all this is necessary, not merely for the application of science but for life itself and the solution of its many problems'.<sup>37</sup> By scientific temper Pt. Nehru means an integral vision of life : 'Science deals with the domain of positive knowledge but the temper which it should produce goes beyond that domain. The ultimate purpose of man may be said to gain knowledge, to realise truth to appreciate goodness and beauty. The scientific method of objective enquiry is not applicable to all these and much that is vital in life seems to lie beyond its scope—the sensitiveness to art and poetry, the emotion that beauty produces, the inner recognition of goodness. The botanist and zoologist



may never experience the charm and beauty of nature; the sociologist may be wholly lacking in love for humanity. But even when we go to the regions beyond the reach of the scientific method and visit the mountain tops where philosophy dwells and high emotions fill us, or gaze at the immensely beyond, that approach and temper are still necessary'.<sup>38</sup> Under the influence of M. N. Roy a contemporary thinker has categorised Pt. Nehru as a secularist Humanist.<sup>39</sup> Here I differ with the thinker and prefer to call Pt. Nehru as an integral humanist though the nature of humanistic tendencies of Pt. Nehru is yet to be examined. The secular knowledge is founded upon the experience of this life and can be maintained and tested by reason at work in experience. Maths, Physics and Chemistry are secular sciences and it is precisely for them to establish a secular theory of conduct and welfare of life. Pt. Nehru favours the integral vision of life : 'It is therefore with the temper and approach of science, allied to philosophy, and with reverence for all that lies beyond, that we must face life. Thus we may develop an *integral vision of life* which embraces in its wide scope the past and the present, with all their heights and depths, and look with serenity towards the future.'<sup>40</sup>

Edward M. Burns rightly traces three main influences which shaped the mind of Pt. Nehru : 'The first was his Western education; the second was the philosophy of Gandhi; and the third was Marxian socialism.'<sup>41</sup> N.K. Devaraja pertinently maintains that, 'as a matter of fact it was not so much the 'philosophy' of Gandhi as his moral personality and his novel method of resistance and struggle that won over Nehru and charmed the world.'<sup>42</sup> He is right in his observation. The other two influences mentioned by Prof. Burns made Nehru a democratic socialist or a socialist democrat, a believer alike

in the worth and dignity of the individual and a champion of the freedom of the individual and social justice. In addition, as already noted, Nehru was a great patriot committed to build a prosperous and progressive India, he was also committed to the cause of the freedom of the Asian and African people. The following extracts from his writings throw light on some of his dominant beliefs and pivotal convictions : 'I have been and am a convinced socialist and believer in democracy, and have at the same time accepted whole-heartedly the peaceful technique of non-violent action which Gandhiji has practised so successfully during the past twenty years.'<sup>43</sup> I suppose I am temperamentally and by training an individualist, and intellectually a socialist, whatever all this might mean. I hope that socialism does not kill or suppress individuality; indeed I am attracted to it because it will release innumerable individuals from economic and cultural bondage.'<sup>44</sup>

Pt. Nehru, the socialist was critical of the institution of property : 'Personally I feel that the institution of private property ( except in a very restricted sense ) gives dangerous power to individuals over society.'<sup>45</sup> Pt. Nehru is not dogmatic rather he is a democrat of first order : 'The method of democracy is discussion, argument, persuasion and ultimate decision and acceptance of that decision even though it might go against our gain. Otherwise the bigger lathi or the bigger bomb prevail and that is not the democratic method.'<sup>46</sup>

Marx, indeed, influenced Pt. Nehru but he finds the Advaita philosophy of the Vedānta still more appealing to him : 'Much in the Marxist philosophical outlook I could accept without difficulty : its monism and non-duality of

matter and the dialectic of continuous change by evolution as well as leap, through action and interaction, cause and effect, thesis, antithesis and synthesis. It did not satisfy me completely, nor did it answer all the questions in my mind and, almost unawares, a vague idealist approach would creep into my mind, something rather akin to the Vedānta approach. It was not a difference between mind and matter, but rather something that lay beyond the mind. Also there was the background of ethics.<sup>47</sup> Then again, he maintains : 'What the mysterious is I do not know. I do not call it God because God has come to mean much that I do not believe in..... Any idea of personal God seems very odd to me. Intellectually, I have been attracted towards the Advaita ( non-dualist ) philosophy of the Vedānta, though I do not presume to understand it in all its depth and intricacy.'<sup>48</sup> Pt. Nehru is more a visionary like our Vedic *Rṣis* than a philosopher : 'At the same time the Vedānta, as well as other similar approaches, rather frighten me with their vague, formless incursions into infinity. The diversity and fullness of nature stir me and produce a harmony of the spirit, and I can imagine myself feeling at home in the old Indian or Greek pagan and pantheistic atmosphere, but minus the conception of God or Gods that was attached to it.'<sup>49</sup>

Pt. Nehru, is very proud of rich heritage of India but at the same time he is not blind towards its shortcomings. As a historian his attitude is balanced one : 'Nothing is more advantageous and more creditable than a rich heritage; but nothing is more dangerous for a nation than to sit back and live on that heritage. A nation cannot progress if it merely imitates its ancestors; what builds a nation is creative, inventive and vital activity.'<sup>50</sup>

Sometimes Pt. Nehru appears as a sceptic and sometimes he appears as an agnostic but his confidence in the spirit of man is total : 'How amazing is this spirit of man. In spite of innumerable failings, man throughout the ages has sacrificed his life and all he held dear for an ideal, for truth, for faith, for country and honour. That ideal may change, but that capacity for self-sacrifice continues.'<sup>51</sup> Then again : 'More wonderful than the earth and heavens is this mind and spirit of man which grows ever mightier and seeks fresh worlds to conquer.'<sup>52</sup> He again remarks : 'Remembering also that life, for all its ills, has joy and beauty, and that we can always wander, if we know how to, in the enchanted woods of nature.'<sup>53</sup> He again observes : 'A University stands for humanism, for tolerance, for reason, for progress, for the adventure of ideas and for the search for truth. It stands for the onward march of the human race towards even higher objectives.'<sup>54</sup> He hates pessimism : 'The pessimism of Buddhism did not fit in with my approach to life nor did the tendency to walk away from life and its problems.'<sup>55</sup> When we read Pt. Nehru's writings we are reminded on the one hand of the genius of great poet Bāṇa, by whom nothing is left, 'Bāṇocchiṣṭham jagatsarvam,' and on the other hand the great philosophical genius of Śaṅkara's mind of a very fine penetration and profound spirituality. Pt. Nehru has drunk the milk of human kindness so much that one is reminded of the universal pathos of a Bodhisattva who would not accept his own liberation so long the entire humanity is not liberated : 'Man's dearest possession is life and since it is given to him to live but once, he must so live as not to be seared with the shame of a cowardly and trivial past, so live as not to be tortured for years without purpose, so live that dying he can say, 'All my life and my strength were given to the first cause of the world—the liberation of mankind.'<sup>56</sup>

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# The Pratyabhijñā Concept of Man and Creation A : Contemporary Reassessment

Science and technology are the inventions of human mind. They are the best aids to mankind in making human life smooth and prosperous. They have created paradise on the earth. But prosperity breeds contempt. The developed countries in order to establish their supremacy over the others are misusing science and technology and are piling up their armouries with such lethal weapons that thousands of Nagasaki and Hiroshima could be destroyed within a moment. The whole of the universe is sitting on a volcano which may burst out at any moment.

Never before were water, air and now the entire cosmos so much polluted as they are to-day. The cosmic pollution is so much that it has now entered as it were into the very heart of the people, that is why corruption has become the normal code of human transactions. Thus pollution is let loose both within and without.

When tradition loses its hold, when scepticism prevails, it is philosophy which comes to our aid and gives a right direction. It is the *Ātma Vidyā*, *Parā Vidyā*, *Adhyātma Vidyā* which alone can save the destiny of man from the twin ghosts of cosmic pollution and nuclear supremacy. There is no other way for salvation ( *Tameva viditvātimṛtyumeti nānyaḥ panthā vidyate ayanāya* ).

In the following pages an humble attempt is made to study 'The *Pratyabhijñā* Concept of Man : A Contemporary Reassessment'.



The beauty of Indian philosophy is this that it is equally rooted in both the *Vedic* tradition and the *Āgamic* tradition. They are complementary to each other. The Vedic philosophy culminates in the Absolutism of Śaṅkara. This Indian genius who hailed from the South sometime during the 8th century A. D. is not great for the reason that his philosophy stands forth complete needing neither a before nor an after. He is not great that he rooted out Buddhism for good. He is great, even, unrivalled so far as his contribution towards the cultural integration of the country is concerned through his philosophy and religion.

The Absolutism of Śaṅkara is rooted in the Upaniṣadic-*Ekamevādvit'yaṁ, Ekaṁ sadviprāḥ bahudhā vadanti, Satyamjñā-namanantaṁ Brahma*. Thus it is pure Consciousness which is devoid of all attributes ( *nirguṇa* ) and all categories of intellect ( *nirviśeṣa* ). This is *para Brahman* of Śaṅkara. *Brahman* associated with *māyā* is the qualified *Brahman* ( *Saguṇa* and *Saviśeṣa* ). This is the *apara Brahman* or the Lord ( *Īśvara* ) who is the creator, preserver and destroyer of this world, which is the *vivarta* of the Lord. The *para Brahma* of Śaṅkara has been compared with the Absolute of Schelling which was condemned by Hegel as a shot out of a pistol and again he called it a night in which all cows were black. It is true. But no philosophy empirically negates the existence of this world. Śaṅkara observes:—That omniscient and omnipotent cause from which proceed the origin, sustenance, and dissolution of this World—World which is differentiated by names and forms, contains many agents and enjoyers, is the abode of the fruits of actions, these fruits having their definite places, time and causes and the nature of whose arrangement cannot even be conceived by the mind—that cause we say is *Brahman*.<sup>1</sup> The universe is a cosmos and not a chaos. The rhythmic movement

of the sun, the moon and the stars, the music of the spheres, the enchanting song of the nightingale, the beautiful form of the black antelope—all these cannot be the handiwork of either a blind force or of a chance coincidence of atoms collecting together. Without the postulation of an intelligent being possessing omnipotence and omniscience the regulated creation of the universe is not intelligible.<sup>2</sup>

Śaṅkara following the Upaniṣadic teaching, establishes the essential identity between *Ātman* and *Brahman*. That is to say, from within *Jīvātman* is *Ātman*, which is identical with *Brahman*—the cosmic Reality. This identity is well brought out in the great sayings of the Upaniṣads such as *Tattvamasi*, *Ayamātmā Brahma*, etc. The empirical life of the *jīvātman* is solely due to *adhyāsa* and when this obstacle of *ajñāna*, is removed by *jñāna*, *jīvātman* realises its identity with *Brahman*. This realization of identity, in the *Advaita* philosophy of Śaṅkara, is called *Mokṣa*. This is the highest goal, according to Śaṅkara, of human life.<sup>3</sup>

One who realises it in one's life makes the best of it, while one who fails to realise it is the greatest loser.<sup>4</sup> There is no better attainment than that of the Self. It is this that all Vedic assertions and scriptural prescriptions have for their ultimate end.<sup>5</sup> *Mokṣa* is the state of Brahmanhood.<sup>6</sup> This realisation of liberation is not the attainment of something new but it is the realisation of that which is one's very nature. Śaṅkara does not talk of a heaven which is apart from us but a heaven which is already with us but which we have forgotten for the time-being. Thus it does not involve the process of becoming *Brahman* but it is the realisation of being *Brahman*. Accordingly, in liberation there is no question of becoming something which does not already exist, but only of the attainment of the knowledge of what has existed from all eternity.<sup>7</sup>

That is why Śaṅkara very lucidly emphasises that liberation is not the fruit of *dharma* or *karma*. He observes : But this ( *Mokṣa* ) is eternal in the true sense, eternal without undergoing any change ( *Kūṭastha nitya* ), omnipresent as ether, free from all modifications, absolutely self-sufficient, not composed of parts, of self-luminous nature. That bodiless entity in fact, to which merit and demerit with their consequences and threefold time do not apply, is called liberation.<sup>8</sup> This is the great contribution of Advaita Vedānta in the realm of the philosophical world. It establishes not only the unity of man with other men and other living beings but also with the supreme reality of the universe, viz. *Brahman*. *The Reality within and without is one and the same*. This supreme state of man is not a matter of philosophical speculations or faith only, it is something which can be tested, experimented and lived here and now. Lord Kṛṣṇa declares, One steadied in Yoga, with pure self and subdued spirit, with the sense-centres under control, and realising the oneness of his Self with the inner Self of all beings—he, even doing actions, incurs no contamination.<sup>9</sup>

If the Vedic philosophy culminates in the Absolutism of Śaṅkara the *Āgamic* philosophy culminates in the Absolutism of Abhinavagupta, which is popularly known as Kāśmīra Śaivism. In the galaxy of Indian geniuses after Śaṅkara the reputation of Abhinavagupta has been great. While the genius of Śaṅkara excels in philosophy and religion alone, the genius of Abhinavagupta excels in poetics and dramaturgy also in addition to philosophy and religion.

Kāśmīra Śaivism has been referred to as the *Pratyabhijñā* philosophy by the *Sarvadarśanasamgrahakāra*, Mādhava. But Kāśmīra Śaivism includes a few more trends, besides, the *Pratyabhijñā* trend. There are clearly three trends, viz. *Krama*,

*Kaula* and *Pratyabhijñā*. The *Krama* sub-school emphasises the worship of *Śakti* and the means of worship adopted by this sub-school is *Śāktopāya*. The *Kaula* sub-school gives emphasis on will and accordingly the means adopted by this sub-school is *Śāmbhavopāya*. But in the *Pratyabhijñā* school there is neither the restriction of the object of worship nor the means of worship, that is why the path adopted by this school is *Pratyabhijñopāya* or *anupāya*. Abhinavagupta synthesised in himself the different trends of Kāśmīra Śaivism and gave a complete picture of the Śaiva thought. Of course, my own attempt is mostly based on the *Pratyabhijñā* trend.

Abhinavagupta in the 35th *Āhnika* of his *Tantrāloka* gives a brief account of *Āgamic* tradition. Kāśmīra Śaivism is mainly based on the sixtyfour monistic *Āgamas*, out of which many are not available at present. However, Vasugupta is supposed to be the propounder of this tradition and two works, *Śiva-sūtras* and *Spandakārikā* go in his name. He was supposed to be in the 8th century A. D. Somānanda, the disciple of Vasugupta is supposed to be the first systematiser of this school, who wrote *Śivadr̥ṣṭi*. His disciple, Utpaladeva, wrote *Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-kārikā*, *Śiva-Stotrāvalī* and *Siddhitrayī*.

The most famous name in this tradition, Abhinavagupta, the grand disciple of Utpaladeva, emerges sometime between the 10th and 11th Century A. D. who wrote his famous commentary, *Vimarśinī* on the *Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-kārikā*, his renowned *magnum opus*, *Tantrāloka* as also *Trantrasāra* and *Paramārthasāra* and many other works. His disciple, Kṣemarāja presented the gist of this tradition in his *Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam*. Maheśvarānanda sometime in the 13th Century A. D. wrote *Mahārthamañjarī*, a beautiful treatise on the *Krama* tradition. Now we examine the Śiva Absolutism.

As opposed to the Advaitic absolute Brahman, which is

*trikālābādhita-sat* the *Parama Śiva*, the Absolute of the Kāśmīra Śaivism is a *Śiva-Śakti-Śāmarasya*, i.e. *sāmarasya* of *Bodha* and *Svātantrya*. It is of the nature of *prakāśa* and *Vimarśa*. While the Absolute of the Advaita Vedānta is free from the impurities and limitations, the Absolute of the K. Śaivism is free to perform even the impossibles. It is the positive approach of Freedom as 'freedom of' as against the Advaitic approach of Freedom which is negative, as 'freedom from'. In the K. Śaivism a greater significance is attached to the concept of freedom. Freedom, i. e. *Svātantrya* stands for the capacity to perform the impossible. The terms like *Svātantrya*, *Ahamtā*, *Sphurattā* represent the essential nature of *Śakti*, or *Vimarśa*. It is through the concept of *Vimarśa*, *Śakti*, *Svātantrya* that the K. Śaivism makes an attempt to bridge the gulf between subjectivity and objectivity, i. e. *Ahamtā* and *Indantā*, *Viśayitā* and *Viśayatā*. *Prakāśa* and *Vimarśa*, are not only united together, rather they are identified. Thus the Supreme Reality of K. Śaivism is *Cit-Śakti*.<sup>10</sup> On this ground the K. Śaivism claims to be the only consistent form of Absolutism while the other forms of Absolutism are weak and inconsistent as they have a sort of allergy toward duality and manifoldness. The K. Śaivism claims to be the philosophy of affirmation and assimilation as against the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta which is a philosophy of negation and rejection. Thus the Absolute of K. Śaivism is neither like the Advaitic Absolute which is only pure being ( which is free from all impurities and limitations ) nor like the Mādhyamika Absolute which is *catuṣkoṭivinirmukta*, not even like the Absolute of Yogācāra which is devoid of the power of objectification. Thus *Parama Śiva* is the supreme *Śāmarasya* of *Prakāśa* and *Vimarśa*. *Jñana* and *Kriyā*, *Bodha* and *Svātantrya*, Being and Becoming, *Śiva* and *Śakti*. *Vimarśa* has also been named as *Parā Śakti*, *Parā Vāc*, *Svātantrya*, *Aiśvarya*, *Kartṛtva*,

*Sphurattā, Sāra, Hṛdaya, Spanda.*<sup>11</sup> Descartes, the father of the Western modern Philosophy declared independence alone as the sole criterion of Substance. Spinoza corrected him by adding knowledge to the concept of Substance. But it was Leibnitz who declared that without force, independence and knowledge would be meaningless. Thus he advanced the theory of Monadology. By accepting infinite number of independent Monads Leibnitz made a lot of mess in his Monadology but in principle he is to a large extent very much consistent so far as the definition of the Substance is concerned. Thus what the Western Modern Philosophy could achieve at its third stage the K. Śaivism achieved at its first stage when it begins its definition of the *Parama Śiva* as *Cidrūpiṇī Śakti*. It is not a meagre achievement.<sup>12</sup>

The entire universe is the manifestation of *Parama Śiva*. *Parama Śiva* is transcendent ( *Viśvottirṇa* ) as well as immanent ( *Viśvamaya* ). Thus *Parama Śiva* is both manifest as well as unmanifest. As *Prakāśa* it is *Viśvottirṇa* and as *Vimarśā* it is *Viśvamaya*. Thus *Parama Śiva* alone is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe. The ultimate causality belongs to *Parama Śiva* alone. It is maintained that the being of the insentient entirely depends on the sentient and thus knowledge and action are the very life of the sentient.<sup>13</sup>

The Śaiva Absolutist maintains essential identity between the individual self and *Parama Śiva*. Due to ignorance the *jīvātman* conceives itself into the maniness of subject and object whereas in reality it is one and identical with *Parama Śiva*.<sup>14</sup> The Advaitic concept of Self is pure Being ( *Śuddha Prakāśa* ) but the Buddhist ( *Yogācāra* ) concept is just the opposite to it i. e. pure Becoming ( only *Kṣaṇika Vijñāna* ). It is the Śaiva Absolutist who provides a beautiful synthesis,

between the two, i. e., it is both *Prakāśa* as well as *Vimarśa*, *Śiva* and *Śakti*.

Here the question arises, why does after all *Parama Śiva* appear as the individual soul ( *Paśu* or *Jiva* ) ? Why does He undergo the bondage ? It is due to the free will ( *Svātantrya* ) of the Lord that He undergoes the bondage, i. e. *āṇava* defilements.<sup>15</sup> Because of ignorance the individual self is subject to the three fetters of defilement—*Āṇava*, *Māyā* and *Kārma*. The Śaivite holds that the real self is never affected by the defilements as the ether is never defiled by the defilement of different jars. Thus under all diverse forms the Self remains one and the same as nothing is really different from the Self.<sup>16</sup>

*Māyā Tattva* has been described as the concealing power of *Parama Śiva*.<sup>17</sup> From *Māyā* principle *kañcukas* in the following order, *Kāla*, *Vidyā*, *Rāga*, *Kalā* and *Niyati* come out and they obscure and limit the powers of the Supreme Lord. Thus the real nature of the Lord is obscured, and as a result its omnipotence is replaced by *Kalā*, i. e. limited power, its omniscience by *Vidyā*, i. e. limited knowledge, its universal love by *Rāga*, i. e. particular objects of desire, its eternity by *Kāla*, i. e. temporality and its omnipresence by *Niyati*. Thus including *Māyā*, these are the six *kañcukas* (cloaks) of the individual soul.<sup>18</sup>

Under the association of three impurities, each separately and three groups consisting of two impurities each and then one group consisting of all the three impurities give rise to seven categories of individual souls respectively, *Śiva*, *Maheśvara* and *Mantrēśvara*, *Vidyēśa*, *Vijñānākala*, *Pralayākala* and *Sakala*.<sup>19</sup> Out of the seven categories of individual souls the first four belong to the state of pure creation. The *Vijñānākalas* belong to the transitional state between the pure and impure creation.

The *Sakalas* and the *Pralayākalas* on the other hand belong to the state of impure creation. The manifoldness of individual souls is unreal as it involves the logical fallacy of *anyonyāś-  
raya*, since maniness of individual souls is due to the variety of insentient and the difference of insentient is due to sentient. Thus all subjects are one. It is one and the same self that shines as one's own Self as well as the Self of others.<sup>20</sup>

It is a difficult task to explain bondage in the absolutistic system like K. Śaivism where it is the nature of the Lord, the freedom, *Svātantrya* of *Parama Śiva* that he accepts His own limitation. If bondage is the free divine will, then spiritual disciplines for the realisation of release lose significance. Abhinavagupta himself poses this problem : if the one Supreme Lord alone is the Self, what then is bondage, for liberation from which it is to be realised ? Who is there other than the Supreme Lord to be in the bondage ?<sup>21</sup> While giving the solution to these problems Abhinavagupta maintains that transcendently there is no bondage, yet the Supreme Self out of its free will assumes limitations and thus forgets its own perfect nature and undergoes bondage. Though under bondage, even in this stage he remains pure and perfect and this is why he is called *Puruṣa*, i. e. one who is ignorant about his perfection.<sup>22</sup>

Thus bondage is the self-limitation of the supreme Lord. It is in his very nature to perform five-fold functions, universal creation, maintenance, destruction, self-concealment and self-revelation. They are always going on without any break.<sup>23</sup>

Impurity of *Mala* is of three kinds, *Āṇava Mala*, *Kārmīya Mala*, and *Māyīya Mala*. As a matter of fact all the three impurities are *Māyīya*, i. e. as they are due to *Māyā*. The *Āṇava Mala* is the primal ignorance of the individual, as due to it he begins to imagine himself as imperfect. The *Āṇava Mala* leads



to the *Kārma Mala* as due to it the power of action is limited. The *Māyīya Mala* limits the power of Knowledge. Ignorance is of two types, *Bauddha* and *Pauruṣa*. The *Bauddha ajñāna* may be removed by the intellectual knowledge ( *Bauddha Jñāna* ) acquired from the *Āgamas*, but the *Pauruṣa ajñāna*, which grips the entire person ( *Puruṣa* ) cannot be removed by intellectual knowledge alone,<sup>24</sup> but by initiation ( *Dīkṣā* ) into this path of *Sādhana*.

Liberation is the revelation of the powers of the Self when the bond of ignorance is burst.<sup>25</sup> It is the awareness of ones own true nature. Like Śaṅkara, Abhinavagupta too does not show a heaven which is apart from us but a heaven which is already with us which we have forgotten for the time being. Liberation is neither on this earth, nor in the underworld, nor some where in the heaven. It is whatever one realises when one has transcended the activity of thought.<sup>26</sup> After liberation the individual ( *paśu* ) realises its identity with *Parama Śiva*, takes this entire universe as the manifestation of the glory of the Lord, even when determinate thoughts ( *vikalpas* ) arise in him.<sup>27</sup> Thus liberation which is the recognition of identity between the individual ( *paśu* ) and the Lord ( *Paśupati* ) does not involve the process of becoming but is rather the process of the *recognition of being the Supreme Lord*. Thus to maintain that *pratyabhijñā* is the total spiritual transformation of the person<sup>28</sup> is debatable,

As the K. Śaivism is the integral philosophy as such its ultimate aim as well as the method prescribed for the recognition of the Supreme Lord which is the *Śiva-Śakti-Sāmānyasya* are also integral. Thus it prescribes *Karma*, *Bhakti* and *Jñāna* which have technically been termed respectively *Aṇavopāya* or *Kriyopāya*, *Śāktopāya* or *Jñānopāya* and *Sāmbhavopāya* or *Ichhopāya*. But the final means is the *Pratyabhijñopāya* or

*Anupāya* by which the *Anuttara* or the *Purṇāhamtā* is realised. Here we leave the Tantric implications of the system which are esoteric and very technical.<sup>29</sup>

The Advaita of Śaṅkara and the K. Śaivism of Abhinavagupta do differ only in their approaches but the import of both is mainly one and the same, i. e. the entire universe is radiant with the light of the Supreme, *tasya bhāsā sarvamidam vibhātī*, *Vāsudevaḥ Sarvamiti, sarvo mamāyam vibhavaḥ*. Sri Aurobindo is very optimistic that after supramental transformation, life here on this very earth would be divine. Laski is in agreement with Sri Aurobindo that without a spiritual culture an effective world-order is not possible.<sup>30</sup> Capra's remark is very meaningful : 'The survival of our whole civilization may depend on whether we can bring about such a change. It will depend, ultimately, on our ability to adopt some of the 'yin' attitudes of Eastern mysticism; to experience the wholeness of nature and the art of living with it in harmony'.<sup>31</sup> It is the attitude of Divinity towards the entire universe, cosmos that can only save us from the total destruction.

### Creation

The entire universe is the manifestation of the Parama Śiva. The Parama Śiva is the transcendent (*Viśvottīrṇa*) and immanent (*Viśvamaya*). Thus the Parama Śiva is both manifest as well as unmanifest. As *Prakāśa* it is *Viśvottīrṇa* and as *Vimarśa* it is *Viśvamaya*. Thus Parama Śiva alone is the material as well as efficient cause of the universe. The ultimate causality belongs to the Parama Śiva alone. It is maintained that the being of insentient entirely depends on the sentient and thus knowledge and action are the very life of the sentient.<sup>32</sup>

The insentient *Prakṛti* cannot be the prius of such a beautiful universe. The K. Śaivism rules out this variety of

causality. The K. Śaivism is in agreement with the Advaita Vedānta when it criticises *Satkāryavāda*, *Asatkāryavāda* and *Pratītyasamutpāda*. It agrees to the following import of the Advaitic theory of causation. Starting from Gaudapāda, the grand teacher of Śaṅkara upto post-Śaṅkara Advaitins, we may, however, categorize philologically the Advaitic theory of causation into *ajātivāda*, *kāryakāraṇānanyatvavāda* and *vivartavāda* but the import of this theory is only this, that it advocates only one-sided dependence of effect on the cause and not vice versa.<sup>33</sup> Here ends its agreement with the Advaita Vedānta. The Advaitic view of Causality makes the Absolute entirely transcendent and declares the world as illusory. On the other hand, the Absolute of the K. Śaivism is transcendent *Viśvottīrṇa* but the world is not false; rather it is the very *Ābhāsa* of the Parama Śiva. It is the free will ( *Svātantrya* ) of the Highest Lord which gives rise to the manifestation ( *Ābhāsa* ) of this universe. The *Ābhāsavāda*, the K. Śaivite theory of causality claims that the objectification of Universe is simply the free will of the Highest Lord.

The entire universe is a creation of Parama Śiva. The Parama Śiva is the real creator.<sup>34</sup> The Lord always performs the five functions not only in case of cosmic creation, destruction etc., but also in practical life.<sup>35</sup>

Beginning from the *Śiva Tattva* upto the *Śuddha Vidyā* has been named as *Śuddha Adhvā*, i. e. pure Creation. According to the *Tantrasāra* Śiva alone is their creator.<sup>36</sup> In their creation *Māyā* has no role at all. The process of creation in the K. Śaivism is in the following order :—

1. *Śiva Tattva*. The Parama Śiva has two states, transcendent ( *Viśvottīrṇa* ) and immanent ( *viśvamaya* ). At the transcendental level which has been termed as the state of *Anuttara* or the state of *Pūrṇāhamtā* the Highest Lord out of its free will manifests itself. The first throb ( *Spanda* ) of the

Parama Śiva is the *Śiva Tattva*.<sup>36b</sup> It is state of pure subjectivity ( *Śuddha Ahaṃ* ). There is no objectivity.

2. *Śakti Tattva*. It is the *Vimarśa* aspect of Parama Śiva. It is the real power of Parama Śiva without which Śiva would be inert ( *Jada* ). Śiva and Śakti are non-different. They are differentiated only empirically. In the K. Śaivism sometimes the *Śiva Tattva* has been described as the first throb ( *Prathama Spanda* ) of the Parama Śiva and sometimes the *Śakti Tattva* has been described as the first throb of the Parama Śiva. Ācārya Kṣemaraja in his '*Parāpraveśikā*' favours *Śakti Tattva* to be the first throb of the Parama Śiva.<sup>37</sup> On the other hand, Abhinavagupta favours the *Śiva Tattva* as the first throb of the Parama Śiva.<sup>38</sup> The *Śiva Tattva* being the very nature of Parama Śiva, who is really transcendental ( *Viśvottīrṇa* ) should not be the first throb of the Parama Śiva. The very moment out of its free will when the Parama Śiva just intends to manifest the universe the first throb should be in his own power, i. e., the *Śakti Tattva*. This point is still open to discussion. But while at the stage of the *Śiva Tattva* there is only the experience of '*Ahaṃ*' at the stage of the *Śakti Tattva* it becomes '*Ahamasmi*'.

3. *Sadāśiva Tattva*. In the order of manifestation Sadāśiva is the third *Tattva*. It is the stage of *icchā*. Here the form of experience is '*Ahaṃ idam*'. There is just blurred idea of objectivity, though subjectivity, i. e. *Ahaṃtā* predominates.

4. *Īśvara Tattva*. It is the stage of *jñāna* and the form of the experience is '*Idam-Ahaṃ*'. Here the idea of the universe is quite clear. Here *idamā*, i. e., objectivity predominates over the *ahamā*, i. e., subjectivity. As an artist has a dim and blurred idea of his picture in the beginning but when he wants to paint it it is quite clear, in the same way at the stage of the

Sadāśiva the idea of the Universe remains dim and blurred but at the stage of the Īśvara it is quite clear.

5. *Śuddha Vidyā Tattva*. At this stage of manifestation which is the stage of *Kriyā* the form of the experience is '*Ahaṃta-Idaṃta*'. Here *ahaṃtā* and *idaṃtā* are bifurcated. Here ends the pure creation, i. e., *Śuddha Adhvā* and the manifestation from *Māyā* to the earth is called impure creation, i. e., *Aśuddha Adhvā* as from here onward the role of *Māyā* becomes predominant. Due to *Māyā* one forgets its true nature.

6. *Māyā Tattva*. At this stage *Ahaṃtā* takes the form of *Puruṣa* and *idaṃtā* takes the form of *Prakṛti*. It has been described as the self-concealing power of the Highest Lord.<sup>39</sup> From *Māyā* principle the five *kañcukas* in this order, *Kalā*, *Vidyā*, *Rāga*, *Kāla* and *Niyati* come out.

7. *Kalā*. It comes out of *Māyā* and veils omnipotence nature of the soul. It makes the individual self feel as a limited and finite being. It is the evolute of *Māyā* but it is the cause of *Vidyā*, *Rāga*, *Kāla* and *Niyati*.

8. *Vidyā*. It is veiling power of the Parama Śiva. It veils its omniscience; and makes it feel that it has limited knowledge.

9. *Rāga*. It makes the perfect into imperfect. It creates desire for pleasant objects.

10. *Kāla*. It creates the feeling of temporality. Here the feeling of the past, present and future operates.

11. *Niyati*. It is the controlling agency through which freedom and omnipresence of the Lord are veiled.

The above eleven *Tattvas* along with the twenty-five *Tattvas* of the Sāṃkhya Philosophy make the thirty-six *Tattvas* of the K. Śaivism. The K. Śaivism mostly agrees with the Sāṃkhya system with slight difference here and there. While Sāṃkhya maintains *Prakṛti* as the First Principle of the Univ-

erse, the K. Śaivism would refute it and proclaim Parama Śiva as the first principle of the Universe. While the Sāṃkhya system claims one *Prakṛti* for all the jīvas, the K. Śaivism maintains many *Prakṛtis* also. According to the Sāṃkhya system *Puruṣa* is *nitya 'uddhabuddhamukta* but on the contrary the K. Śaivism maintains that *Puruṣa* is associated with *Ṣaṭ-kañcukas*. According to the Sāṃkhya system *Puruṣa* is another independent principle but it is not so with the K. Śaivism. According to this system *Puruṣa* is the manifestation of Parama Śiva. This is in brief the process of the order of manifestation out of the free will of the Highest Lord. In the following lines we shall make a critical estimate of this problem.

The manifestation of the free will of the Highest Lord through the five-fold functions, universal creation, maintenance, destruction, self-concealment and self-revelation is always going on without any break.<sup>40</sup> This is again and again emphasised that the five-fold functions by the Highest Lord are always in operation. Thus, the Lord always performs the five functions not only in case of cosmic creation, destruction, etc., but also in practical life.<sup>41</sup> Here creation becomes the essential nature of the Highest Lord. If so it is not very much consistent with principle of *Svātantryavāda* in this system. According to this system the Highest Lord is free to create the universe. Creation is not the essential nature of Parama Śiva.

Secondly, if action, i. e., *Śakti* or *spanda* is very nature of the Highest Lord, it cannot get rid of temporality and thereby looses its Absoluteness. Though it has been said as *Anuttara*, *Viśvottīrṇa* and even as *Akāla* but can it claim to be without *Vimarśa* even in the transcendental stage? If so it would be like pure being of the Advaita variety.

Thirdly, now-a-days an attempt is made by introducing Advaita Vedānta in the K. Śaivism. It is maintained that

creation is not the essential nature of the Highest Lord, it is not the *Svarūpa Lakṣaṇa* of the Parama Śiva rather it is the *Taṭastha lakṣaṇa*. Only *cit* and *ānanda* are the *Svarūpa Lakṣaṇa*; while *icchā*, *jñāna* and *kriyā* may be defined as the *Taṭastha Lakṣaṇa*. Thus creation being *kriyā* is only the accidental nature of the Highest Lord. Even if it is accepted, then the question arises whether in its essential nature the Highest Lord can remain without *Vimarśa*, or *Spanda*. If it is without *Spanda* it is as good as the pure Brahman of the Advaita Vedānta. And this system ultimately lands itself into the Advaitic position. It is clearly but quite emphatically maintained that *Śiva Tattva* or *Śakti Tattva* is the first *Spanda*. This suggests that in its *Anuttara* stage it is without *Spanda*. If the Lord is without *Spanda* then it would be the Advaitic position.

Finally, how can this system preserve the non-duality of the Parama Śiva with its 36 *ābhāsas* which have been proclaimed to be real? It is true that this system provides a positive approach towards the Absolute but out of its enthusiasm of bridging the gulf between phenomena and noumena it really loses its non-duality.

#### References :

The following abbreviations have been used;—

- I. P. Īśvara Pratyabhijñā
  - I. P. V. Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarśinī
  - P. H. Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam
  - P. S. Paramārthasāra
  - SBS. Śārīraka-bhāṣya on the Brahmasūtras ( Eng. Trans. by Thibaut )
  - T. A. Tantrāloka.
1. SBS, 1. 1. 2,
  2. R. R. Pandey, Man and the Universe, p. 151.
  3. S. Taitt. upa, II. 1; SBS, 1.1.1. ( Brahmāvagatir hi puruṣārthah ).

4. S. Kena. upa, II. 5.
5. Upadeśasāhasrī, XVIII, 4.
6. SBS, 1. 1. 4 ( Brahmabhāvaśca Mokṣaḥ ).
7. The System of Vedānta, p. 401.
8. SBS, 1. 1. 4.
9. Bhagavadgītā, V. 7.
10. Jñānam Kriyātmakam yo hi jñānāti ca karoti ca sa jīvātī-  
yucyate, Īśvarapratyabhijñānavimarśinī, Vol. I, p. 43.
11. Jaideva Singh, Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam, p. 5.
12. R. R. Pandey, The Concept of Creation in the K. Śaivism,  
Prof. Baldeva Upadhyaya Felicitation Vol., p. 293; Gang-  
anatha Jha Kendriya Sans. Vidyapeeth, Vol. XXXVII—  
Dec. Parts 1-4.
13. I. P., I. L. 3; 4. Iti svatantraḥ evaikaḥ prakāśaḥ paramār-  
thataḥ, sarvākāranirākārasvabhāvaḥ virājate.
14. P. S. Kārikā 25, Purnatā Pratyabhijñā, 48.
15. P. S. Kārikā, 16. 3. Ibid., p. 42.
16. Ibid., p. 58 ( Iti sa eka eva sarvāvasthāsu samvidanu-  
gamāt ).
17. Tantrālokaṭikā, Vol. 3, p. 283 ( Māyā hi svarūpagopan-  
ātmikā pārameśvarī icchāśaktiḥ ).
18. P. S. Kārikā, 34.
19. I. P. V., III. 2. 10.
20. P. H., p. 42 ( Śrī Parama Śivabhāṭṭāraka eva ittham  
nānāvaicitryasahasraiḥ sphurati ).
21. I. P. V. IV. 1. 2-3 ( nanu yadyeka evāyam maheśvarar-  
ūpa ātmā kasya bandhaḥ ? Īśvara vyatirikto hi anyo' sti ? )
22. I. P. V., IV. 1. 3-4.
23. P. H., pp. 62-64, L. N. Sharma, Kāśmīra Śaivism,  
p. 225.
24. T. A., 1. 24 ( na hi Bauddhājñānamātra nivṛttau mokṣo  
bhavet ).